Baptiste v. DeKalb Cnty. Sheriff

360 Ga.App. 345

861 S.E.2d 212

BAPTISTE

v.DeKalb County Sheriff, Jeffrey L. MANN, in His Official Capacity.

A21A0361

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 29, 2021

Cheryl B. Legare, Amelia Anne Ragan, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Laura Karen Johnson, Nikisha Lynette McDonald, for Appellee.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

Anton I. Baptiste, plaintiff in the wrongful-termination case below, appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, DeKalb County Sheriff Jeffrey L. Mann, in his official capacity. In five enumerations of error, Baptiste argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Mann because he presented a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act and carried his burden of presenting evidence that Sheriff Mann's stated reason for terminating him was pretextual. We agree and therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

(Footnote omitted.) Caldon v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. , 311 Ga. App. 155, 715 S.E.2d 487 (2011).

So viewed, the record shows that in the spring of 2014, Jeffrey Mann, a chief deputy for the Dekalb County Sheriff's Office, was campaigning for the July 22, 2014 Dekalb County Sheriff's election. Baptiste worked in various positions at the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office from 2001 until his termination on July 24, 2014. He served as an investigator in the Office of Professional Standards ("OPS") from 2003 to 2012 and as a sergeant in the Jail Division from 2012 to 2014.

On January 30, 2014, Baptiste was the supervisor on duty when Detention Officer Anthony Dozier used excessive force against inmate Joseph Sims ("Dozier/Sims Incident"). Baptiste prepared a written statement, as per the proper procedure, and he also reported the incident directly to the Assistant Commander of OPS, Lieutenant Christopher Patterson. According to Patterson, Baptiste was concerned the Jail Division would attempt to shield Officer Dozier from criminal prosecution. Patterson assigned OPS Investigator Rodney Scandrett to investigate the Dozier/Sims Incident.

Shortly thereafter, on February 10, 2014, Baptiste's supervisor, Captain Roderick Morgan, prepared a written counseling disciplinary action recommendation form against Baptiste for the Dozier/Sims Incident. On the form, Morgan alleged that Baptiste was guilty of neglect of duty for failing to remove Dozier from the scene. Additionally, according to Baptiste, after he contacted Patterson, Morgan told him that he should never contact OPS about anything that happens in the jail, because "[w]e're going to take care of our own in the jail."

Baptist then prepared a rebuttal memo. In the memo, Baptiste recounted the events of the Dozier/Sims Incident and explained why he disagreed with Morgan's assertion that he failed to take appropriate supervisory action. Baptiste also stated that he had contacted OPS to advise them of the use of force violation. In addition, Baptiste discussed two previous use of force incidents at the jail, alleging that those scenes were far greater examples of sergeants failing to supervise their subordinate officers, and asserting that the incidents had not been properly reported and that the individuals had not been appropriately disciplined. He suggested that, in questionable use of force incidents, the Sheriff's Office should consider obtaining "assistance from [an] outside entity that specializes in civil rights violations."

In May 2014, Patterson followed up with Investigator Scandrett and learned that he had not conducted any investigation at all into the Dozier/Sims Incident. Patterson then contacted Morgan and asked about the status of the Jail Division's use of force package on the Dozier/Sims Incident.¹ Morgan responded that the Jail Division would "handle it on [its] own." During the same time period, Investigator Scandrett repeatedly told Patterson, "[T]hey will take care of you and Baptiste after the election." Patterson understood these statements to mean that, once Mann was elected as Sheriff, the Sheriff's Office command staff would target Patterson and Baptiste for their efforts to seek accountability for the use of force complaints in the Jail Division.

In May 2014, Baptiste met with Xernia Fortson, the chief of administration of the Dekalb County Sheriff's Office, and told her that civil rights violations were occurring in the jail and that they were not being referred to the District Attorney for possible prosecution. According to Fortson, she was "completely unfamiliar with" the things Baptiste was discussing. Following the meeting, Fortson called Patterson and told him that Baptiste had reported to her that civil rights violations were occurring at the jail and not being referred to the District Attorney. Fortson asked Patterson if Baptiste had reported such violations to him, and Patterson confirmed that Baptiste had made such reports.

In June or July 2014, a former Sheriff's Office employee told Baptiste that two doctors had resigned because Fortson told them to recycle inmate medication by giving medicine prescribed to one inmate to another inmate. On July 8, 2014, Baptiste contacted Dr. William Brickhouse, the Mental Health Director for the vendor that supplies counseling services at the jail, and asked if he was aware of any medication being recycled and whether he knew the names of the doctors who had resigned. Brickhouse found the call to be an inappropriate "political solicitation" because Baptiste seemed to be "fishing for dirt" on Fortson and Mann, who was campaigning for Sheriff, and Baptiste mentioned a desire to "stop th[e] reign of terror" by Fortson and Mann. Brickhouse prepared a written report of the phone call and sent it to Baptiste's supervisors.

Baptiste's supervisors subsequently questioned him about his conversation with Brickhouse. Specifically, Baptiste was asked whether he spoke with any sworn, non-sworn, or civilian personnel to obtain negative information about command staff. Baptiste denied doing so. Morgan, however, concluded that Baptiste had violated the office's policies against public criticism of the office and for truthfulness/cooperation, and he recommended that Baptiste be disciplined immediately. Chief Deputy Reginald Scandrett, a commander in the Jail Division, asked Baptiste why he had contacted Brickhouse and whether he had used the phrase "reign of terror." Baptiste was evasive but ultimately admitted that he was conducting an investigation and that he had used the phrase.

The sheriff's election was held on July 22, 2014. Baptiste was terminated two days later, and, three days later, Patterson was demoted and transferred out of OPS. Ultimately, it was Sheriff Mann who decided to terminate Baptiste, but both Fortson and Chief Scandrett agreed with the decision.

Baptiste filed the instant suit against Sheriff Mann in his official capacity, alleging that his termination violated the Georgia Whistleblower Act ("GWA") and asserting a claim for attorney fees. Mann moved for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issue of material fact remained on Baptiste's claim because (1) Baptiste's reports of excessive use of force and the alleged medication recycling were not "disclosures" within the meaning of the GWA; (2) the alleged disclosures were not causally connected to Baptiste's termination; (3) Baptiste's violation of the office's policies on public criticism and truthfulness/cooperation was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Baptiste's termination; and (4) Baptiste could not show that the proffered reason for his termination was pretextual.² The trial court granted the motion after a hearing, and Baptiste filed this appeal.

The Georgia Whistleblower Act, OCGA § 45-1-1 et seq. , prohibits a public employer from retaliating "against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency, unless the disclosure was made with knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity." OCGA § 45-1-4 (d) (2). To succeed on a claim under the GWA, a public employee must establish "that (1) [he] was employed by a public employer; (2) [he] made a protected disclosure or objection; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there is some causal relationship between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Murray-Obertein v. Ga. Govt. Transparency and Campaign Finance Comm. , 344 Ga. App. 677, 680-681, 812 S.E.2d 28 (2018).

When analyzing claims brought under the Georgia Whistleblower Act, we apply the same burden-shifting analysis established by the United States Supreme Court for retaliation cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U. S. 792, 802-803 (II), 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.E[d.]2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of retaliation. If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. If the employer successfully meets this burden of production, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that each proffered reason was pretext.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Franklin v. Pitts , 349 Ga. App. 544, 547, 826 S.E.2d 427 (2019). When analyzing cases under the McDonnell Douglas framework, we have previously relied on, and found persuasive, cases from the Eleventh Circuit. Tuohy v. City of Atlanta , 331 Ga. App. 846, 851 (3) (a) n.6, 771 S.E.2d 501 ...