Barboza v. Mercedes-Benz U.S., LLC

CRYSTAL M. BARBOZA, Plaintiff v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, MERCEDES-BENZ OF BAKERSFIELD, and DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendants

No. 1:22-CV-0845 AWI CDB

United States District Court, E.D. California

December 27, 2022

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

(DOC. NO. 7)

This case arises out of the sale of an allegedly defective Mercedes-Benz automobile. Plaintiff Crystal M. Barboza brings claims under the California Song-Beverley Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq.), the California Commercial Code, the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.), and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) (15 U.S.C. § 2300 et seq.). Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (“MBU”) removed this case from the Kern County Superior Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction through the MMWA claim. Currently before the Court is MBU's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and/or Rule 12(f) motion to strike. For the reasons that follow, MBU's motion to dismiss will be granted, and the entire Complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.

RULE 12(b)(6) FRAMEWORK

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 41 F.4th 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2022). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). However, complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1145. The Court is “not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs cannot “rely on anticipated discovery to satisfy Rules 8 and 12(b)(6); rather, pleadings must assert well-pleaded factual allegations to advance to discovery.” Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2021). If a motion to dismiss is granted, “[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made . . . .” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

From the Complaint, on August 21, 2021, Barboza purchased a Mercedes Benz CLA 250 with a VIN ending in 464 (“the Vehicle”). Defendants provided a written warranty that the Vehicle would be free from defects of material and workmanship and that they would remedy any defects through an authorized repair center. Further, the Vehicle is subject to the implied warranty of merchantability. However, the vehicle had defects, malfunctions, and non-conformities. The Vehicle did not comply with written or implied warranties, and Defendants failed to remedy the defects, properly repair the Vehicle, replace the Vehicle, or refund the purchase price to Barboza. As a result, Barboza was harmed. The Complaint alleges that the Vehicle was a 2021 Mercedes Benz automobile. However, the sales contract, which is an exhibit to Defendants' notice of removal, indicates that the Vehicle had over 13,000 miles, was used, and was a 2020 model year. See Doc. No. 1-2.^[1]

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

Defendant's Argument

MBU argues that the first two causes of action (Song-Beverly Act claims) against it fail. Express warranty liability under Song-Beverly requires that a new vehicle be at issue, but the Vehicle sold to Barboza was a used car. Further, while Song-Beverly does provide for implied warranties regarding used goods, such warranties are against the distributors and retailers, not manufacturers like MBU.

MBU argues that the third cause of action (Commercial Code express warranty) fails because such a claim required Barboza to provide notice of a breach of warranty. However, the Complaint does not allege that Barboza gave any notice after discovering any breaches of warranty. Additionally, no plausible breach of express warranty is alleged because the Complaint does not allege any facts necessary to describe or support this claim.

MBU argues that the fourth cause of action (MMWA) fails for similar reasons. There are no factual allegations that describe the warranty at issue or how the warranty was breached. Further, because the substantive scope of the MMWA relies on state law warranties, the failure of Barboza to allege any valid state law warranty claims necessarily means that the MMWA claim must also fail.

MBU argues that the fifth cause of action fails to plead a plausible UCL claim under any of the three independent UCL prongs. First, the Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the heightened pleading standard for fraudulent or unfair conduct; instead, the Complaint makes conclusory allegations. Second, because no other claims are plausibly pled, the Complaint fails to allege unlawful conduct. Third, with respect to unfair conduct, there are no allegations that explain how any harm caused by unfair conduct outweighs any benefit the conduct may have. Finally, because Barboza has adequate remedies at law for her harm, she cannot pursue equitable remedies, including injunctive relief, through the UCL.

MBU argues that these shortcomings cannot be cured through amendment. Therefore, these claims should be dismissed without leave to amend.

Plaintiff's Opposition

Barboza filed no opposition or response to MBU's motion.

Discussion 1. First & Second Causes of Action - Song Beverly Act

The Song-Beverly Act, which is popularly known as California's automobile lemon law, is a strongly pro-consumer law aimed at protecting consumers. See Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterps., Inc., 17 Cal.4t h 985 990 (1998); Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 500 (2022). The Song-Beverly Act regulates warranty terms and imposes service and repair obligations on those who issue warranties. See Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 217 (2022)2; see also Joyce v. Ford Motor Co., 198 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486 (2011).

a. Express Warranty & “Refund and Replace”

Barboza seeks relief under the “refund and replace” provisions of the Song-Beverly Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.^[2](d)(2)) which requires manufacturers to refund or replace a “new motor vehicle” if the vehicle cannot be repaired so as to conform with an express warranty. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2). “New motor vehicle” is a defined term under the Song-Beverly Act that includes an “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2). Recently, a California court of appeal examined the statutory history and framework of the “refund and replace” provisions and the definition of “new motor vehicle” in particular. See Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 219-225. Rodriguez concluded that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” refers to “cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance [left on] the original warranty.” Id. at 225. A number of district courts have examined Rodriguez as persuasive authority and adopted its reasoning. E.g. Edwards v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182894, *5-*7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2022); Pineda v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135400, *8-*9 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2022); Fish v. Tesla, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87065, *31-*32 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2022). After review, the Court agrees with these cases and the reasoning of Rodriguez.

Here although the Complaint alleges that Barboza bought a 2021 Mercedes-Benz in August 2021, i.e. a new car, that is contrary to the purchase agreement (which, again, is attached to the notice of removal) and the express and repeated representations of MBU that the Vehicle is used. In the absence of an opposition, the Court will credit the representations of MBU and the purchase agreement and view the Vehicle for purposes of this motion as a used vehicle. Under Rodriguez, unless the Vehicle was sold to Barboza with a new express warranty, or the original warranty was expressly extended to the Vehicle, the express warranty that accompanied the Vehicle during its first sale does not apply to Barboza. See Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 225. The Complaint alleges that an express written warranty exists, but it does not identify the terms of any express warranty, specifically describe the Vehicle's malfunctions/explain how the Vehicle failed to conform to a particular term of the express warranty, or explain how Defendants...