Barbuto v. Syracuse Univ.

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THEODORE BARBUTO, Plaintiff, v. SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY and MARY PAT GRYZMALA, individually and in her official capacity, Defendants.

No. 5:23-CV-245

United States District Court, N.D. New York

July 24, 2024

MARK DAVID SHIRIAN P.C. ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

BARCLAY DAMON LLP ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

OF COUNSEL: MARK SHIRIAN, ESQ. EDWARD G. MELVIN, ESQ.

DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD ^[1] UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 23, 2023, plaintiff Theodore Barbuto (“Mr Barbuto” or “plaintiff') filed this civil action against Syracuse University (“Syracuse U”) and Mary Pat Grzymala (“Gryzmala”) (collectively “defendants”) for employment discrimination. Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Barbuto's seven-count complaint asserts claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “Rehabilitation Act”), Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), and related portions of New York state law. Id.

On April 26, 2023, defendants moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Mr. Barbuto's complaint in its entirety. Dkt. No. 8. The motion has been fully briefed and will be considered without oral argument. Dkt. Nos. 12, 14.

II. BACKGROUND

In September 2016, Mr. Barbuto began working for Syracuse U in food service.^[2] Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. Thereafter, Syracuse U promoted Mr. Barbuto to work as a custodian in September 2019. Id. ¶ 17.

In December 2019, Mr. Barbuto's now-husband was diagnosed with depression and anxiety related to his status as HIV-positive.^[3] Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff and his husband were married the following summer on June 20, 2020. Id. ¶ 20.

In March 2021, Syracuse U approved Mr. Barbuto's request to take FMLA leave to care for his husband. Compl. ¶ 21. As his husband's caretaker, plaintiff assisted his husband with his medication, bathing, driving, and other household duties. Id.

That fall, Mr. Barbuto elected to take advantage of one of his fringe benefits as a Syracuse U employee-remitted tuition. Compl. ¶ 23. But as plaintiff attempted to register for spring classes, Syracuse U imposed a stipulation (the “Stipulation”) on plaintiff that directed him not to attend classes on any day that he called out of work to exercise his FMLA benefits or otherwise in December 2021. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. According to plaintiff, this Stipulation was the first of its kind. Id. ¶ 29.

In April 2022, Mr. Barbuto made several verbal and written complaints to Syracuse U personnel claiming that he felt he was being discriminated against on the basis of his FMLA status, caregiver status, associational disability, and sexual orientation.^[4] Compl. ¶ 39. During plaintiff's in-person meeting with Cathy Bottari (“Bottari”) on March 31, 2022, Bottari assured plaintiff that the stipulation would be removed. Id. ¶ 40. Bottari followed up by sending plaintiff a copy of a revised class arrangement without the stipulation on April 4, 2022. Id. But the Stipulation remained in place until April 12, 2022. Id. ¶ 41. This lawsuit followed.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Forjone v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 414 F.Supp.3d 292, 297-98 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be either facial or fact-based. Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).

Facial Rule 12(b)(1) motions are “based solely on the allegations of the complaint . . . and exhibits attached to it[.]” Id. To resolve a facial motion, the district court must “determine whether the pleading alleges facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has standing to sue.” Id. (cleaned up). In doing so, the district court “must accept the complaint's allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Wagner v. Hyra, 518 F.Supp.3d 613, 623 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Nicholas v. Trump, 433 F.Supp.3d 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)). By contrast, a defendant who makes a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion submits extrinsic evidence. Carter, 822 F.3d at 57. If defendant's extrinsic evidence reveals a dispute of fact whether jurisdiction is proper, plaintiff must proffer evidence to controvert defendant's evidence. Id. To resolve a fact-based motion, the district court must then make findings of fact to determine whether plaintiff has standing to sue. Id.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to elevate the plaintiffs right to relief above the level of speculation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). So while legal conclusions can provide a framework for the complaint, they must be supported with meaningful allegations of fact. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). In short, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

To assess this plausibility requirement, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in the pleading, any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).

IV. DISCUSSION

Mr. Barbuto's complaint sets forth claims for employment discrimination under the FMLA (Counts I and II), the Rehabilitation Act (Count V), the ADA (Count VI), the New York State Human Rights Law (the “NYSHRL”) (Counts III and VII) as well as a claim for negligent hiring under New York state common law (Count IV). Compl. ¶¶ 49-111. Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Defs.' Mem. at 10-22.^[5] Defendants motion raises both jurisdictional defects and merits-related questions.^[6] The Court will address defendants' jurisdictional arguments first, before turning to the merits of plaintiff's remaining claims.

A. Rehabilitation Act (Count V)

First, defendants argue that Mr. Barbuto lacks standing to bring a Rehabilitation Act claim. Defs.' Mem. at 18-19.

Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). As relevant here, the Second Circuit has recognized “associational discrimination” claims brought under Rehabilitation Act by plaintiffs who suffer an “independent injury causally related to the denial of federally required services to the disabled persons with whom the non-disabled plaintiffs are associated.” Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 279 (2d Cir. 2009) (Wesley, J. concurring and writing for the Court as to this issue).

Upon review, Mr. Barbuto lacks standing to bring his Rehabilitation Act claim. While plaintiff alleges that his husband is disabled within the meaning of the Act, plaintiff does not allege that his husband was denied any federally required services. See Compl. ¶ 19. Thus, plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act claim cannot survive this motion to dismiss absent any allegation that his husband suffered a deprivation of rights himself. Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 280 (Wesley, J. concurring and writing for the Court as to this issue) (“This does not relieve the person aggrieved of establishing an injury causally related to, but separate and distinct from, a disabled person's injury under the statute.”)

Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim will be granted.^[7]

C. ADA (Count VI)

Defendants also seek dismissal of Mr. Barbuto's ADA claim. Defs.' Mem. at 20-22. Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it has been rendered moot by the removal of the Stipulation. Id.

“Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only where there is a live controversy and must dismiss a case when the issue between the parties becomes moot.” Lallave v. Martinez, 609 F.Supp.3d 164, 173 (E.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 635 F.Supp.3d 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). “A case becomes moot-and therefore no longer a ‘Case' or ‘Controversy' for purposes of Article III-when the issues presented are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (cleaned up).

As relevant here, where the defendants have voluntarily ceased the allegedly unlawful conduct, the case is not ordinarily rendered moot because the defendants might resume the same conduct. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 815 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2015). Thus, a court will only find that the defendants' voluntary cessation of the allegedly unlawful conduct rendered the case moot when “(1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur[;] and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Saba v. Cuomo, 535 F.Supp.3d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 109 F.Supp.3d 626, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). It is the defendants' burden to persuade the court that their conduct “cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).

To begin, there is no...