Barfield v. SandRidge Energy, Inc.

630 S.W.3d 109

John BARFIELD and Tana Barfield, Wife, Individually, and John Barfield and Tana Barfield as Next Friends of C. B. and K. B., Minor Children, Appellants,

v.SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC., and Jose "Pepe" Saenz, Appellees.

No. 08-17-00059-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

March 27, 2020

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS, William W. Clifton, Jr., Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc., 700 N. Grant Ave., Suite 201, Odessa, TX 79761, Dana Brooke Levy, Thad D. Spalding, Durham, Pittard & Spalding, LLP, P.O. Box 224626, Dallas, TX 75222.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES, William W. Clifton, Jr., Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc., 700 N. Grant Ave., Suite 201, Odessa, TX 79761, Michael Choyke, Wright & Close, LLP, One Riverway, Ste. 2200, Houston, TX 77056.

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

OPINION ON REHEARING

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

We previously issued our Opinion on December 6, 2019. Appellees SandRidge Energy, Inc. (SandRidge) and Jose "Pepe" Saenz jointly filed a motion for rehearing on January 13, 2020. After reviewing the motion for rehearing and response thereto, we grant the motion for rehearing, in part, and deny the remainder. We withdraw our Opinion and Judgment issued on December 6, 2019 and issue the following Opinion on Rehearing.

In this case of premises liability, Appellants John Barfield¹ and Tana Barfield (collectively, Barfield) challenge the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of SandRidge Energy, Inc. (SandRidge) and Jose "Pepe" Saenz. By his suit, Barfield alleged he was electrocuted while working for an independent contractor on an improvement located on property owned and controlled by SandRidge. On appeal, Barfield argues that he carried his burden to produce evidence raising genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law on the statutory elements required to impose liability on SandRidge, a property owner, pursuant to chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 95.001 - .004. As to Saenz, however, Barfield concedes the validity of the trial court's summary judgment in his favor even though he initially challenged that ruling on appeal.

We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND²

On the occasion in question, SandRidge operated oil and gas leases in Andrews County, Texas, as an energy-production company. Additional to owning property and improvements thereon, SandRidge owned the substation and distribution lines on its property which provided electrical power to its operations. SandRidge hired OTI Electrical Services, LLC (OTI), to modify a series of distribution lines attached to electrical poles on the property. Barfield worked as a lineman employed by OTI.

Pursuant to a master services agreement, OTI performed electrical work for SandRidge that generally involved the building of power lines to support new wells drilled on its property. Barfield was assigned to work on the lease known as the SandRidge Miles Terry Steven #10 located on a portion of property referred to as the Arena Field. For SandRidge, electrical engineer Jose "Pepe" Saenz was assigned to supervise the work of Barfield and the other OTI crewmembers working in the field.

On January 11, 2012, Barfield was performing electrical work that included modifications to a distribution line that supplied electrical power to a series of wells when he sustained an injury that caused severe burns to his body. Barfield was working high above ground in a bucket—performing his work within four feet or so of an energized distribution line—removing "hot taps" to de-energize transformers. In his live pleading, Barfield alleged he sustained an electrical shock that rendered him unconscious and caused burns to both arms that were so severe that his left arm was amputated at the shoulder and his right arm was amputated at his forearm. Barfield alleged these injuries occurred because SandRidge and Saenz had "imposed a procedure on OTI to work on the energized end-bank pole of the distribution line which supplied power to pump jacks on the well site." Barfield claimed that SandRidge and Saenz would not "de-energize" their lines before electrical work was performed. Instead, he alleged, that SandRidge and Saenz required OTI and its employees to work on and around a live energy source in direct contravention of the safe work practices and regulatory requirements applicable not only to SandRidge's own employees but also to employees of its contractors. Barfield claimed he was informed "that ‘de-energizing’ the line would take multiple wells offline until the work was completed with resultant loss of production." Barfield alleged his injuries were caused by the negligence of both SandRidge and Saenz individually. Invoking chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Barfield asserted that SandRidge was liable for personal injuries based on the facts alleged given that SandRidge exercised control over the manner in which his work was performed on its property, that it had actual knowledge of a danger or condition existing on the property, and that it failed to adequately warn him of the same. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003.

Responding to Barfield's suit, both SandRidge and Saenz generally denied Barfield's allegations while additionally asserting several affirmative defenses. Among defenses, both defendants asserted that Barfield's action against them failed pursuant to section 95.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id. § 95.003. Based on proportionate responsibility, SandRidge and Saenz additionally asserted that Barfield's own negligence was the proximate cause of the occurrence in question and resulting damages. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001 -.003.

Following a period of discovery, SandRidge and Saenz jointly filed a hybrid motion for summary judgment combining both traditional and no-evidence grounds pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) and (i). Pursuant to chapter 95, SandRidge argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on four grounds. First, that SandRidge did not owe a duty to warn Barfield or his employer about the allegedly dangerous condition on its premises (i.e. the presence of energized lines at the poles where Barfield was working as an independent contractor) because the evidence conclusively established that Barfield and OTI knew about this condition. Second, even if SandRidge owed a duty to warn Barfield about the energized poles, the evidence conclusively established that SandRidge did not fail to adequately warn Barfield of this condition as he admitted that he and OTI knew they were working on energized poles. Third, that SandRidge did not have actual knowledge of any other allegedly dangerous condition on its premises that may have resulted in Barfield's injuries, to wit: that the maximum voltage in the lines was higher than expected due to the structure of the poles. Fourth, that SandRidge did not exercise or retain control over the manner in which Barfield or OTI performed their work.

Independent of SandRidge, Saenz argued that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he was acting solely within the scope of his employment. Moreover, Saenz asserted he did not owe a duty to Barfield given that he did not own or control the premises at issue, nor did he engage in any contemporaneous activity that caused Barfield's injury. Both SandRidge and Saenz included summary judgment evidence in support of their motions to include the master services agreement between SandRidge and OTI, certain documents produced in discovery, and testimony from witnesses who were deposed.

Responding with his own evidence, Barfield asserted he raised issues of fact precluding judgment as a matter of law as to the statutory elements required by chapter 95 to impose liability upon SandRidge, under limited conditions, for an alleged failure to provide a safe workplace. In its entirety, however, Barfield's response focused solely on the liability of SandRidge without contesting Saenz’ independent assertion that he owed no duty of care to Barfield given he had merely worked as an employee of SandRidge.

By written order, the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment of both SandRidge and Saenz without providing explanation. Subsequently, Barfield filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial, which the trial court later denied. Thereafter, Barfield filed a timely appeal of the trial court's order.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Barfield raises two issues challenging the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SandRidge. Simultaneously, however, he abandons the related challenge he asserted against the judgment granted in favor of Saenz.³ Barfield seeks reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that SandRidge owed a duty to make its premises safe given that (1) SandRidge had actual knowledge of the hazard of Barfield's necessary work in close proximity to energized power lines, (2) SandRidge failed to adequately warn, and (3) SandRidge exercised "some control" over how Barfield and OTI performed their work. Barfield essentially argues he met the evidentiary burden of chapter 95 to raise issues of fact on whether the limited conditions of the statute were satisfied to impose liability on SandRidge for an alleged failure to make its premises safe. Being that both issues are intertwined with statutory requirements, we consider them together for brevity.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) ; Chappell v. Allen , 414 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). A party seeking summary judgment may move for both a traditional and a no-evidence summary judgment. Binur v. Jacobo , 135 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex. 2004) ; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i). When a party has...