Barfield v. Streeval

1

CHRISTOPHER BARFIELD, Petitioner, v. J. C. STREEVAL, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 7:21-cv-00190

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division

May 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Elizabeth K. Dillon, United States District Judge

Christopher Barfield, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241, alleging that his continued detention is unconstitutional. Barfield asserts that under Rehaif v United States, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), his 2010 conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is invalid. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000) (hereinafter “Jones”) (allowing § 2241 challenge to federal conviction). Respondent filed a response in opposition and a request for dismissal (Dkt. No. 12), arguing that the petition should be dismissed because the court lacks jurisdiction over it, Barfield has procedurally defaulted his claims, and his claims fail on the merits. Barfield filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 16.)

Shortly after the response was filed, the court granted Barfield's first motion to amend (Dkt. No. 11), noting that it would consider the additional arguments he raised in that motion and giving respondent the opportunity to file a supplemental response. (Dkt. No. 15.) Respondent filed a supplemental response, to which Barfield has not responded.

Also pending before the court is Barfield's second motion to amend. (Dkt. No. 17.) The court will grant that motion insofar as it will consider the additional arguments he raises therein. After considering all the briefing, including Barfield's supplemental filings, the court concludes that jurisdiction is lacking over Barfield's § 2241 petition. Thus, the court will dismiss the petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2007, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Barfield with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c). See generally United States v. Barfield, Case No. 2:07-cr-00481-ER (E.D. Pa.).^[1]

Barfield elected to go to trial, and the jury convicted him of the offense. At sentencing, the United States provided certified copies of Barfield's prior adult convictions. These showed that he previously had been convicted of four charges of manufacturing with the intent to deliver a controlled substance in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 30, 36-48, Dkt. No. 13.) His sentences were expressed in ranges. For example, on each of his first two offenses, he was sentenced to “time served to 23 months, ” but he was granted parole on the day he was sentenced. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 39.) He also was sentenced for his third and fourth offenses on the same day, although the offenses were committed on different days. For each, he was sentenced to serve 18 months to 3 years. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 46.) He spent almost three full years in custody for those two offenses.

Because of these prior convictions, Barfield was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which sets forth increased sentencing penalties for persons with three prior serious drug offenses or violent felonies. Barfield, ECF No. 58, at 3. His applicable guideline range was 262 to 327 months. United States v. Barfield, 348 Fed.Appx. 743, 744 (3d Cir. 2009). The court sentenced Barfield to 300 months' imprisonment on April 23, 2008. Barfield, ECF No. 46.

Barfield appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. Barfield, 348 Fed.Appx. at 746. Barfield's petition for rehearing en banc and his petition for writ of certiorari both were denied. The Third Circuit issued its mandate on April 12, 2010.

In February 2011, Barfield filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. Barfield, ECF Nos. 56, 65. The sentencing court also denied a number of arguments raised for the first time in his reply brief, finding them untimely. Id., ECF No. 65. The Third Circuit denied Barfield a certificate of appealability. Id., ECF No. 71.

On June 8, 2020, Barfield filed a successive § 2255 petition, and he raised the same arguments he asserts in the § 2241 petition before this court. The district court transferred the successive petition to the Third Circuit to determine whether the district court could consider it. Id., ECF No. 74. After Barfield failed to prosecute his appeal, the Third Circuit dismissed the case. Id., ECF Nos. 75, 76.

Barfield's § 2241 petition was received by the Clerk of this court on April 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.) In it, Barfield challenges his felon-in-possession conviction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for certain individuals to possess firearms. “The provision lists nine categories of individuals subject to the prohibition, including felons ....A separate provision, § 924(a)(2), adds that anyone who ‘knowingly' violates the first provision shall be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years.” Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2194; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that “the word ‘knowingly' applies both to the defendant's conduct and to the defendant's status. To convict a defendant, the Government therefore must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S.Ct. at 2194.

Barfield asserts three related arguments, all relying on Rehaif. First, he makes a sufficiency of the evidence argument, contending that the government failed to prove at trial that he knew he was a prohibited person. Second, he asserts that the indictment was constitutionally deficient because it failed to allege that Barfield knew he was a prohibited person. Third, he claims that he was not properly convicted because the jury was not instructed that they had to find he knew he was a prohibited person. (Pet. 6-7, Dkt. No. 1.)

For relief, Barfield requests that this court reduce his sentence to time served and release him immediately. Alternatively, he requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated and that the trial court be permitted to retry him. (Pet. 8.)

In his supplemental filings, Barfield primarily explains why he believes he can satisfy the Jones test and why he believes Rehaif is retroactive. He also elaborates upon his three primary arguments. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 11, 17.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Barfield's § 2241 Petition.

Typically, a petitioner challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence must proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district where he was convicted. However, the “savings clause” in § 2255 allows a prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction and/or his sentence by filing a § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus, if he demonstrates that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).^[2] “[T]he remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion.” In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).

In Jones, the Fourth Circuit explained that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of a conviction when:

(1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

328 F.3d at 333-34.

The requirements of the savings clause are jurisdictional. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2018). Thus, a § 2241 petitioner relying on the savings clause to challenge his conviction must satisfy each prong of the Jones test for the district court to have jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the petitioner's claims. Id. at 426-29. Although the court must apply the procedural standard in Jones, “[i]n evaluating the substantive law in a § 2255(e) savings clause analysis, the court must ‘look to the substantive law of the circuit where a defendant was convicted.'” Hahn v. Moseley, 931 F.3d 295, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2019). In this case, Barfield was convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is within the Third Circuit. Thus, Third Circuit substantive law governs Barfield's petition, but the court looks to Fourth Circuit law concerning the availability of § 2241. See id.

Respondent's opposition first notes that respondent disagrees with the Fourth Circuit's “substantive framework” as to what claims can be brought in a § 2241 petition and believes that “Jones and its progeny are wrongly decided, ” preserving that issue for appeal. (Opp'n 9, Dkt. No. 12.) Respondent next moves to dismiss the petition based on the court's lack of jurisdiction. In particular, although respondent acknowledges that Barfield's claim satisfies the first and third Jones requirements, (id. at 9 n.5), he argues that Barfield's § 2241 petition fails to meet the second. (Id. at 9-12.) Respondent also contends that, even if the court had jurisdiction, Barfield has procedurally defaulted his claims and failed to show cause and prejudice or “actual innocence” so as to overcome that default. (Id. at 12-18.) Lastly, respondent maintains that Barfield's Rehaif claim fails on its merits. (Id. at 18-19.)

The court agrees with respondent-and with the vast majority of district courts...