Barker v. Young

151 Hawai‘i 312

511 P.3d 811

Phillip J. BARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Christopher YOUNG, Administrator, Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center, Defendant-Appellee

NO. CAAP-21-0000098

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i.

MAY 11, 2022

On the briefs:

Samuel P. King, Jr. for Plaintiff-Appellant

Candace J. Park Deputy Attorney General for Defendant-Appellee

LEONARD, PRESIDING JUDGE, HIRAOKA AND NAKASONE, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKASONE, J.

This appeal considers the application of the expungement statute to a person convicted of a violation. The pertinent statute, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS ) § 831-3.2(a)¹ provides that "a person arrested for, or charged with but not convicted of a crime," is entitled to have his or her arrest record expunged (expungement statute ). At issue is whether the word "crime" used in the expungement statute has an ordinary meaning, or, whether the Hawai‘i Penal Code (Penal Code or Code ) provision in HRS § 701-107(5) that "[a] violation does not constitute a crime," applies.

Plaintiff-Appellant Phillip J. Barker (Barker ) appeals from the (1) Judgment; and (2) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Order Granting Summary Judgment ), both entered and filed on March 1, 2021 by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court ).²

On appeal, Barker contends that the Circuit Court erred in granting Defendant-Appellee Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center's (HCJDC ) Motion for Summary Judgment, in which HCJDC argued that its denial of Barker's expungement application where Barker was convicted of a violation, was appropriate as a matter of law.

We hold that based on Barker's conviction for a disorderly conduct violation, Barker was convicted of a "crime" under HRS § 831-3.2(a) ; Barker was thus ineligible for expungement, and the Circuit Court did not err in denying Barker's expungement application. We conclude that the legislative history of the word "crime" in the expungement statute shows that the term was intended to have an ordinary meaning that does include "violations," even though the terms "crime" and "violation" are separate and distinct under the Penal Code. We therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal arises out of Barker's October 19, 2020 First Amended Complaint³ seeking a judgment and order in the nature of mandamus to HCJDC directing HCJDC to expunge Barker's arrest record pursuant to HRS § 831-3.2. The following undisputed facts⁴ were adduced from cross-motions for summary judgment filed on January 2, 2021 and January 8, 2021, and from the declarations of Barker and HCJDC Administrator Christopher Young (Young ) attached to those motions.

On October 7, 2017, Barker was arrested for the offense of Harassment pursuant to HRS § 711-1106, which classifies the offense as a petty misdemeanor.⁵ On November 21, 2017, Barker was found guilty of the amended charge of Disorderly Conduct Noise Substantial Harm Persist After Warning (Disorderly Conduct ) and fined $200.00 pursuant to HRS § 711-1101(1)(b), which classifies the offense as a violation according to HRS § 711-1101(3).⁶ On June 20, 2019, Barker submitted an application to HCJDC to have his Harassment arrest record expunged pursuant to HRS § 831-3.2 because he was convicted of a "violation" and not a "crime." On September 19, 2019, HCJDC denied Barker's application for expungement on the basis that "arrests which result in a guilty conviction do not qualify for expungement under HRS [§] 831-3.2."

In Barker's motion for summary judgment, Barker argued that HRS § 701-107⁷ classified his Disorderly Conduct conviction as a "violation" and not as a "crime," which entitled Barker to have his record expunged pursuant to HRS § 831-3.2. HCJDC argued in its cross-motion for summary judgment that a "[v]iolation is a [c]rime;" and that "crime" in HRS § 831-3.2(a) should be read in "the general sense" and not in pari materia with HRS § 701-107 of the Penal Code, as the narrow definition of "crime" in the Code is "contrary to the objective of the expungement law and would lead to impractical results." HCJDC also relied on an unpublished order, Grindling v. Attorney Gen., No. SCPW-12-0000472, 2012 WL 1764177 (Haw. May 17, 2012) (Grindling Order ), in which the Hawai‘i Supreme Court denied a mandamus request for the expungement of arrest records where the petitioner was convicted of, inter alia , violations of the traffic code.

On January 28, 2021, the Circuit Court held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and the parties presented brief argument. On March 1, 2021, the Circuit Court filed its Order Granting Summary Judgment, which stated:

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

....

1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact; 2. Defendant HCJDC's denial of Plaintiff Barker's application for expungement of his October 7, 2017 arrest which resulted in a guilty conviction of Disorderly Conduct, a violation, was appropriate;

3. This finding is consistent with the Hawaii Supreme Court's unpublished decision in Grindling v. Attorney General, SCPW-12-0000472, 2012 WL 1764177, which is persuasive;

4. Plaintiff Barker has failed to prove that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Barker timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

On appeal, we review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai‘i 46, 55, 292 P.3d 1276, 1285 (2013) (citation omitted). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

B. Statutory Interpretation

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo. State v. Thompson, 150 Hawai‘i 262, 266, 500 P.3d 447, 451 (2021) (citation omitted).

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Second, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.

JD v. PD, 149 Hawai‘i 92, 96, 482 P.3d 555, 559 (App. 2021) (citation omitted). When a statute is ambiguous, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be determined by "examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such as legislative history, or the reason and spirit of the law." State v. Woodfall, 120 Hawai‘i 387, 394, 206 P.3d 841, 848 (2009) (citing State v. Bayly, 118 Hawai‘i 1, 7, 185 P.3d 186, 192 (2008) ).

III. DISCUSSION

Barker and HCJDC disagree on whether the word "crime" in the expungement statute has an ordinary meaning and includes a violation, or whether the Penal Code definition of "crime" in HRS § 701-107 that excludes a violation, applies.

On appeal, Barker specifically contends that the Circuit Court "erred in holding that the word ‘crime’ in HRS § 831-3.2(a) really means ‘offense’ as defined in the penal code." The Circuit Court, however, did not specifically hold that the word "crime" in HRS § 831-3.2(a) "really means ‘offense.’ " We address Barker's argument to the extent that he claims the Penal Code meaning of "crime" applies to HRS § 831-3.2. In his Opening Brief, Barker argues that "crime" in HRS § 831-3.2 should be defined as set forth in HRS § 701-107, which states that a violation is not a crime.⁸ Barker claims that "the legislature knew the meaning of the word ‘crime’ in the Penal Code when it enacted H.R.S. § 831-3.2 because it used the word ‘crime’ and ‘violation’ in subsection (a)."

HCJDC contends that:

When section 831-3.2(a) is read in its entirety, it is clear that "crime" is meant in its ordinary sense. This interpretation is bolstered by the way section 831-3.2 unfolds. It begins by stating the general rule that expungement orders should issue if there is no conviction, and is then followed by provisions of exceptions to the general rule; the exceptions cover the wide range of crimes in the ordinary sense: felonies, misdemeanors, petty misdemeanors and violations.

HCJDC points to the subsection (a)(2) five-year expungement exception for "violations" involving bail forfeitures, which HCJDC claims establishes that expungement law applies to violations generally. Urging against Barker's interpretation, HCJDC argues: "[h]aving an exception to the expungement law for violations, even though the expungement law does not apply to violations, is absurd." HCJDC also refers to the language of HRS § 846-2.5,⁹ which defines HCJDC's role in collecting, storing, disseminating and analyzing criminal justice data to enable "law enforcement to utilize the tools needed to prevent crimes and detect criminals in support of the right of the public to be free from crime and the fear of crime." (Emphases added). HCJDC maintains that because "[t]he general and popular use of the word crime includes violations," and because criminal justice data "includes information on violations," the "only logical interpretation" under expungement law "is to use the word crime in its ordinary sense." HCJDC also argues that the Grindling Order is persuasive authority that HRS § 832-3.2 applies to violations.¹⁰

A. The term "crime" in the expungement statute, HRS § 831-3.2(a), is ambiguous.

The term "crime" is not defined in the expungement statute. HRS §...