Barksdale v. Clarke

1

SHURON MAURICE BARKSDALE, Petitioner, v. HAROLD CLARKE, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 7:23-cv-00087

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division

March 4, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Elizabeth K. Dillon, United States District Judge

Shuron Maurice Barksdale filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2018 conviction and eighty-year prison sentence for drug distribution. (Habeas Pet., Dkt. No. 1.) Before the court is the respondent's motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 6.) For the reasons stated below, this motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2018, following a bench trial, petitioner was convicted on two counts of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Schedule I Drug (Heroin). (Resp't's Ex 1 at 132-33, Dkt. No. 8-6.) The trial court sentenced Barksdale to a total of eighty years in prison, with sixty years suspended, resulting in an active sentence of twenty years. (Id. at 487-89.)

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which denied his petition for appeal in orders dated August 15 and October 30, 2019. (Resp't's Ex. A at 54-67, Dkt. No. 8-1.) The Supreme Court of Virginia refused his petition for appeal on August 26, 2020. (Id. at 71.)

Barksdale filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia on August 24, 2021. (Resp't's Ex. C2 at 2, Dkt. No. 8-5.) The petition was denied on August 5, 2022. (Resp't's Ex. C3, Dkt. No. 8-8.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner alleges the following claims: (1) the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling with regard to the drugs at Barksdale's trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish Barksdale possessed a schedule I or II drug with the intent to distribute; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing Barksdale to an active sentence of 20 years; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the “chain of custody” for the drugs at Barksdale's trial; and (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the certificates of analysis as no forensic examiner testified to the contents of those certificates. (See Habeas Pet.)

B. Timeliness

Respondent first argues that this action is untimely. Section 2254 petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, running from the latest of four commencement dates enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), which in this instance is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondent argues that the petition is untimely by seven days, based on the reasoning that the limitations period began to run on November 24, 2020, the date upon which petitioner's time to seek a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired-90 days after the Supreme Court of Virginia refused Barksdale's petition for appeal on August 26, 2020.

This argument fails to account for the Supreme Court order extending the 90-day timeframe to 150 days during the COVID-19 pandemic, from March 19, 2020, through July 19, 2021. See Order of the United States Supreme Court of July 19, 2021, rescinding prior order of March 19, 2020.^[1]The March 19, 2020 order, now rescinded, provided that “the deadline to file any petition for a writ of certiorari due on or after the date of this order is extended to 150 days from the date of the lower court judgment, order denying discretionary review, or order denying a timely petition for rehearing.” See Order of the Supreme Court of March 19, 2020 (now rescinded) (emphasis added).^[2] Because Barksdale's petition for a writ of certiorari was due after March 19, 2020, based on a judgment or order entered prior to July 19, 2021,^[3] the limitations period for Barksdale's petition began to run 60 days later than contemplated by respondent's argument. Therefore, the court finds that the instant petition is timely filed.

C. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A federal court “may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner in state custody unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state remedies by presenting his claims to the highest state court.” Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, the petitioner must present to the state court the same operative facts and the same controlling legal principles that he seeks to present to the federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2002). Failure to do so “deprive[s] the state court of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). A petitioner must also present his federal claims to the appropriate state court in the manner required by the state court, so as to give the state court “a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). A state prisoner does not “fairly present” a claim for exhaustion purposes when the claim is raised in “a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered.” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989).

“A claim that has not been presented to the highest state court nevertheless may be treated as exhausted if it is clear that the claim would be procedurally barred under state law if the petitioner attempted to present it to the state court.” Baker, 220 F.3d at 288; see Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the procedural default doctrine as a “distinct but related limit on the scope of federal habeas review”). Simultaneous exhaustion and procedural default occurs “when a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust available state remedies and ‘the court to which petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.'” Breard, 134 F.3d at 619 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722). In that case, “the procedural bar that gives rise to exhaustion provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence, and thus prevents federal habeas review of the defaulted claim, unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default.” Baker, 220 F.3d at 288.

The court finds that Barksdale properly exhausted all claims except the third claim, that the trial court erred in sentencing him to 20 years. Barksdale raised this claim on direct appeal (see Resp't's Ex. 1 at 7), but then dropped the claim before the Supreme Court of Virginia (see Resp't's Ex. B1, Dkt. No. 8-2). This claim is simultaneously exhausted and procedurally defaulted because it is now too late to bring it in state court. See Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (providing that a habeas corpus petition “shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues”); Booker v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr., 727 S.E.2d 650, 651 (Va. 2012) (“The limitation period for habeas corpus petitions challenging revocation hearings is one year after the cause of action accrues,” which is the date “the circuit court entered the order under which petitioner is currently detained”); Sparrow v. Dir., Dep't of Corr., 439 F.Supp.2d 584, 587-88 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that Virginia Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) constituted an independent and adequate state law ground).^[4]

However, Barksdale's remaining claims were properly exhausted either on direct appeal or in the habeas petition filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia. (See Resp't's Exs. B1, C2.) Therefore, the court will address the merits of these claims.

D. Merits Standard of Review

Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a petitioner is entitled to relief only if the state court adjudication of their claim was [1] ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court'; or [2] ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.'” Allen v. Stephan, 42 F.4th 223, 246 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). “The role of a federal habeas court is to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not to apply de novo review to factual findings and to substitute its own opinions for the determinations made on the scene by the trial judge.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 276 (2015).

“Clearly established Federal law” for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). “A state court's decision is ‘contrary to' clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) when it ‘arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law' or ‘decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'” Allen, 42 F.4th at 246 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)). A state court's decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle but “‘unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). This standard is meant to be “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). “‘The ruling must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.'” Allen, 42 F.4th at 246 (quoting Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017)). The petitioner “must show that the state court's ruling was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing...