Barnaba v. Cnty. of San Diego

1

ALEXIS ANN BARNABA, as guardian ad litem for minor child and successor-in-interest A.N.Y.; and YVETTE YOUNG, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant.

No. 23-cv-01622-AJB-SBC

United States District Court, S.D. California

November 26, 2024

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. NO. 19)

HON ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Defendant County of San Diego's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Alexis Ann Barnaba, as guardian ad litem for minor child and successor-in-interest A.N.Y and Yvette Young's (collectively “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 19.) The motion is fully briefed, (Doc. Nos. 19, 21, and 22), and pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the instant matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the County's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' FAC.

I. BACKGROUND

The following allegations are accepted as true for the purposes of this Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion. This action arises out of the death of Chaz Guy Young-Villasenor (“Decedent”) while incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the San Diego County Central Jail. (FAC, Doc. No. 18, ¶ 7.) There, on May 5, 2022, Decedent died of “an overdose of . . . methamphetamine and/or fentanyl[.]” (Id. ¶ 27.)

Plaintiffs allege staff at Central Jail knew Decedent was “arrested for . . . possession of illicit narcotic drugs, knowing that he was a frequent illicit narcotic drug user and/or addict[.]” (Id. ¶ 20.) After ingesting “dangerous narcotic drugs[,]” Decedent “went into serious and obvious medical extremis” where he “collapsed in his jail cell . . . squirm[ed] and writhe[d] on his jail cell floor for several hours . . . and ultimately died.” (Id. ¶ 27.)

Plaintiffs now bring this case individually and as Decedent's successor-in-interest against: (1) the County; (2) Does 1-6 (whom Plaintiffs allege are “sworn peace officers and/or deputy sheriffs and/or Custodial Officers and/or Special Officers and/or police officers and/or supervisors and/or investigators . . . and/or Sheriff's Aids and/or Nurses and/or Doctors and/or other health officials and/or dispatchers and/or some other public officers, officials or employees of defendant COUNTY and/or some other public entity”); and (3) Does 7-10 (whom Plaintiffs allege “are supervisors and policy-making officials, including the Sheriff of the County of San Diego, the Undersheriff of San Diego County, the Sheriff's Assistant Sheriffs, Commanders, Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Detectives and/or other Supervisory personnel employed by COUNTY and/or the County Executive Officer and/or Members of the Board of Supervisors of San Diego County, and/or Doctors and/or Nurses and/or other County Health Personnel / Officers / Officials and other County Officers / Officials”). (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.)

Plaintiffs present four factual theories about Defendants' involvement in Decedent's death: (1) Decedent was “sold or otherwise provided with dangerous narcotic drugs by DOES” while in-custody and confined as a Pretrial Detainee, (id. ¶ 19); (2) Decedent was provided such drugs by “inmates” with “DOES 1 through 3 . . . knowing that said inmates at the jail were providing said dangerous narcotic drugs to other inmates at jail, including” Decedent, and failed to stop them despite the “opportunity,” (id. ¶ 20); (3) Decedent was provided drugs by inmates because Does 1 through 3 were paid by inmates at County Jail to “permit them to sell and distribute said dangerous narcotic drugs,” (id. ¶ 21); and (4) Decedent was provided drugs by inmates because Does 1 through 3 were “paid by persons who were not inmates” at County Jail to permit said inmates to “sell and distribute said dangerous narcotic drugs[,]” (id. ¶ 22).

Plaintiffs further allege Does 7 through 10 have a “longstanding custom and practice of condoning and/or otherwise failing to prevent its deputy sheriffs [and] . . . other jail personnel from bringing dangerous narcotic drugs” into San Diego County Jails. (Id. ¶ 13(a).) Does 7 through 10 also allegedly fail to train its officers on “how and when to provide medical care to Jail inmates [. . .]” and “how to recognize when inmates are suffering from severe medical distress,” including drug overdoses. (Id. ¶ 13(b)-(c).) Does 7 through 10 also allegedly have a “longstanding custom and practice of failing to provide medical care to jail Inmates” at San Diego County jails when inmates “appear to be in serious/acute medical distress,” including drug overdoses. (Id. ¶ 13(d).) Plaintiffs further allege Does 7 through 10 have a “longstanding custom and practice of failing to discipline and/or train its deputy sheriffs [and] . . . other jail personnel, for failing to provide medical care to jail Inmates at the San Diego County Jails,” including inmates “who appear to be in serious/acute medical distress,” including drug overdoses. (Id. ¶ 13(e).)

Under any of the above theories, Plaintiffs allege Does 1 through 6 knew of Decedent's need for medical assistance after his ingestion of drugs and were “deliberately indifferent” and “disregarded it by failing to take reasonable measures to address it.” (Id. ¶ 25.) As a result, Decedent suffered “tremendous physical, mental and emotion pain [. . .] for several hours, until he ultimately died[.]” (Id. ¶ 27.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring nine causes of action against the County and Doe Defendants 1-10. (See generally id.) The County moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See generally Doc. No. 19.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for: “(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). To defeat a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, “some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset” before a case can move forward. Id. at 588 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept legal conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for the court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). On the other hand, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court only reviews the contents of the first amended complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims - Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiffs' first five causes of action are 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. (FAC ¶¶ 17-106.) As an initial matter, the County argues it is not liable for private crimes under Section 1983. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 11-12.) Stating that “[p]roviding narcotics provides no conceivable governmental purpose regardless of who provides them,” the County argues that such drug-dealing actions as alleged in the FAC are not committed under the color of law, as is required by Section 1983 liability. (Id.) Citing Van Ort v. Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1996), the County compares the allegations in the FAC against Does to the actions of an off-duty Sheriff's Deputy in Van Ort who forcibly entered and robbed a private entrance which he had lawfully searched while on-duty earlier. (Id. at 11 (citing Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 838).) Plaintiffs distinguish the present matter from Van Ort, noting that a “public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” (Doc. No. 21 at 14 (quoting Paeste v. Gov't of Guam, 798 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 2015)).)

In the present matter, the actions alleged against Does are distinguishable from those in Van Ort in that all allegations made in the FAC were actions within the San Diego County Jail and were not outside the scope of “official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Paeste, 789 F.3d at 1238. Indeed Plaintiffs plead that Does 1 through 3 “sold or otherwise provided dangerous narcotic drugs . . . including methamphetamine and fentanyl” while Decedent “was still in-custody and still confined as a Pretrial Detainee at the San Diego County Jail[.]” (FAC ¶ 19.) Therefore, the fact that the Does' alleged actions are criminal in nature (either selling or facilitating the...