Barnes v. 21ST Century Premier Ins. Co.

334 Mich.App. 531

965 N.W.2d 121

Curtis BARNES, Plaintiff-Appellee,andAlwayz On Time Transportation and Total Toxicology Labs, LLC, Intervening Plaintiffs,andSynergy Spine and Orthopedic Surgery Center, LLC, and St. John Macomb-Oakland Hospital, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.21ST CENTURY PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 347120

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted October 14, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided November 5, 2020, 9:00 a.m.

Romano Law, PLLC, Pleasant Ridge (by Daniel G. Romano and Richard A. Moore) and Steven A. Hicks for Curtis Barnes.

Christensen Law, Southfield (by Dustin C. Hoff and David E. Christensen ) and Steven A. Hicks for Synergy Spine and Orthopedic Surgery Center, LLC.

Bruce K. Pazner, Grosse Pointe Park and Joshua S. Havens for St. John Macomb-Oakland Hospital.

Hewson & Van Hellemont, PC (by Grant O. Jaskulski, Oak Park, and Jordan A. Wiener, Southfield) for 21st Century Premier Insurance Company.

Before: Boonstra, P.J., and Markey and Hood, JJ.

Per Curiam.

Defendant, 21st Century Premier Insurance Company (CPIC), appeals by right a consent judgment that was entered following a one-day jury trial in which jurors solely determined that plaintiff Curtis Barnes was domiciled in the same household as his grandparents on the date that Barnes was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The grandparents had a no-fault automobile insurance policy through CPIC when the accident occurred. MCL 500.3114(1) generally provides that a no-fault policy "applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person's spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household , if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident." (Emphasis added.) This case presented the question whether Barnes was domiciled in the same household as his grandparents, and the trial court denied two motions for summary disposition filed by CPIC, as well as CPIC's motion for a directed verdict raised during the trial. On appeal, CPIC argues that the trial court erred by denying the motions for summary disposition and a directed verdict and that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.¹

I. OVERVIEW

Barnes sustained injuries in a car accident on September 27, 2013, at which time his grandparents held the no-fault policy issued by CPIC. It is undisputed that on that date Barnes was living in the same two-story house as his grandparents, but the property was separated into "upstairs" and "downstairs" units. Barnes resided in the upstairs unit, and his grandparents resided in the downstairs unit. The parties presented substantial evidence at summary disposition and at trial. Barnes and intervening plaintiffs argued that the evidence showed that the two units constituted one household for purposes of MCL 500.3114(1), and CPIC contended that the evidence reflected that the two units were separate and distinct households under MCL 500.3114(1). As previously indicated, the trial court denied motions for summary disposition and a directed verdict brought by CPIC, and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Barnes, after which CPIC consented to entry of judgment against it while reserving the right to appeal the underlying rulings and verdict.

II. THE PERTINENT EVIDENCE

CPIC relied on evidence that the upstairs and downstairs units had their own entrances, living rooms, bedrooms, kitchens, bathrooms, gas and electric meters, furnaces, hot water heaters, thermostats, and doorbells. Barnes's grandfather referred to the "five and five," meaning that there were five rooms downstairs and the same five rooms upstairs (living room, two bedrooms, kitchen, and bathroom). CPIC also pointed to evidence that the two units were separated by an interior door equipped with a deadbolt, that Barnes and his grandmother testified in their depositions that Barnes had everything he needed in the upstairs unit, that Barnes paid his own gas and electric bills, and that Barnes paid half of the mortgage and water bills for the house. Additionally, CPIC cited a copy of the no-fault insurance application that Barnes's grandfather had submitted on December 7, 2010, which listed another grandson, who lived with the grandparents in the downstairs unit, as a "household member," while failing to list Barnes as such.

Barnes and the intervening plaintiffs relied on evidence that only family members had lived in the house for nearly 50 years; that the cable bill was the only utility bill that Barnes paid;² that the interior doors of the house were never locked, including the door between the lower and upper levels; that Barnes regularly and freely entered the downstairs unit to do laundry and to retrieve items such as food, towels, and linen; and that Barnes contributed money toward expenses of the house but had no rental agreement with his grandparents. They further cited evidence that the cost of house repairs was evenly split regardless of whether only one unit or level was involved; that the house had only one mailbox and address, which Barnes used as his own personal address; that the home was zoned single-family residential; that Barnes and his grandparents had a very close relationship; that Barnes kept personal effects in the house; and that the grandparents set rules for the upstairs unit concerning noise, company, and similar matters. There was also testimony developed at trial showing that Barnes's grandparents could and did enter the upstairs unit at will without the need to obtain Barnes's permission; that the grandmother would sometimes cook using the stove in the upstairs level; that Barnes was always welcome and spent time in the downstairs unit, where he sometimes cooked; and that on occasion they all shared meals together.

III. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS

With respect to the initial motion for summary disposition, CPIC argued that, in light of the evidence, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Barnes's upstairs unit constituted a separate household distinct from the downstairs unit where the grandparents resided. The trial court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the house encompassed one or two households, distinguishing the caselaw on which CPIC relied. The trial court deemed it important that there was free, easy, and exercised access between the upstairs and downstairs units that could have been prevented using readily available means but that those means had never been employed for nearly 50 years, during which time exclusively family members lived in the residence.

Subsequently, CPIC renewed its motion for summary disposition on the issue of domicile, mostly reiterating its prior arguments. At the ensuing motion hearing, the trial court refused to reconsider the question of Barnes's domicile as a whole, reasoning that it had already decided that issue when ruling in regard to CPIC's initial motion for summary disposition. Instead, the court stated that it would only consider the import of the sole piece of new evidence that CPIC had presented—the December 7, 2010 insurance application. CPIC's attorney argued that the grandfather's failure to list Barnes as a household member on the insurance application revealed the grandfather's "subjective belief" that Barnes resided in a "separate" household in the upstairs unit. The trial court questioned CPIC's counsel with respect to the temporal relevance of the insurance application, asking whether Barnes even lived in the house at the time of the application. Counsel replied, "My understanding is that Mr. Barnes did live there, at the time." When the court asked about supporting evidence, CPIC's attorney cited unspecified "answers to interrogatories," admitting that CPIC had failed to submit those answers to the court. And, without any evidentiary support, counsel also argued that in subsequent "renewals of the policy" the grandfather had failed to list any additional residents. On the other hand, Barnes's counsel indicated that he was uncertain whether Barnes was residing at the house when the grandfather submitted the insurance application.

Thereafter, the trial court chastised the parties for creating "a morass of total confusion." The court observed that it had "insufficient information to make a ruling" on CPIC's renewed motion for summary disposition in the absence of any record evidence to establish the temporal relevance of the insurance application. The trial court denied the renewed motion for summary disposition without prejudice to CPIC's right to bring a similar motion at a later date. The court allowed the parties 45 days to conduct further discovery. Rather than renewing the motion for summary disposition after conducting the permitted discovery, CPIC subsequently stipulated to the entry of an order that the question of Barnes's domicile would be decided at trial. At trial, CPIC moved for a directed verdict after the close of plaintiffs’ proofs. The trial court denied the motion, distinguishing caselaw cited by CPIC and determining that plaintiffs had presented evidence sufficient to create a factual issue for the jury to resolve regarding whether the property consisted of one household or two. The jury subsequently rendered a special verdict, finding that Barnes was domiciled in the same household as his grandparents when the accident occurred. Because CPIC did not dispute that Barnes was injured in the motor vehicle accident, it agreed to entry of a consent judgment, but the stipulation also reserved the right for CPIC to appeal on the issue of domicile. That appeal is before us now.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

CPIC first argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant summary disposition in its favor under MCR 2.116(C)(10). CPIC contends that the evidence established as a matter of law that Barnes was not domiciled in the same household as his grandparents but rather that he resided in a separate and distinct household—the upstairs unit of...