Barnes v. Broyles

TUERE BARNES, Plaintiff, v. B.O.P OFFICER BROYLES, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 13-737 (NLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 12, 2016

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Tuere Barnes, # 84034-054

FCI Danbury

Route 37

Danbury, CT 06811

Plaintiff Prose

HILLMAN, District Judge

On or about February 4, 2013, Plaintiff Tuere Barnes, a prisoner presently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI") in Danbury, Connecticut, filed this civil action asserting claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). (ECF No. 1). This case was previously administratively terminated due to Plaintiff's failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement. (ECF No. 2). However, on or about June 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reopen the Case (ECF No. 6), followed by an application to proceed in forma pauperis on July 1, 2013 (ECF No. 7). Accordingly, on September 25, 2013, the case was reopened for review by a judicial officer. (ECF No. 8).

The Court finds Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application to be complete. At this time the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint will be permitted to PROCEED IN PART and will be DISMISSED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts that on July 9, 2012, while confined at FCI Fort Dix, he was sexually assaulted by Defendant Broyles, a female correctional officer at FCI Fort Dix. Plaintiff contends that when he "protested her sexual abuse," Defendant Broyles and other staff at FCI Fort Dix retaliated against him. (Compl. 4, ECF No. 1).

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that an unknown officer, who Plaintiff describes as a Food Service Administrator, "witnessed a confrontation between [Plaintiff] and Officer Broyles" and then retaliated against Plaintiff by switching Plaintiff's job. (Id.). Plaintiff later asserts that his job was changed for "punishment purposes." (Compl. 8, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff states that Officer Kwartin is a Unit Counselor at FCI Fort Dix. Plaintiff asserts that he reported the sexual assault to Officer Kwartin; however, Officer Kwartin failed to report the assault as required by BOP policy. Plaintiff further complains that Officer Kwartin took three months to answer his "BP8" (a prison grievance form), and purposely found Plaintiff's complaint to be unfounded. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff names Officer Bartel, an SIS investigator at FCI Fort Dix as a defendant in this case. Plaintiff states that Officer Bartel attempted to silence Plaintiff's claims of sexual assault by putting Plaintiff in "the Hole" and/or the Security Housing Unit ("SHU"), by confiscating Plaintiff's address book, and by filing false charges against Plaintiff. (Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Olsen, a unit Case Manager at FCI Fort Dix, was made aware of Plaintiff's sexual assault claim, but did not properly report it. Plaintiff further states that Officer Olsen retaliated against him by finding Plaintiff guilty of false charges, and by raising Plaintiff's custodial points "when he lacked authority to do so." (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff asserts that Officer Hammerman, a property officer in the SHU, confiscated items that Plaintiff was permitted to possess. Plaintiff contends that OfficerHammerman's "goal [for doing so] was strictly to punish [Plaintiff] for filing a complaint against his fellow officer." (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff further states that Officer Hammerman "threw papers relating to my sexual assault accusation." (Compl. 9, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff also brings a retaliation claim against Officer Rodriguez, who Plaintiff states is a Unit Manager at FCI Fort Dix. Specifically, Plaintiff states that Officer Rodriguez was also made aware of Plaintiff's sexual assault claim, but never reported it properly. (Compl. 7, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff further asserts that Officer Rodriguez made several threats to Plaintiff in July, August and September of 2012 in an attempt to get Plaintiff to drop the sexual assault charges. (Id.). Plaintiff adds that Officer Rodriguez "refused to help [Plaintiff] with any of [his] needs" while he was detained in the SHU.

Finally, Plaintiff names unknown officers as defendants. Plaintiff does not explain their involvement and simply describes them as "any officers who help conspire and inflict punishment on me for filing my claim that I'm not aware off [sic] but leave out as a result of this complaint." (Compl. 7, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of one million dollars.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Sua Sponte Dismissal

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action willnot do ... . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

That is, a complaint must assert "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

The determination of whether the factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief is "'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

In general, where a complaint subject to statutory screening can be remedied by amendment, a district court should not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Graysonv. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that leave to amend should be granted "in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or futility of amendment"), cited in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F. App'x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).

Finally, in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Bivens Claims

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action against that agent, individually, for damages. The Supreme Court has also implied damages remedies directly under the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), and the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). But "the absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation does not necessarily mean that courts should create a damages remedy against the officer responsible for the violation." Schreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988)).

Bivens actions are simply the federal counterpart to § 1983 actions brought against state officials who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Walker v. Zenk, 323 F. App'x 144, 145 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1049, 125 S.Ct. 868, 160 L.Ed.2d 769 (2005)). Both are...