Barnes v. Colvin

80 F.Supp.3d 881

George Barnes, Plaintiff

v.Carolyn Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.

Case No. 13 C 3850

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed February 23, 2015

Barry Alan Schultz, Law Offices of Barry Schultz, Evanston, IL, for Plaintiff.

Abigail Lynn Peluso, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Daniel G. Martin, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff George Barnes (“Plaintiff” or “Barnes”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of Defendant Carolyn Colvin, the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits in a February 10, 2012 written decision issued Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Rebecca LaRiccia. Barnes appealed the ruling to this Court and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that seeks to reverse the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion. The Court has carefully reviewed the short administrative record but omits a detailed description of it. The parties have carefully outlined the record in their briefs and are thoroughly familiar with the relevant evidence. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion is granted, and the Commissioner's motion is denied.

I. Legal Standard

A. The Social Security Administration Standard

In order to qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he is disabled. An individual does so by showing that he cannot “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 4243(d)(1)(A). Gainful activity is defined as “the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b).

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) applies a five-step analysis to disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The SSA first considers whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity during the claimed period of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). It then determines at Step 2 whether the claimant's physical or mental impairment is severe and meets the twelve-month durational requirement noted above. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At Step 3, the SSA compares the impairment (or combination of impairments) found at Step 2 to a list of impairments identified in the regulations (“the Listings”). The specific criteria that must be met to satisfy a Listing are described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant's impairments meet or “medically equal” a Listing, the individual is considered to be disabled, and the analysis concludes; if a Listing is not met, the analysis proceeds to Step 4. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

Before addressing the fourth step, the SSA must assess a claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which defines his exertional and non-exertional capacity to work. The SSA then determines at the fourth step whether the claimant is able to engage in any of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, he is not disabled. Id. If the claimant cannot undertake past work, the SSA proceeds to Step 5 to determine whether a substantial number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience. An individual is not disabled if he can do work that is available under this standard. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

B. Standard of Review

A claimant who is found to be “not disabled” may challenge the Commissioner's final decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ's decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). A court reviews the entire record, but it does not displace the ALJ's judgment by reweighing the facts or by making independent credibility determinations. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir.2008). Instead, the court looks at whether the ALJ articulated an “accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.2008). This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to “assess the validity of the agency's ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir.2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ's opinion is adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413 (citation omitted).

Applying the familiar five-step analysis, ALJ LaRiccia found at Step 1 that Barnes had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of June 3, 2008. She concluded at Step 2 that he had the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, anxiety, diabetes, obesity, and arthritis. None of the impairments were found to meet or equal a listing at Step 3. Before moving to Step 4, the ALJ concluded that claimant was not entirely credible. She also assessed his RFC as light work with several exertional and non-exertional restrictions. These included only carrying out “simple routine tasks with non-collaborative interaction with coworkers, superficial contact with the general public, and occasional interactions with supervisors.” (R. 29). The ALJ found at Step 4 that Barnes could not perform his past relevant work. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded at Step 5 that jobs existed in the national economy that Barnes could perform. She thus concluded that he was not disabled.

Barnes argues that the ALJ incorrectly assessed (1) his credibility, (2) the weight to be given to his treating psychiatrist, and (3) his RFC. The Court addresses each of these in turn.

II. Discussion

A. The Credibility Issue

If an ALJ finds that a medical impairment exists that could be expected to produce a claimant's alleged condition, he must then assess how the individual's symptoms affect his ability to work. SSR 96–7p. The fact that a claimant's subjective complaints are not fully substantiated by the record is not a sufficient reason to find that he is not credible. The ALJ must consider the entire record and “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir.2000). Factors that should be considered include the objective medical evidence, the claimant's daily activities, allegations of pain, any aggravating factors, the types of treatment received, any medications taken, and functional limitations. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.2006) ; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) ; SSR 96–7p. A court reviews an ALJ's credibility decision with deference and overturns it only when the assessment is patently wrong. Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir.2010).

The ALJ used standard boilerplate language to find that Barnes' statements concerning the intensity and limiting effects of his symptoms were “not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (R. 32). The Court does not discuss the parties' claims concerning this statement. Courts have consistently held that such language explains nothing meaningful about a claimant's credibility. This Court fully agrees. However, that does not necessarily require remand. The more important issue is how the ALJ went about determining why Barnes was not credible.

That question is not easily answered because the ALJ never addressed the issue directly. She appears to have assessed credibility as part of her finding that Barnes' impairments had not “precluded him from all competitive work.” (R. 35). Her reasoning raises several serious problems. As the ALJ recognized, Barnes suffers from bipolar disorder. She thought that he was not credible based on several aspects of his medical treatment for that problem, beginning by finding that a gap existed in Plaintiff's mental health treatment in 2010.

That was an erroneous ground for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. The ALJ did not explain why Barnes' intermittent treatment made him less credible. Social Security Ruling 96–7p is clear that an ALJ “must not draw any inferences about an individual's symptoms and their functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue regular medical treatment without first considering any explanations that the individual may provide[.]” The ALJ never asked Barnes to explain the reason for what she believed was inconsistent treatment. See Orienti v. Astrue, 958 F.Supp.2d 961, 977 (N.D.Ill.2013) (“ALJs have a duty to consider factors like inability to travel, mental illness, or economic constraints that may have prevented claimants from seeking [or] receiving medical care.”). The record shows that Barnes might not have been able to afford the kind of treatment the ALJ thought he should have sought. A treatment note states that he “can't afford Ecker [Mental Health Center].” (R. 299). Barnes also told the ALJ that he did not have insurance for all of his physical needs. (R. 69). Perhaps he also lacked sufficient insurance to cover mental health treatment in 2010. The ALJ should have clarified the matter before construing lack of treatment against Barnes.

The issue was particularly pressing in this case because of Barnes' bipolar disorder. The ALJ never considered whether his mental illness played a role in what she construed as episodic...