Barnes v. St. Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

905 S.E.2d 881

BARNES

v.STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.

A24A0852

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 26, 2024

Ashley Ann Cameron, Atlanta, for Appellant.

John Holder Smith Jr., Valdosta, Jeremy Wayne Willis, for Appellee.

Hodges, Judge.

Plaintiff Aundray Barnes appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the insurance company providing liability coverage to defendant Lyft, Inc. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that Lyft is not a motor carrier as defined by the Georgia Motor Carrier Act and that State Farm, as its liability insurance provider, therefore could not be directly named as a defendant in Barnes’ lawsuit. Because State Farm has not met its burden of proving that Lyft is exempt from the Georgia Motor Carrier Act’s definition of motor carrier, it was proper for Barnes to directly name State Farm in her lawsuit. We therefore reverse the trial court’s decision.

[1, 2] We review the construction of statutes under a de novo standard. See Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 693, 749 S.E.2d 726 (2013). Likewise, "[w]hen this Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, it conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) EZ Green Assocs. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 Ga. App. 655, 658 (1) (a), 734 S.E.2d 485 (2012). "[T]he opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 657-658 (1) (a), 734 S.E.2d 485.

So viewed, the underlying facts as detailed in Barnes’ complaint — assumed true for the sake of this appeal — show that Barnes was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a car driven by Rome Leite-Brown in June 2020. At the time, Leite-Brown was operating his vehicle as a driver for Lyft. In May 2022, Barnes sued Liete-Brown, Lyft, and State Farm as Lyft’s insurance provider. State Farm answered and moved for summary judgment, claiming that Lyft is not a motor carrier as defined by Georgia statutory law, and, therefore, State Farm could not be joined directly in Barnes’ lawsuit. The trial court granted State Farm’s motion, and this appeal followed.

[3–6] The general rule in Georgia is that "a party may not bring a direct action against the liability insurer of the party who allegedly caused the damage unless there is an unsatisfied judgment against the insured or it is specifically permitted either by statute or a provision in the policy." Hartford Ins. Co. v. Henderson & Son, 258 Ga. 493, 494, 371 S.E.2d 401 (1988); accord Haezebrouck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Ga. App. 248 (1), 555 S.E.2d 764 (2001). However, there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, in cases brought against "motor carriers," Georgia law permits direct actions against liability insurance companies. See OCGA § 40-1-112 (c) (2012) ("It shall be permissible under this part for any person having a cause of action arising under this part to join in the same action the motor carrier and the insurance carrier, whether arising in tort or contract.")¹; OCGA § 40-2-140 (d) (4) (2015) ("Any person having a cause of action, whether arising in tort or contract, under this Code section may join in the same cause of action the motor carrier and its insurance carrier.")²; see also Nat. Indem. Co. v. Lariscy, 352 Ga. App. 446, 449, 835 S.E.2d 307 (2019) (holding that the statutory exceptions in OCGA §§ 40-1-112 (c) and 40-2-140 "permit a direct action by an injured party against an insurance carrier which insures a motor carrier").

The purpose of permitting joinder of an insurance company in a claim against a motor carrier is to further the policy of the Motor Carrier Act, that is, to protect the public against injuries caused by the motor carrier’s negligence. Additionally, it enables injured persons to recover compensation more efficiently and quickly and encourages insurers to resolve legitimate claims by settlement.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hughes v. Ace American Ins. Co., 368 Ga. App. 650, 651-652, 888 S.E.2d 341 (2023). The direct action statutory exceptions are in derogation of common law, and their terms therefore require strict compliance. Lariscy, 352 Ga. App. at 449, 835 S.E.2d 307.

[7–9] Barnes’ sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in determining that Lyft is not a motor carrier as defined by the Georgia Motor Carrier Act and, therefore, in dismissing her direct action against State Farm, Lyft’s liability insurer. This appears to be a question of first impression in Georgia, and, given the statutory language enacted by the General Assembly in the Georgia Motor Carrier Act, we agree with Barnes that the trial court erred in this case.

When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would…. Applying these principles, if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). "Indeed, as long as the statutory language is clear and does not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) AMG, LLC v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 372 Ga. App. 160, 164 (2), 904 S.E.2d 10 (2024).

With these principles in mind, we necessarily turn to the Georgia Motor Carrier Act as our starting point for determining whether Lyft is a motor carrier. According to State Farm, ride share network services like Lyft are governed only by Part 4 of the Motor Carrier Act, and not Part 2. We disagree.

1. The Georgia Motor Carrier Act. The Georgia General Assembly enacted the Motor Carrier Act, which included Parts 1-3, in 2012. Ga. L. 2012, p. 580, § 1.³ Part 1 encompasses OCGA §§ 40-1-50 through 40-1-58, generally addressing the creation of the Motor Carrier Act and penalties for violations of the Act.⁴ Part 2 encompasses OCGA §§ 40-1-100 through 40-1-130, generally addressing Act definitions, commissioner authorizations, applications and requirements of motor carriers, and certifications of motor carriers.⁵ Part 3 encompasses OCGA §§ 40-1-150 through 40-1-170, generally addressing Georgia limousine carriers.⁶

[10, 11] Under Part 2 of the Act, a "motor carrier" is defined as

[e]very person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the business of transporting for hire persons, household goods, or property or engaged in the activity of nonconsensual towing pursuant to Code Section 44-1-13 for hire over any public highway in this state.

OCGA § 40-1-100 (12) (A) (2013). The Act, however, exempts a number of vehicles that would otherwise fall under the definition of "motor carrier," including certain taxicabs and limousine carriers. OCGA § 40-1-100 (12) (B) (ii), (iii) (2013). Insurance carriers may not be joined in the same action for these exempted vehicles. See, e.g., Brunson v. Valley Coaches, 173 Ga. App. 667, 669 (2), 327 S.E.2d 758 (1985) (finding that a taxicab insurer could not be joined as a party defendant with its insured where there had been no judgment previously obtained against the insured). The burden of proving that a party is exempt from the Motor Carrier Act lies with the party claiming the exemption, and there is no burden on the opposing party to prove that a vehicle is not within the exemption. See Jarrard v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 267 Ga. App. 594, 595, 600 S.E.2d 689 (2004); see also Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of North Carolina v. Johnson, 302 Ga. App. 677, 678, 691 S.E.2d 589 (2010). With the exception of minor revisions and a subsection number change in 2013, no amendments or alterations have been made to the definition of motor carrier or the motor carrier exemptions since the Article was enacted. Compare OCGA § 40-1-100 (10) (2012) with OCGA § 40-1-100 (12) (2024); see also Ga. L. 2013, p. 838, § 6.

In 2015, the Georgia General Assembly amended the Act to include Part 4, which encompasses OCGA §§ 40-1-190 through 40-1-200, addressing "Ride Share Network Services and Transportation Referral Services."⁷ Ga. L. 2015, p. 1262, § 3. The parties do not dispute that Lyft is a "ride share network service" as defined in OCGA § 40-1-190 (4) (2015):

"Ride share network service" means any person or entity that uses a digital network or Internet network to connect passengers to ride share drivers for the purpose of prearranged transportation for hire or for donation. The term "ride share network service" shall not include any corporate sponsored vanpool or exempt rideshare⁸ as such terms are defined in Code Section 40-1-100, provided that such corporate sponsored vanpool or exempt rideshare is not operated for the purpose of generating a profit.⁹

Part 4 defines a "ride share driver" as "an individual who uses his or her personal passenger car, as defined in paragraph (41) of Code Section 40-1-1,¹⁰ to provide transportation for passengers arranged through a ride share network service." OCGA § 40-1-190 (3) (2015).¹¹ The Part is broken into 12 subsections, which encompass titles such as definitions, legislative findings and preemption, registration and licensure requirements for both transportation referral service providers and ride share network service providers, registration of taxi services,...