Barnes v. Zaccari

THOMAS HAYDEN BARNES, Plaintiff, v. RONALD M. ZACCARI, et al, Defendants.

Case No. 7:12-cv-89 (HL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

SO ORDERED: July 24, 2013

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Ronald M. Zaccari's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 373) and Motion for Qualified Immunity (Doc. 370), as well as Plaintiff Thomas Hayden Barnes's Motion to Strike (Doc. 388). For the reasons stated below, the Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Qualified Immunity are denied. The Motion to Strike is granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

a. Factual Background¹

The history of this case begins in the spring of 2007, over six years ago. At that time, Plaintiff Thomas Hayden Barnes, who was somewhat of an activist, instigated a campaign at Valdosta State University ("VSU") to raise awarenessabout the possible construction of a parking garage on campus. Barnes was concerned about the potential environmental impact and the financial implications associated with the construction of the parking garage. As part of his protest, Barnes put up flyers, communicated with fellow students and VSU officials via email, contacted members of the Board of Regents, and posted information about the parking garage on his personal Facebook page.

Barnes's protest caught the attention of then-President Ronald M. Zaccari, who was a strong advocate for the construction of the garage. Zaccari took several steps in response to Barnes's protest. He began by investigating Barnes's record at VSU, including his counseling history and academic record. Barnes's counseling history revealed that he met with a counselor on a regular basis and received special accommodations from VSU through the Access Office based on disability. After doing an initial investigation, Zaccari met personally with Barnes to discuss his protest. Zaccari also met with other school administrators to discuss Barnes. Those administrators with whom he met included Major Ann Farmer, the head of VSU campus police; Leah McMillan, Barnes's counselor at VSU's Counseling Center; Kurt Keppler, Vice President of Student Affairs; Russ Mast, the Dean of Students; and Victor Morgan, the Director of the VSU Counseling Center. The record reflects that Zaccari also consulted with Elizabeth Neely, Vice Chancellor for Legal Affairs at the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia ("BOR"), and Laverne Gaskins, in-house counsel for VSU, to seek legal advice about the options that were available to him for dealing with Barnes.

After a series of meetings with the above-listed group, Zaccari eventually made the decision to "administratively withdraw" Barnes from VSU under Board of Regent's Policy 1902.² Zaccari's decision was met with some dissent. Gaskins informed Zaccari that a student accused of violating Board Policy 1902 was entitled to due process. Keppler and McMillan discussed with Zaccari that no one at the VSU Counseling Center thought that Barnes posed a threat to campus. Despite these comments, Zaccari proceeded to administratively withdraw Barnes, effective May 7, 2007. A letter informing Barnes of his administrative withdrawal was slipped under the door of his dorm room. It stated that he had been withdrawn and notified him that he was deemed a "clear and present danger to the school." There were two conditions for readmission in the letter, with which Barnes contends he complied, but he was not allowed readmission to VSU in spring 2007.

Zaccari claims that all of the actions that he took were based on his belief that Barnes posed a serious threat to the VSU campus. The timing of Barnes'sprotest coincided with the April 16, 2007 Virginia Tech massacre when a student diagnosed with mental illness killed thirty-two people and wounded seventeen others in two separate attacks. The shooting took place on the same day that Zaccari first met with Barnes to discuss his parking deck protest. Zaccari claims that the Virginia Tech shooting put VSU on high alert, and Zaccari contends that Barnes's actions alarmed him so greatly that that he felt Barnes's withdrawal was necessary.

b. Procedural Background

In 2008, Barnes filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia, originally naming eight defendants³. The lawsuit alleged seven counts against Defendants including claims that Defendants violated Barnes's First Amendment right to free speech in both their individual and official capacities under § 1983, that Defendants violated Barnes's procedural and substantive due process under § 1983 in both their individual and official capacities, that VSU and the BOR breached a contract between the parties, and that all Defendants in their official capacities violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. (Complaint, Doc. 1.) Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were granted in part and denied in part by the Northern District. (Doc. 37.) The Northern District granted the motion to dismiss the claims under § 1983 against all Defendants in their individual capacities. The other claims survived.

In December 2009, all of the parties filed motions for summary judgment, with the exception of Victor Morgan, who was voluntarily dismissed by Barnes a few days prior to the filing of summary judgment motions (Doc. 161). In September 2010, the Northern District issued an order on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Leah McMillan, Laverne Gaskins, Kurt Keppler, and Russ Mast were all granted summary judgment (Doc. 244) and the claims against them were dismissed. Valdosta State University was also dismissed as a defendant. Additionally, summary judgment was granted to all Defendants on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The Northern District also granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes on two of his claims: (1) a breach of contract claim against the Board of Regents, and (2) a claim for a procedural due process violation against Zaccari. At the end of the order, the Northern District wrote "[h]aving resolved all pending claims in this lawsuit as a matter of law, the only remaining issue in this case is damages." (Doc. 244, p. 57.)

Zaccari and the Board of Regents filed an interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit on the issue of Zaccari's defense of qualified immunity and the breach of contract issue (Doc. 249). Barnes filed a cross appeal on the Northern District's decision to grant summary judgment to Zaccari on Barnes's First Amendment claim and on the substantive due process claim. Barnes also appealed the dismissal of his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Actand the Rehabilitation Act, and appealed the decision to deny injunctive relief (Doc. 255).

In February 2012, the Eleventh Circuit addressed only the qualified immunity issue and the breach of contract issue, noting that because final judgment had not yet been entered, the other claims were not ripe for review. As to qualified immunity, the appellate court agreed that Zaccari was not entitled to qualified immunity and that he was responsible for breaching Barnes's procedural due process rights by administratively withdrawing him from VSU (Doc. 267). However, as to the breach of contract claim, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Northern District, finding the contract claim to be without merit. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the claim against the BOR and proceed to trial on the issue of damages as to the procedural due process violation. Soon after the remand, the case was transferred to this Court for the resolution of the damages issue.

In January 2013, the case proceeded to a trial by jury on the issue of damages. The Court, against Zaccari's objections, chose to trifurcate the trial in an attempt to avoid confusion and prejudice. (Doc. 339.) Because liability had already been decided, Phase One of the trial focused solely on the issue of the amount of damages that should be awarded to Barnes. At the end of Phase One, jury instructions were read and a verdict form given to the jury for deliberation. Next, after the jury returned a verdict in Phase One, Phase Two was to be focused on punitive damages, assuming the jury found in Phase One thatpunitive damages were warranted. Finally, Phase Three of the trial was intended to resolve any outstanding evidentiary disputes relevant for purposes of qualified immunity. At the end of Phase Three, any special interrogatories pertinent to qualified immunity would be sent back with the jury for resolution.

After a week-long trial, the jury returned a verdict in Phase One awarding $50,000 to Barnes. The jury did not find punitive damages were warranted. (Doc. 354.) Thus, Phase Two was not necessary. The Court conferred with counsel for Zaccari and Barnes outside the presence of the jury, and the parties declined to move into Phase Three of the trial. (Doc. 383, p. 5.) With Phase Three waived by the parties, the trial concluded.

Now, in the aftermath of the trial, the Court is faced with the resolution of the post-trial motions filed by the parties. The pending motions are discussed below.

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (Doc. 378)

In his original Motion, Defendant Zaccari argues that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate for two reasons: (1) Barnes did not prove that his damages resulted from the denial of procedural due process, and (2) the damages award was based on speculation and conjecture. The Court finds that neither argument has merit.

Zaccari first argues that Barnes was unable to prove at trial that his damages were the result of a procedural due process violation. Zaccari maintains that this failure to properly prove the cause of his claimed injuries means thatBarnes is entitled to only nominal damages. For support, Zaccari relies on Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1977). In Carey, the Supreme Court of the United States held that mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of...