Baro v. Lake Cnty. Fed'n of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO

594 F.Supp.3d 1012

Ariadna Ramon BARO, Plaintiff,

v.LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO and Waukegan Community Unit School District #60, Defendants.

No. 20-cv-02126

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 28, 2022

Jeffrey M. Schwab, James Joseph Mcquaid, Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Joshua B. Shiffrin, John Miller West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, George A. Luscombe, III, Robert E. Bloch, Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO.

Shelli Lynn Anderson, Richard Jason Patterson, Franczek P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant Waukegan Community Unit School District #60.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN F. KNESS, United States District Judge

On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro, a public-school English teacher, signed a membership agreement to join a teacher's union under the mistaken belief that such membership was required. Under the terms of that agreement, Plaintiff authorized the union to deduct annual membership dues from her salary. When Plaintiff realized her mistake—that union membership and paying union dues were not, in fact, required—Plaintiff attempted to resign her membership and revoke her dues authorization. On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff received an email from the union asserting that "you will pay union dues regardless of whether or not you are a member," which Plaintiff interpreted to mean that her request to resign was effectively denied. In January 2020, the school began to deduct dues from Plaintiff's salary on the union's behalf.

On April 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim against her employer and the Union for violating her First Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). On April 10, 2020, the Union sent Plaintiff a formal acknowledgment of her resignation, assurance that dues would no longer be deducted from her earnings, and a check for a full refund of the dues, plus five hundred additional dollars to compensate Plaintiff for her troubles. Plaintiff refused to accept the check and instead amended her complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.

Now before the Court are Defendants’ fully briefed motions to dismiss. As explained below, Plaintiff's voluntary choice to join her school's local union—even if ill-informed—means that Plaintiff is bound by the terms of the union membership agreement and thus cannot show that the deduction of dues from her paycheck violated the First Amendment. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions are granted, and the case is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro, a citizen of Spain, relocated to Waukegan, Illinois in 2019 to begin work as an English-as-a-second-language teacher for high school students in the Waukegan Community Unit School District #60 (the "District"). (First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Dkt. 7 ¶ 10.) On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff attended an orientation meeting at which a representative of Defendant Lake County Federation of Teachers, Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO (the "Union") presented information about the teachers’ union. (Id. ¶ 11.) Believing that membership in the Union was required, Plaintiff filled out the union membership card and returned it to the representative. (Id. ) Under the terms of that union membership agreement, Plaintiff agreed to authorize the Union "to deduct from [Plaintiff's] earnings on a regular pro rata basis ... [a]n amount equal to the current annual membership dues as certified by [the Union] ... for a period of one year[.]" (FAC, Exh. A.)

A few days later, Plaintiff "learned that union membership and paying the union was, in fact, not required," contrary to her prior belief. (Id. ¶ 12.) She then sent letters to both the District and the Illinois Federation of Teachers (the Union's affiliated entity) resigning her membership. (Id. ¶ 13.) In those letters, Plaintiff declared that her earlier dues-deduction authorization "was signed under a framework Janus declared unconstitutional." (Id. , Exhs. B & C.) On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff received an unrelated email from "Mr. Weber," a fellow teacher and a union representative, stating that "you will pay union dues regardless of whether or not you are a member." (Id. ¶ 14.) This statement, Plaintiff admits, was not true. (Id. ¶ 14.) But Plaintiff believed at the time that this emailed statement "meant that her request to resign was effectively denied." (Id. ¶ 15.)

In January 2020, the District began deducting Union dues from Plaintiff's paycheck and remitting them to the Union. (Id. ¶ 16.) On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff again contacted her Union representative and the District's payroll department to explain that she wanted to resign her membership and stop paying dues. (Id. ¶ 17.) But the payroll department told her that it could not stop deducting the dues and that she would have to speak to her Union representative. (Id. ) The Union president then contacted Plaintiff and explained that she would have to wait until the withdrawal period in August 2020 to resign her membership and stop the deduction of dues. (Id. )

Plaintiff filed her first complaint in this case on April 3, 2020, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) against Defendants for violating her First Amendment rights by allegedly withholding Plaintiff's dues without Plaintiff's consent. (Id. ¶ 18; Dkt. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff sought various declarations regarding Defendant's violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights under Janus , an injunction barring the further deduction of her Union dues, damages in the form of all dues collected from her, and costs and fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (See Dkt. 1.) On April 15, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter from the Union acknowledging her resignation and explaining that dues would no longer be deducted. (FAC ¶ 18.) The letter included a check for $829.30, which represented "a full refund of all [Plaintiff's] dues plus an additional five hundred dollars for your efforts in pursuing this matter." (Id. ¶ 18, Exh. F.) Plaintiff returned the check (id. ¶ 20) and filed an amended complaint on April 24, 2020 that added a claim for punitive damages (See FAC). Now before the Court are Defendants’ fully briefed motions to dismiss. (Dkts. 20, 22.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7 , 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Those allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Put another way, the complaint must present a "short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that conveys a story that holds together." Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc. , 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. But even though factual allegations are entitled to the assumption of truth, mere legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed under both 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). (Dkts. 21, 22.) Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's claim does not implicate the First Amendment because Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a private agreement with Defendants. (Dkt. 21 at 5–7; Dkt. 22 at 1–2.) Defendants also contend that their tender to Plaintiff, made after Plaintiff brought this action, eliminated any case or controversy between the parties. (Dkt. 21 at 9–14; Dkt. 22 at 2–3.) As matter of jurisdiction, the Court first addresses the issue of mootness.

A. Plaintiff's case is not moot

If a case becomes moot at any point during the proceedings, it is "no longer a Case or Controversy for purposes of Article III and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande R.R., Inc. , 13 F.4th 560, 570 (7th Cir. 2021). A case is moot when "the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." L.A. Cnty. v. Davis , 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) ). The party asserting mootness bears a "heavy burden of proof" in demonstrating it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Comm. Schs. , 885 F.3d 1038, 1051 (7th Cir. 2018). The proper test for mootness is "whether it is still possible to fashion some form of meaningful relief to the [Plaintiff] in the event [she] prevails on the merits." Holder v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs. , 751 F.3d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 2014). To answer this question, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff remains injured and what relief Plaintiff requests.

At the crux of Plaintiff's alleged injury is a constitutional deprivation; namely, that Defendants violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights under Janus by withholding union dues from Plaintiff's pay. To remedy this, Plaintiff requests: (1) a declaration that the union membership card she signed did not waive her First Amendment rights under Janus and that Defendants’ actions thereby...