Barrameda v. Barrameda

MARK ROSAURO BARRAMEDA, Appellant, v. CELESTE BARRAMEDA, Respondent.

No. 73372

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

May 18, 2018

ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND

Mark Rosauro Barrameda appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside, or, in the alternative, modify a divorce decree, and an order denying his motion to amend findings and to reconsider that first order. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mathew Harter, Judge.

Mark and respondent Celeste Barrameda filed a joint petition for divorce.¹ The district court granted a decree of divorce on October 14, 2016. Their joint petition, including child support and property division worksheets, explicitly merged with the decree.

The decree stated that the court was ordering a child support amount that deviated from the statutory child support formula. However, neither the decree nor the joint petition or the relevant worksheet indicated what the parties' child support obligation would have been under the statutory formula or under Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998).² The decree also awarded the parties' community property house toCeleste, and awarded $54,000 to Mark for his interest in the house, to be paid to him from the proceeds from the sale of the house. Neither the decree nor the relevant portion of the joint petition specified when the house would be sold.

On May 11, 2017, about seven months after the decree was entered, Mark moved to set aside the decree pursuant to NRCP 60(b) because of fraud.³ In the alternative, Mark requested that the district court modify the decree of divorce. Before Celeste filed a response, and without a hearing, the district court denied Mark's motion. The district court denied Mark's motion to amend findings and to reconsider its order, again, before Celeste filed a response and without a hearing.

Mark appeals from both of the district court's orders. He raises two issues. First, he argues the district court erred by refusing to modify a divorce decree that contained a child support obligation that did not comply with Nevada law. Second, he argues the district court erred by interpreting the decree as awarding Mark a lien on the house and by refusing to establish a timeframe in which Celeste must sell the house. We agree.

The district court erred by determining it lacked the authority to modify the child support obligation in the parties' decree of divorce

We review decisions regarding child support for an abuse of discretion. Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). However, a district court "commits legal error when it misinterprets or failsto follow the statutes as written." Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. 28, 39, 222 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2010). Further, "questions of statutory construction, including the meaning and scope of a statute, are questions of law, which this court reviews de novo." City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003).

Mark argues the district court erred when it concluded it lacked the authority to modify the terms of a decree because it was based upon a settlement agreement. Mark contends district courts retain jurisdiction to modify child support throughout a child's minority.⁴ We agree.

"The trial court has continuing jurisdiction over its child support orders." Fernandez, 126 Nev. at 35, 222 P.3d at 1035; see also NRS 125B.145(1)-(2). "[T]he jurisdiction of the court never ends in a support matter, as long as the child is supposed to be getting support." Fernandez, 126 Nev. at 36, 222 P.3d at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, when the parties agree to a child support amount, "[a]ny inaccuracy or falsification of financial information which results in an inappropriate award of support is grounds for a motion to modify or adjust the award." NRS 125B.080(2). Because Mark alleged below that the information in the joint petition worksheet concerning child support was inaccurate or false, the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to NRS125B.080(2) to modify the terms of the agreed-upon child support obligation.

The district court erred by finding the child support obligation in the decree complied with Nevada law

Again, we review a district court's decision concerning child support for an abuse of discretion, see Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543, though we review questions of law de novo, see Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. ___, ___, 412 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2018). Settlement agreements in family law cases are valid and generally enforceable as long as they are not unconscionable, illegal or in violation of public policy. Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. ___, ___, 385 P.3d 982, 984 (Ct. App. 2016). However, once a party asks the district court to review an order that is based upon an agreement, that court must apply Nevada law and not contract principles. See Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. 106, 111, 345 P.3d 1044, 1047-48 (2015). For agreements regarding child support obligations, the agreement must be "calculated and reviewed under the statutory child support formula and guidelines in NRS 125B.070 and NRS.080." Fernandez, 126 at 34, 222 P.3d at 1035.

Mark argues the district court erred by not modifying the child support obligation in the decree to comply with Nevada's statutory child support formula. He contends, among other things, that the decree is statutorily deficient because it does not include a calculation of the child support obligation under the statute, before providing a deviation from that statutory formula. We agree.

NRS 125B.080(6)(b) states that when a child support award deviates from the statutory formula, the court shall "[p]rovide in the findings of fact the amount of support that would have been established under the applicable formula." In this case, however, neither the decree nor the parties'worksheets include these required findings. Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law when it determined that the decree complied with Nevada law. See Miller, 134 Nev. at ___, 412 P.3d at 1085-86 (noting a district court commits reversible error if it fails to provide "in the findings of fact the amount of support that would have been established under the applicable formula" (quoting NRS 125B.080(6)(b))).

Furthermore, changes in child support are considered matters of public policy and must be considered with regard to the best interests of the child. See Fernandez, 126 Nev. at 33-36, 222 P.3d at 1034-35; Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 431, 216 P.3d 213, 228 (2009). Here, the district court denied Mark's motion using principles of contract law and without considering the best interests of the child receiving support. As a result, the district court also erred by denying Mark's motion without considering the best interests of the child.⁵

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's orders regarding child support. We remand this matter for a hearing for the district court to determine the appropriate amount of child support.

The district court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the decree's division of community property The district court asserted that it lost jurisdiction to modify the decree's division of community property six months after the decree was entered. This is correct. See Kramer v. Kramer, 96 Nev. 759, 762, 616 P.2d 395, 397-98 (noting that, because of NRCP 60(b)'s six-month time limit, a divorce decree in all respects, except as to custody and support of minor children, becomes "unmodifiable six months after the decree [is] entered"). Nevertheless, the district court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the decree's division of property. See Davidson v. Davidson, 132 Nev. ___, ___, ___, 382 P.3d 880, 883, 886 (2016) (holding that the district court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce a divorce decrees until the six-year statute of limitations expires); see also Holyoak v. Holyoak, Docket No. 67490 (Order of Affirmance, May 19, 2016) ("[T]he time requirements of NRCP 60(b) do not apply" when a district court interprets and enforces the terms of a decree).

Although Mark's original motion nominally requested the district court to set aside or modify the decree after the six-month time limit had expired, "[a] party is not bound by the label he puts on his papers." Doan v. Wilkerson, 130 Nev. 449, 454, 327 P.3d 498, 501 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts should examine the substance, rather than the name, of a party's request to determine whether that party seeks to modify or only clarify and enforce a divorce decree. See Murphy v. Murphy, 64 Nev. 440, 449-51, 183 P.2d 632, 636-37 (1947). Here, the substance of Mark's motion was a request for clarity and enforcement of his interest awarded in the divorce decree.⁶ Accordingly, we conclude the district court possessed jurisdiction to address Mark's motion.The district court erred by interpreting the decree's house provision as awarding Mark a lien

Mark contends the district court erred by refusing to supply a time for sale term and by interpreting the decree's provision concerning the house as awarding him a lien on the house. Celeste counters that the district court's understanding of the parties' agreement is supported by the plain language of the agreement and that the decree unambiguously gave her the power to choose when to sell the house.

When a district court's interpretation of a divorce decree presents a question of law, this court reviews such an interpretation de novo. Henson v. Henson, 130 Nev. 814, 818, 334 P.3d 933, 936 (2014). "Contract interpretation is a question of law . . . ." Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC v. Washoe Cty., 127 Nev. 451, 460, 254 P.3d 641, 647 (2011). The district court's interpretation of the "plain text" of the provision in the decree concerning the marital home presents a question of contract interpretation that we will review de novo. See Henson, 130 Nev. at 818, 334 P.3d at 936.

Here, Mark and Celeste used the following language in their divorce...