Barrett v. Tri-Coast Pharmacy, Inc.

518 F.Supp.3d 810

Joseph BARRETT, Plaintiff,

v.TRI-COAST PHARMACY, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 18-14872 (RBK/AMD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage.

Signed February 10, 2021

John A. Mattiacci, Jr., Mattiacci Law LLC, Moorestown, NJ, for Plaintiff.

ROBERT B. KUGLER, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's second motion for Default Judgment (Doc. No. 21). The motion is unopposed. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Joseph Barrett ("Plaintiff") is an otherwise healthy 57-year-old adult residing in New Jersey. (Doc. No. 14, Am. Compl. at ¶ 1). In December of 2016, he was prescribed injectable human chorionic gonadotropin ("hCG"), which was purportedly developed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant Tri-Coast Pharmacy, Inc.—a Florida corporation that manufacturers, distributes, and sells pharmaceutical products to medical facilities and pharmacies throughout the United States, including New Jersey, for use on patients as injections. (Id. at ¶¶ 2,9). At the time Plaintiff was prescribed the pharmaceutical, Defendant Kevin O'Connell, a citizen of South Carolina, was a pharmacist for and principal and/or officer of Tri-Coast Pharmacy. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 21). Shortly after administering the hCG, Plaintiff developed symptoms including diarrhea, gas, bloating, pain, joint pain, and pain in various parts of his body. (Id. at ¶ 11). He received treatment by his physician to alleviate these symptoms in December of 2016 and the years following. (Id. ). However, subsequent testing revealed a bacterial infection and in January of 2017, Plaintiff underwent surgery for infective synovitis of the wrist. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13).

In May of 2017, Tri-Coast Pharmacy recalled products due to bacterial contamination. (Id. at ¶ 14). That same month, Plaintiff received a recall notice from Tri-Coast Pharmacy which indicated that the injectable hCG he had been prescribed was subject to the recall. (Id. at ¶ 15). It is believed the contamination stemmed from the unsanitary environment in which Defendant Tri-Coast Pharmacy manufactured its pharmaceuticals. (Id. at ¶¶ 24–25). Defendants allegedly did not disclose the unsanitary nature of their facilities to the hospitals, physicians, and consumers to which that their products were distributed to. (Id. at ¶ 26). As a result, Plaintiff could not discover the cause of his bacterial infection and infective synovitis until after he received the recall notice in May of 2017. (Id. at ¶ 27).

B. Procedural Posture

October 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendant Tri-Coast Pharmacy and Defendant Kevin O'Connell alleging (1) violations of the New Jersey Products Liability Act; (2) breach of implied warranties; (3) breach of express warranties; (4) negligence; (5) negligence per se; (6) fraud under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and NJSA 56:8-1 ; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff sought damages for past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, and pain and suffering. (Id. at ¶¶ 29–33). Subsequently, on December 6, 2018, Defendant Tri-Coast Pharmacy and Defendant Kevin O'Connell were served with a copy of the summon and complaint. (Doc. No. 4). Defendants were required to answer, move, or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's complaint by December 27, 2018. Defendants’ did not do so and consequently, Plaintiff requested an entry of default from the Clerk of the Court on March 14, 2019. (Doc. No. 6). The Clerk granted Plaintiff's request for entry of default that same day. Plaintiff then moved for an entry of default judgment on March 28, 2019. (Doc. No. 8). This Court denied Plaintiff's motion as moot because he failed to properly allege diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff amended the complaint but still failed to properly allege diversity jurisdiction causing this Court to dismiss the case without prejudice. (Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which this Court granted on October 4, 2019. (Doc. No. 13). The complaint was then amended to properly plead diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 14). On March 2, 2020, Plaintiff made his second request for entry of default by the Clerk of the Court. (Doc. No. 17). It was granted on March 9^th. Plaintiff now moves for an entry of default judgment against Defendants Tri-Coast Pharmacy and Kevin O'Connell. (Doc. No. 21).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) allows the Court, upon a plaintiff's motion, to enter default judgment against a defendant that has failed to plead or otherwise defend a claim for affirmative relief. The Court should accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint by virtue of the defendant's default except for those allegations pertaining to damages. Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky , 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535–36 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin , 908 F.2d 1142, 1146 (3d Cir. 1990) ). The Court also does not adopt a plaintiff's legal conclusions because whether the facts set forth an actionable claim is for the Court to decide. Doe v. Simone , No. 12-5825, 2013 WL 3772532, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013).

While the decision to enter default judgment is left principally to the discretion of the district court, there is a well-established preference in the Third Circuit for cases to be decided on the merits rather than by default judgment whenever practicable. Hritz v. Woma Corp. , 732 F.2d 1178, 1180–81 (3d Cir. 1984). Consequently, the Court must address a number of issues before deciding whether a default judgment is warranted in the instant case. If the Court finds default judgment to be appropriate, the next step is for the Court to determine a proper award of damages. Slaughter v. Moya , No. 17-6767, 2018 WL 3742622, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018).

III. Discussion

A. Court's Jurisdiction

First, the Court must determine whether it has both subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cause of action and whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y.C. v. Romash , No. 09-3510, 2010 WL 2400163, at *1 (D.N.J. June 9, 2010). This is to prevent issuance of a void judgment and a collateral attack. See id. citing Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan , 802 F.2d 1200, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 1986).

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, "the party asserting jurisdiction must show that there is complete diversity of citizenship among the parties" as well as an amount in controversy that exceeds the statutory threshold. Schneller v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr. , 387 Fed.Appx. 289, 292 (3d Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has alleged that he resides in and is a citizen of New Jersey and that Defendant Tri-Coast Pharmacy is incorporated in the state of and has its principal place of business in Florida. (Doc. No. 14, Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1–3). Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kevin O'Connell resides in and is a citizen of the state of South Carolina. (Id. at ¶ 5). Damages are alleged to be in excess of $75,000. (Doc. No. 14, Am. Compl.). Accordingly, because the Plaintiff and Defendants are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory threshold, this Court has diversity jurisdiction.

Turning to the issue of personal jurisdiction, if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court does not have authority to render a default judgment, and any such judgment will be deemed void.

Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White , 536 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2008). In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff's complaint need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Allaham v. Naddaf , 635 F. App'x 32, 36 (3d Cir. 2015). A district court sitting in diversity may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed under the law of the forum state. New Jersey's long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution. Thus, the standard for a federal court sitting in diversity is whether a "defendant has minimum contacts, such that the exercise of jurisdictions comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Allaham , 635 F. App'x at 37.

There are two distinct theories under which personal jurisdiction can arise: general and specific. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp. , 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994). A court has general jurisdiction when a defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum state. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co. , 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007). A court has specific jurisdiction when a plaintiffs claim arises from a defendant's actions within the forum state, such that the defendant could "reasonably anticipate being haled into [the state's] court[s]." Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co. , 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff does not allege that this Court has general jurisdiction over Defendant Tri-Coast Pharmacy and Kevin O'Connell. Rather, it appears Plaintiff is alleging that this Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendants because they allegedly sold the contaminated pharmaceuticals in numerous states, including New Jersey. (See Doc. No. 14, Am. Compl. at ¶ 16).

To satisfy federal due process limits, which are incorporated by the New Jersey long-arm statute, a defendant's minimum contacts are examined in relation "to the nature of the interactions and type of jurisdiction asserted." Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd. , 458 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2006). For specific jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has delineated three due process requirements: (1) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum; (2) the litigation must...