Barron v. State

629 S.W.3d 557

Jamai Nicole BARRON, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 11-19-00125-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

Opinion filed April 15, 2021

Discretionary Review Refused August 25, 2021

Benjamin R. Smith, District Attorney, for Appellee.

David Matthew Crook, Lubbock, for Appellant.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

OPINION

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS, JUSTICE

The jury convicted Appellant, Jamai Nicole Barron, of the second-degree felony offense of tampering with physical evidence, namely human corpses. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(c), (d)(1) (West 2016). The jury assessed Appellant's punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of ten years. Appellant's sentence of confinement was suspended, and Appellant was placed on community supervision for ten years. The jury also assessed a fine of $10,000.

In four issues on appeal, Appellant asserts (1) that the trial court committed cumulative error in declaring Appellant's justification defense irrelevant and preventing Appellant from arguing self-defense and presenting evidence of justification defenses throughout the case, (2) that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict, (3) that the trial court erred in omitting a jury charge instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted tampering, and (4) that the trial court erred in omitting from the court's charge jury instructions as well as application paragraphs on Appellant's justification defenses. We first address Appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue, then Appellant's cumulative-error and justification issues, then Appellant's issue related to the lesser included offense of attempted tampering. We affirm.

Background Facts

Around 10:00 p.m. one night, Appellant began drinking, smoking marihuana, and using cocaine with her boyfriend Juan Ramon Barron and one other friend. Around 4:00 a.m., Appellant and Juan heard a knock at the back door. Juan grabbed a knife before answering the door, as they were not expecting company. Two men dressed in all black and wearing ski masks were at the door. Juan rushed toward them, yelling, "You ain't going to rob me...." A fight ensued between Juan and the two men. Appellant grabbed two knives and joined Juan in the fight. Juan repeatedly stabbed one of the men—who was holding a gun—in the neck, face, and "anywhere [he] could reach." Juan took the gun from him, turned around to the other man fighting with Appellant, and "shot the guy until [Juan] thought he was dead."

Both Juan and Appellant were still intoxicated during these events and began to panic. They decided to drag the corpses to the side of the trailer, pull back the skirt from the bottom of the trailer, and stuff the bodies under the trailer. They placed the skirt back on the trailer and cleaned the trailer and yard with bleach and water. Juan dug up the areas of dirt that were covered in blood, placed the blood-soaked dirt along with his bloody clothes in blankets, and hid them behind a shed. Juan wrapped the gun in a paper towel and placed the gun, along with the shell casings, in a pizza box on the kitchen table. After sobering up, Appellant and Juan decided to "turn[ ] [themselves] in" and went to the police station to inform the police of what had occurred. Appellant was then arrested and charged with tampering with physical evidence. The jury convicted Appellant, and this appeal followed.¹

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her second issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant actually completed the act of tampering with evidence. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ; Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778.

It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant's guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State , 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ). Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13.

A person commits the offense of tampering with evidence if, "knowing that an offense has been committed, [the person] alters, destroys, or conceals any ... thing with intent to impair its ... availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation of or official proceeding related to the offense." PENAL § 37.09(d)(1). This statute requires proof of three elements: the defendant (1) knew an offense was committed; (2) concealed, altered, or destroyed a thing; and (3) intended to impair the availability of that thing as evidence in any subsequent investigation or official proceeding related to the offense. Stahmann v. State , 602 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

A person has knowledge of the commission of a murder where that person is aware at the time of his alleged acts that someone intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another individual. See PENAL § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2019); Hall v. State , 283 S.W.3d 137, 159 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. ref'd).

Proof of actual concealment "requires a showing that the allegedly concealed item was hidden, removed from sight or notice, or kept from discovery or observation." Stahmann , 602 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting Stahmann v. State , 548 S.W.3d 46, 57 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018), aff'd , 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) ); see also Rotenberry v. State , 245 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd) (noting in dicta that "[the defendant] concealed physical evidence —[the victim's] body—when [the defendant] hid the body in the septic tank").

A person acts with the intention to impair the availability of the evidence in a subsequent investigation or proceeding related to the offense when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to impair the availability of the evidence. See PENAL § 6.03(a) (West 2011). The focus of this element is only whether Appellant intended to impair the availability of the thing by concealing it; it is not an element of the offense that concealment actually impair the evidence's availability. See PENAL § 37.09(d)(1) ; Carnley v. State , 366 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref'd) ; Lewis v. State , 56 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).

Here, the record demonstrates that Appellant was aware that Juan stabbed one man repeatedly in the face and neck, grabbed the gun from him, and "shot the [other] guy until [Juan] thought he was dead." When Appellant subsequently talked to police, she stated that she and Juan "had done something bad" because "someone broke into their house and that [Appellant and Juan] had killed them." Appellant expressly admitted to police that they dragged the corpses by their feet to the side of the trailer, removed the skirting from the trailer, "stuffed them under the house," placed the skirt back on the trailer, and proceeded to clean up the trailer and yard with bleach and water. Juan also dug up the areas of dirt that were covered in blood, placed the blood-soaked dirt and their bloody clothes in blankets, and hid the blankets along with drugs behind a shed. Appellant admitted to seeing Juan wrap the gun in a paper towel and place the gun, along with the shell casings, in a pizza box on the kitchen table.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was aware that a murder had been committed, that she actually concealed the corpses, and that she did so intending to impair the availability of the corpses as evidence in a subsequent investigation or proceeding related to the underlying offense.

Appellant also asserts the law of justification and renunciation as defenses to her conduct. For reasons discussed in the remainder of this opinion, neither the law of justification nor renunciation applies to a charge of tampering with evidence under these facts. We overrule Appellant's second issue.

II. Justification Defense

In her first issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court committed cumulative error in declaring Appellant's justification defenses irrelevant and in preventing Appellant from presenting evidence of justification defenses throughout the trial. The indictment read, in relevant part, that Appellant "did then and there, knowing that an offense had been committed, to-wit: murder, intentionally or knowingly...