Barry v. Corrigan

79 F.Supp.3d 712

Walter BARRY, et al., Plaintiffs

v.Maura CORRIGAN, Defendant.

Case No. 13–cv–13185.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed Jan. 9, 2015.

Elan S. Nichols, Jacqueline Doig, Saginaw, MI, Miriam J. Aukerman, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Grand Rapids, MI, Sofia V. Nelson, ACLU of Michigan, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Joshua S. Smith, William R. Morris, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, Kristin M. Heyse, Michigan Department of the Attorney General, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S [81] MOTION TO DISMISS AND / OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' [39] AMENDED MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' [49] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JUDITH E. LEVY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action against defendant Maura Corrigan, in her official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”), challenging Michigan's law and policy governing disqualification of “fugitive felons” from various forms of public assistance, including federal food assistance. Under that law and policy, defendant disqualifies applicants and recipients of federally-funded public assistance benefits based on a match between the applicant's / recipient's name and a record of an outstanding felony warrant in the Michigan Law Enforcement Information Network (hereinafter “LEIN”). Defendant informs persons of their disqualification by means of a written notice. Plaintiffs challenge that notice as failing to provide the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as failing to meet the notice requirements of the Food and Nutrition Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. Plaintiffs also contend the Michigan law and DHS policy themselves violate and are preempted by the Act.

Before the Court are defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 81), plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39), and plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant's Motion to Dismiss with respect to plaintiff Woodward only, and deny defendant's motion with respect to the remainder of the relief sought; grant plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class; and grant plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Factual background

Congress first established a permanent Food Stamp Program in 1964. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88–525, 78 Stat. 703 (1964). The purpose of the program was “to promote the general welfare” and “to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.” Id. § 2. Congress made significant revisions to the program in 1977. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95–113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). In 2008, the Food Stamp Program was renamed the “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program” (hereinafter “SNAP”) and the Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (hereinafter “SNAP Act”).¹ Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110–234, 122 Stat. 1092 (2008).

SNAP is administered through state programs, although the benefits are funded by the federal government. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013, 2020(a), (d), (e). The state programs are governed by criteria set forth in the SNAP Act. Those criteria include the standards for qualification for and disqualification from SNAP benefits. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014 –2015. The eligibility standards in state plans must be “in accordance with sections 2014 and 2015 of [the SNAP Act] and “include no additional requirements imposed by the State agency.” ” Id. § 2020(e)(5). States are expressly prohibited from imposing “any other standards of eligibility as a condition for participating in the program,” Id. § 2014(b).

Of relevance here, section 2015(k) provides that:

No member of a household who is otherwise eligible to participate in the supplemental nutrition assistance program shall be eligible to participate in the program as a member of that or any other household during any period during which the individual is—

(A) fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing, for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing or that, in the case of New Jersey, is a high misdemeanor under the law of New Jersey; or(B) violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under a Federal or State law.

7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(1).

Michigan's SNAP program, titled Food Assistance Program (hereinafter “FAP”), is administered by DHS. DHS also administers other public assistance programs, including the Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Day Care Program, and Refugee Assistance Program.

Since October 8, 2011, Michigan's Social Welfare Act prohibits DHS from granting public assistance benefits to any person who is “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual in this or any other jurisdiction.” 2011 P.A. 198, codified at Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b. The Act also requires DHS and Michigan State Police (hereinafter “MSP”) to develop an automated program that compares DHS' list of public assistance recipients with MSP's information regarding outstanding felony warrants or extradition warrants. Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10c. That program, dubbed the “fugitive felon interface,” has been operational since January 2013. (Dkt. 49–2 & 49–3, Ex. A & B to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J.)

DHS' computer eligibility system is known as “Bridges.” Pursuant to the policies set forth in its Bridges Eligibility and Bridges Administrative Manuals [hereinafter “BEM” and “BAM”], DHS disqualifies persons from food assistance benefits who are (1) subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge, (2) subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant for extradition arising from a criminal charge, or (3) admitted fugitive felons. (Dkt. 49–5 & 49–6, Exs. D & E to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 204); Dkt. 49–7 & 49–8, Ex. F & G to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 203).) Bridges automatically identifies matches between the DHS benefit list and the MSP warrant information. Bridges then sets the benefit applicant's / recipient's file to close, generates a criminal justice disqualification notice that is sent to the applicant / recipient, and automatically schedules the reduction or termination of benefits. (Dkt. 49–14, Ex. M to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 2/1/13); Dkt. 49–15, Ex. N to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 5/1/13); Dkt. 49–16, Ex. O to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 7/1/13); Dkt. 49–17, Ex. P to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 2–3.)

The individual plaintiffs in this case are Walter Barry, Heather Woodward, Donitha Copeland, Kenneth Anderson, and Westside Mothers, a non-profit organization with 450–500 dues-paying members that advocates on behalf of public assistance applicants and recipients. Barry, Woodward, Copeland, and Anderson have all received at least one criminal justice disqualification notice and have been threatened with reduction or termination of food assistance benefits, or have experienced actual reduction or termination of benefits, based on the criminal justice disqualification.

Plaintiffs bring four counts in their Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 70). Counts I, II, and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 :

• Count I: Denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs allege defendant's criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, before denial / reduction / termination of public assistance benefits, as a matter of constitutional law.

• Count II: Denial of due process under the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program Act (“SNAP Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Plaintiffs allege the criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs' rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before denial / reduction / termination of public assistance benefits, as a matter of statutory law.

• Count III: Violation of rights to receive food assistance under the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege Mich. Comp. Laws 400.10b, as well as defendant's policies enacted pursuant to that law, violate plaintiffs' federal statutory right to food assistance benefits.

• Count IV: Preemption of Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and defendant's fugitive felon policy by the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2015(k), and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege the SNAP Act expressly preempts Mich. Comp. Laws 400.10b and defendant's fugitive felon policy and practices.

The Court will begin its analysis with the issues of whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit and whether their claims are moot. The Court will then address plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the remaining issues in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

II. Standing / mootness

Defendant argues for dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. Defendant further maintains that the claims of plaintiffs Barry, Woodward, and Copeland (and therefore, Westside Mothers) are moot, and should therefore be dismissed. (Dkt. 75, Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. xi.)

A. Standing

It is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III” that a plaintiff must have standing to bring a case in federal court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Constitutional standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show (1) a “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” injury, that is (2) “fairly traceable” to the defendant's conduct, and is (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at...