Bartalsky v. Osborn

337 Mich.App. 378

977 N.W.2d 574

Donald BARTALSKY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. Zachary OSBORN, Kaitlyn Moug, and Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees,andWilliam Beaumont Hospital, John Doe Construction Company, and John Roe, also known as John Doe, Defendants.

No. 349317

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted October 7, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided May 27, 2021, 9:00 a.m.

Wigod & Falzon, PC (by Eric J. Rosenberg ) for plaintiff.

Blanco Wilczynski, PLLC, Troy (Orlando L. Blanco and Derek S. Wilczynski ) for defendants.

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Jansen and Borrello, JJ.

Swartzle, P.J. Defendants Zachary Osborn and Kaitlyn Moug are emergency medical technicians (EMTs) who work for defendant Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc. (CEMS). The two EMTs were transporting plaintiff Donald Bartalsky on a stretcher in a hospital parking lot, and plaintiff injured his hip when the stretcher fell over. Plaintiff sued defendants under theories of ordinary negligence and medical malpractice, but the trial court dismissed the claims under the immunity provision of the Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA), MCL 333.20901 et seq.

On appeal, we conclude that the mere transportation of a patient is not sufficient to meet the requirement that the act or omission causing the injury occur "in the treatment of a patient" under MCL 333.20965(1). Accordingly, the EMSA's immunity for acts or omissions that do not rise to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct does not apply here, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an injury that occurred in the parking lot of William Beaumont Hospital. Plaintiff needed transportation to the hospital for evaluation of a nonemergency condition. Osborn and Moug transported him to the hospital, where he was evaluated and discharged. After discharge, the EMTs began the process of returning plaintiff to his rehabilitation clinic. Defendants claim that, consistent with their training, the EMTs secured plaintiff "with a 5-point restraint system" and moved the stretcher in a "semi-Fowler" position. A semi-Fowler position is a clinical position in which a patient is placed on an ambulance stretcher or hospital bed on their back with the head and trunk raised to an angle between 15 and 45 degrees.

According to plaintiff, Osborn and Moug began to wheel him out, but "[w]hile still in the Beaumont parking lot," Osborn and Moug "caused the wheels on the stretcher to hit some debris," causing the stretcher to "tip over" and plaintiff's left shoulder and hip to strike the pavement. Plaintiff alleges that Osborn and Moug "were further negligent in somehow (unwittingly) enabling the already injured Plaintiff to fall a second time on the concrete." In contrast, defendants claim that "as the two EMTs were transferring their patient from the ER to the ambulance on a stretcher, one of the stretcher wheels came in contact with debris in the ambulance bay and began to tip." Defendants assert that "the EMTs were able to maintain a grip of the stretcher when it tipped, mitigating the impact with the pavement," but that "[a]fter Plaintiff disregarded the instructions of the two EMTs to remain on the ground while they attended to the stretcher, he stood up and fell to the ground, striking his left side on the pavement" and breaking his left hip. The parties’ differing factual accounts of the incident were not resolved below and are not pertinent to the critical issue on appeal.

Plaintiff sued defendants, alleging both negligence and professional malpractice, but not gross negligence. Defendants moved for summary disposition based on the argument that, under MCL 333.20965(1) and (1)(d), unless the acts or omissions of a licensed EMT and life-support agency are the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct, no liability will be imposed on them for providing services consistent with their licensure or training. The trial court agreed and dismissed plaintiff's claims against defendants, and plaintiff appealed. The trial court also dismissed several claims against other defendants, though these are not the subject of this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Ardt v Titan Ins Co , 233 Mich App 685, 688, 593 N.W.2d 215 (1999). Defendants moved the trial court for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity), (8) (failure to state a claim), and (10) (no genuine issue of material fact). The trial court granted the motion on the ground that defendants were not subject to claims of negligence short of gross negligence under the EMSA, thus indicating that it granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (8).

In reviewing a trial court's decision under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we consider the record evidence to determine whether the defendant is entitled to immunity. Poppen v Tovey , 256 Mich App 351, 353-354, 664 N.W.2d 269 (2003). In contrast, "[a] motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone." Smith v Stolberg , 231 Mich App 256, 258, 586 N.W.2d 103 (1998). In this appeal, however, the specific facts necessary to resolve the matter are not in dispute, and therefore the question before us focuses on the legal meaning of the immunity provision of the EMSA.

When construing a statute, we do not defer to the construction adopted by a trial court or administrative agency. Stirling v Leelanau Co , 336 Mich App 575, 578 & n. 2, 970 NW2d 910 (2021). Rather, we review the matter de novo. Id. at 578 n. 2, 579, 970 N.W.2d 910. When doing so, we are required to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Van Buren Co Ed Ass'n v Decatur Pub Sch , 309 Mich App 630, 643, 872 N.W.2d 710 (2015). "The Legislature is presumed to intend the meaning clearly expressed, and this Court must give effect to the plain, ordinary, or generally accepted meaning of the Legislature's terms." D'Agostini Land Co LLC v Dep't of Treasury , 322 Mich App 545, 554, 912 N.W.2d 593 (2018). "Only when ambiguity exists does the Court turn to common canons of construction for aid in construing a statute's meaning." Id. at 554-555, 912 N.W.2d 593.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE IMMUNITY PROVISION OF THE EMSA

The focus of our review on appeal is the immunity provision found in MCL 333.20965(1) of the EMSA. The provision reads in relevant part:

Unless an act or omission is the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the acts or omissions of a medical first responder, emergency medical technician, emergency medical technician specialist, paramedic, medical director of a medical control authority or his or her designee, or ... an individual acting as a clinical preceptor of a department-approved education program sponsor while providing services to a patient outside a hospital, in a hospital before transferring patient care to hospital personnel, or in a clinical setting that are consistent with the individual's licensure or additional training required by the medical control authority ... or consistent with an approved procedure for that particular education program do not impose liability in the treatment of a patient on those individuals or any of the following persons:

* * *

(d) The life support agency or an officer, member of the staff, or other employee of the life support agency.

Our Supreme Court has recognized that the Legislature enacted the EMSA "to (1) provide for the uniform regulation of emergency medical services, and (2) limit emergency personnel's exposure to liability." Jennings v Southwood , 446 Mich. 125, 133, 521 N.W.2d 230 (1994). As the Court elaborated in Jennings , "Before the statutory immunity, emergency personnel were liable for their ordinary negligence. The Legislature, dissatisfied with this situation, enacted the EMSA limiting liability to situations of gross negligence or wilful misconduct." Id. at 134, 521 N.W.2d 230. Thus, by enacting the EMSA, "the Legislature intended to shield emergency medical personnel from the very liability they were previously exposed to—liability for ordinary negligence." Id.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Osborn and Moug qualify as EMTs under MCL 333.20965(1) and that CEMS qualifies as a life-support agency under Subdivision (d). Moreover, the parties contend, and we agree, that Osborn and Moug were transporting plaintiff when they wheeled him on the stretcher from the hospital toward the ambulance. The parties disagree, however, on whether immunity applies to covered persons and entities even in situations involving "nonemergency transportation" of a patient. Related to this, the parties spend considerable time and resources focused on whether plaintiff's injury occurred during an emergency or nonemergency circumstance. And yet, as we explain, the key question on appeal is whether "transportation" alone—emergency or otherwise—qualifies for immunity under MCL 333.20965(1) of the EMSA.

We begin with the specific text of MCL 333.20965(1). The provision lists the occupations that are subject to immunity: "a medical first responder, emergency medical technician, emergency medical technician specialist, paramedic, medical director of a medical control authority or his or her designee, or ... an individual acting as a clinical preceptor of a department-approved education program sponsor." This list of covered occupations is followed by a description of the location where services are provided: "outside a hospital, in a hospital before transferring patient care to hospital personnel, or in a clinical setting." The statute sets forth two additional, necessary conditions before immunity will attach: the act or omission must occur "while providing services to a patient" and "in the treatment of a patient."

As noted, there is no question on appeal that Osborn and Moug were engaged in a covered occupation, nor is there a question that CEMS is...