Barton v. Warren Cnty.

JULIA BARTON, a/k/a Julia Benson;and McKENNA S. FRANK, a/k/a McKenna S. Brodie, Plaintiffs, v. WARREN CTY.; NATHAN YORK,in his official capacity as Sheriff of Warren Cty. and individually, a/k/a Bud;and AL MADAY, in his official capacityas Div. Commander of the Warren Cty. Corr. Facility and Individually, Defendants.

1:19-CV-1061 (GTS/DJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 7, 2020

APPEARANCES:

OFFICE OF RONALD J. KIM

Counsel for Plaintiffs

P.O. Box 318

Saratoga Springs, NY 12866

JOHNSON & LAWS, LLC

Counsel for Defendants

648 Plank Road, Suite 204

Clifton Park, NY 12020

OF COUNSEL:

RONALD J. KIM, ESQ.

GREGG T. JOHNSON, ESQ.

LORAINE C. JELINEK, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Julia Barton ("Plaintiff Barton") and McKenna S. Frank ("Plaintiff Frank") against Warren County ("Defendant County"), Nathan York ("Defendant York"), and Al Maday ("Defendant Maday") (collectively "Defendants"), is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and/or for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (Dkt. No. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Summary of Plaintiffs' Complaint

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Defendants discriminated against and retaliated against both Plaintiff Barton and Plaintiff Frank after they informed Defendants that they were pregnant. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 [Plfs.' Compl.].) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts the following eight claims against all Defendants: (1) a sexual discrimination claim through a hostile work environment under Title VII, (2) a sexual discrimination claim through a hostile work environment under New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), (3) a sexual discrimination claim through disparate treatment under Title VII, (4) a sexual discrimination claim through disparate treatment under NYSHRL, (5) a pregnancy discrimination claim under Title VII, (6) a pregnancy discrimination claim under NYSHRL, (7) a retaliation claim under Title VII, and (8) a retaliation claim under NYSHRL. (Id.) Familiarity with the factual allegations supporting these claims in Plaintiff's Complaint is assumed in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties. (Id.)

B. Parties' Briefing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Generally, in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants assert the following five arguments: (1) all federal claims against Defendants York and Maday must be dismissed as a matter of law because Second Circuit precedent maintains that Title VII does not provide for individual liability; (2) all of Plaintiffs' state law claims under NYSHRL must be dismissedbecause Plaintiffs failed to timely serve a Notice of Claim ("NOC") on Defendants under NYSHRL; (3) Plaintiffs fail to plead facts plausibly suggesting that they were exposed to a hostile work environment under Title VII; (4) Plaintiffs fail to state a retaliation claim under both federal and state law because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit, and do not allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs under either Title VII or NYSHRL; and (5) Plaintiffs fail to state disparate treatment claims under Title VII because they fail to allege facts plausibly suggesting that either Plaintiff was treated any differently than any other employee who was unable to fully perform the essential functions of their jobs. (See generally Dkt. No. 4-4 [Defs.' Memo. of Law].)

Generally, in opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs assert the following six arguments: (1) Defendants impermissibly assert, and rely on, facts in their motion to dismiss, which should be disregarded as a matter of law; (2) Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their pregnancy claims because they have alleged facts plausibly suggesting that both Plaintiffs suffered adverse employment actions because they were pregnant; (3) Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their hostile work environment claims because they have alleged facts plausibly suggesting that they were subject to an objectively a hostile work environment; (4) Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their disparate treatment claims because they have alleged facts plausibly suggesting that they were treated differently than each other; (5) Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their retaliation claims because they have alleged facts plausibly suggesting Defendants retaliated against them based on their pregnancy-status; and (6) Plaintiffs' NYSHRL claims against Defendants York and Maday are properly before the Court, because a NOC is not required to assert such claims against county employees. (See generally Dkt. No. 5 [Plfs.'Memo. of Law].)

Generally, in reply to Plaintiffs' response, Defendants asserts the following five arguments: (1) Plaintiffs' federal claims against Defendants York and Maday must be dismissed as a matter of law because, in their opposition memorandum of law, Plaintiff's failed to respond to Defendants' challenges to those claims, (2) all of Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed against all Defendants because of Plaintiffs' concessions in their opposition memorandum, (3) Plaintiffs admit they cannot plead any cognizable claim for a hostile work environment under Title VII and NYSHRL, (4) Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims are patently defective because they fail to plead facts that compare similarly situated individuals to Plaintiffs, and (5) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for retaliation because Plaintiff Barton failed to allege a single subsequent retaliatory act and Plaintiff Frank failed to show a causal connection between the adverse action and alleged retaliatory motive. (See generally Dkt. No. 10.)

II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Legal Standard Governing a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

"It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Generally, a claim may be properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where a district court lacks constitutional or statutory authority to adjudicate it. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). A district court may look to evidence outside of the pleadings when resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 [2d Cir. 1996]). When a courtevaluates a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, all ambiguities must be resolved and inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113).

B. Legal Standard Governing a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds: (1) a challenge to the "sufficiency of the pleading" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cty., 549 F. Supp.2d 204, 211 nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.) (adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo review).

Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court's view, this tension between permitting a "short and plain statement" and requiring that the statement "show[]" an entitlement to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the "short and plain" pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as "simplified" and "liberal." Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that, by requiring the above-described "showing," the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that "give[s] the defendant fair notice ofwhat the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of "enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial" and "facilitat[ing] a proper decision on the merits" by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases); Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the "liberal" notice pleading standard "has its limits." 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding that a pleading has failed to meet the "liberal" notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 213 n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).

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