Bartow v. Corporal Edward Thomas, Tri-Star Motors, Inc.

MICHAEL J. BARTOW, Plaintiff, v. CORPORAL EDWARD THOMAS, TRI-STAR MOTORS, INC.,and KEVIN B. SERGENT, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-271

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: July 2, 2014

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Synopsis

Pending before the Court are Defendant Thomas's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim (ECF No. 16) and Defendants Tri-Star Motors and Sergent's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's malicious use of process claim (ECF No. 12). Both motions contend that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposes the motions. (See ECF Nos. 18 and 19). For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT both motions and will dismiss the Complaint.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court has jurisdiction over the malicious prosecution claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the malicious use of process claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)because a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

III. Background

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the disposition of the pending motions. This case stems from an investigation by the Pennsylvania State Police into certain transactions regarding the wholesale of used cars between David Humbert and Plaintiff Michael Bartow. (See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 11 and 13). Defendant Kevin B. Sergent was the President of Tri-Star Motors, Inc., and Humbert was Tri-Star's Used Car Manager. (Id. ¶¶ 9 and 13). Plaintiff is the owner of Mike's Car Lot in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 10).

On July 14, 2009, Sergent contacted the Pennsylvania State Police to report questionable transactions between Humbert and Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 11). Sergent alleged that Humbert and Plaintiff had an agreement by which Humbert would understate the value of used vehicles and then wholesale them to Plaintiff at a lower price. (Id. ¶ 13). Sergent explained that he noticed a discrepancy when he compared the actual cash value (ACV) of the vehicles in question with the prices listed on the wholesale sheets that Humbert prepared. (Id. ¶ 16). The ACV reflects the appraised wholesale value of the vehicle as determined by Humbert at the time Tri-Star purchased it. (Id. ¶ 17). The wholesale sheets reflect the price of the vehicle at the time Humbert sold it in wholesale. (Id. ¶ 18).

Thereafter, Defendant Edward R. Thomas, a Corporal with the Pennsylvania State Police, opened an investigation into the matter. (Id. ¶ 23). Based on records provided by Tri-Star, Thomas determined that Tri-Star "lost approximately eleven thousand one hundred sixty-eight dollars and fifty-five cents ($11,168.55) on one hundred twenty five (125) cars that were sold to Mr. Bartow from October 2006 to December 2007." (Id. ¶ 26).

Sergent instructed Thomas to inspect Plaintiff's records to look for further inconsistencies. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33). However, Thomas was only able to review Plaintiff's unofficial records during his investigation. (Id. ¶ 34). The prices in Plaintiff's unofficial records reflected the purchase price plus necessary repairs, and the records documented only 54 of the transactions. (Id. ¶ 35). Thomas subpoenaed financial records from both Plaintiff and Humbert; however, he was not able to identify any instances of money being transferred between the two parties as part of the alleged conspiracy. (Id. ¶ 38-39). Thomas submitted a report of his findings to the Somerset District Attorney on March 30, 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41). The report stated that Tri-Star had received $700 more for the vehicles than Humbert had asked for them. (Id. ¶ 42).

District Justice Arthur Cook "accepted charges of Theft by Deception, Criminal Conspiracy, and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property" against Plaintiff on July 7, 2010, and the case was held over for trial. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44). Sergent then filed a claim with his insurance company and received payment for the misappropriated funds. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46). All charges against Plaintiff were dismissed on December 12, 2011, "due to the Commonwealth's failure to exercise due diligence in prosecuting the case." (Id. ¶ 55).

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit to seek relief in the form of actual and compensatory damages for "loss of business, damage to reputation, and emotional distress." (Id. ¶ 73(a)). Plaintiff asserts a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Thomas anda claim for malicious use of process against Tri-Star and Sergent under Pennsylvania state law. (Id. ¶ 1). The Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim.

IV. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal of a complaint or any portion of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although the federal pleading standard has been "in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years," the standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge is now well established. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2009).

In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must conduct a two-part analysis. First, the court must separate the factual matters averred from the legal conclusions asserted. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Second, the court must determine whether the factual matters averred are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Moreover, the court must construe the alleged facts, and draw all inferences gleaned therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at 228 (citingWorldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)). However, "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, the complaint must present sufficient "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 263 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Ultimately, whether a plaintiff has shown a "plausible claim for relief" is a "context specific" inquiry that requires the district court to "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The relevant record under consideration includes the complaint and any "document integral or explicitly relied on in the complaint." U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court must permit a curative amendment, irrespective of whether a plaintiff seeks leave to amend, unless such amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236; see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).

V. Discussion

Plaintiff's Complaint contains two counts. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Thomas "deprived him of his right to be free from malicious prosecution," and asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1). In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Tri-Star and Sergent "engaged in a malicious use of process when they provided false andmisleading information to authorities for the purposes of prosecuting Plaintiff," asserting a claim under Pennsylvania state law. (Id.).

A. Count One: Malicious Prosecution

Thomas has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim contained in Count One of the Complaint. In order to succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege all five elements of his malicious prosecution claim. Thomas concedes that Plaintiff has met the first two elements; however, he contends that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged elements three through five. The Court will address only the three contested elements.

1. Probable Cause

Thomas contends that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts showing that the criminal charges against him lacked probable cause. Probable cause is an absolute defense against a claim for malicious prosecution. Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 63 (1993). "Probable cause is proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of acriminal offense." Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993). "Probable cause does not depend on the state of the case in point of fact but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party prosecuting." Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., ...