Bass v. City of Edmonds

508 P.3d 172

Brett BASS, an individual; Curtis McCullough, an Individual; Swan Seaberg, an Individual; the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., a Washington nonprofit Corporation; and National Rifle Association of America, Inc., a New York nonprofit Association, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF EDMONDS, a municipality; Edmonds Police Department, a department of the City of Edmonds, Defendants.

No. 99596-6

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued: January 11, 2022

Filed: April 21, 2022

Jessica L. Goldman, Summit Law Group, 315 5th Ave. S. Ste. 1000, Seattle, WA, 98104-2682, Molly Thomas-Jensen, Eric Tirschwell, Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund, 132 E. 43 St. # 657, New York, NY, 10017, for Plaintiffs.

Steven Walter Fogg, Eric A. Lindberg, Corr Cronin LLP, 1001 4th Ave. Ste. 3900, Seattle, WA, 98154-1051, for Defendants.

Jeremiah Miller, Fair Work Center & Working Washington, 116 Warren Ave. N. Ste. A, Seattle, WA, 98109-4977, Erica Franklin, Seattle City Attorney's Office, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 2050, Columbia Ctr., Seattle, WA, 98104-7095, Derrick Anthony De Vera, Wash. State House of Representatives, P.O. Box 40600, Olympia, WA, 98504-0600, Daniel J. Dunne Jr., Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 5600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7045, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of City of Seattle.

Timothy J. Donaldson, Walla Walla City Attorney, 15 N. 3rd Ave., Walla Walla, WA, 99362-1859, Daniel J. Dunne Jr., Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 5600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7045, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of City of Walla Walla.

Mark Edward Barber, City of Olympia, 601 4th Ave E., P.O. Box 1967, Olympia, WA, 98507-1967, Daniel J. Dunne Jr., Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 5600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7045, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of City of Olympia.

Kevin Maitland Raymond, City of Kirkland, 123 5th Ave., Kirkland, WA, 98033-6189, Daniel J. Dunne Jr., Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 5600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7045, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of City of Kirkland.

Thomas John Tobin, Attorney at Law, 1201 3rd Ave. Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3095, Kristine Elizabeth Kruger, Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave. Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3099, Jonathan Lowy, Christa Nicols, Brady, 840 First Street Ne Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20002, Roberta L. Horton, Lucy S. McMillan, John Cella, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, LLP, 601 Massachusetts Avenue Nw, Washington, DC, 20001, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Brady.

Gregory J. Wong, Attorney at Law, 3305 35th Ave. S., Seattle, WA, 98144-7003, Kai Andrew Smith, Attorney at Law, Pacifica Law Group, 1191 2nd Ave., Seattle, WA, 98101, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Gun Responsibility.

Jeffrey Burton Taraday, Lighthouse Law Group PLLC, 600 Stewart St. Ste. 400, Seattle, WA, 98101-1217, for Other Parties.

González, C.J. ¶ 1 Under our system of divided government, many elected bodies hold legislative power, including elected city councils. These councils, however, must legislate within constitutional constraints. One of those constraints is that city ordinances must not "conflict with general laws" that have been enacted by the people of our state by initiative or by our state legislature. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. Constitutional general laws that state they explicitly occupy the field, that implicitly occupy the field, or that are otherwise inconsistent with local laws preempt local lawmaking. We are asked today whether a city ordinance that requires that guns be stored safely and kept out of unauthorized hands is preempted by state law. We hold that it is.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 After robust debate following a mass shooting at the nearby Marysville Pilchuck High School, the Edmonds City Council adopted an ordinance requiring residents to safely store their firearms when not in use. Ordinance 4120, codified as Edmonds City Code (ECC) chapter 5.26. The ordinance contains two operative provisions. Under the "storage provision,"

It shall be a civil infraction for any person to store or keep any firearm in any premises unless such weapon is secured by a locking device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inaccessible or unusable to any person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized user.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, for purposes of this section, such weapon shall be deemed lawfully stored or lawfully kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user.

ECC 5.26.020. Under the "unauthorized access" provision,

It shall be a civil infraction if any person knows or reasonably should know that a minor, an at-risk person, or a prohibited person is likely to gain access to a firearm belonging to or under the control of that person, and a minor, an at-risk person, or a prohibited person obtains the firearm.

ECC 5.26.030. Violation of either provision carries a fine. ECC 5.26.040.

¶ 3 At around the same time, Washington voters enacted Initiative 1639. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 3. This initiative, among many other things, criminalizes unsafe storage of firearms but in more limited circumstances than Edmonds' ordinance. Compare RCW 9.41.360, with ECC 5.26.020, .030. The initiative specifically did not "mandate[ ] how or where a firearm must be stored." RCW 9.41.360(6).

¶ 4 The plaintiffs¹ challenged the ordinance as preempted by state law. The city moved to dismiss on the theory that the challengers did not have standing. Based on the facts alleged in the initial complaint, the trial judge found the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the safe storage section of the ordinance, ECC 5.26.020, but not the unauthorized access section, ECC 5.26.030, since they had not alleged facts that would tend to show an unauthorized person would get access to their weapons.

¶ 5 Later, both sides moved for summary judgment. Report of Proceedings at 3. The trial judge renewed her earlier determination that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the safe storage portion of the ordinance, ECC 5.26.020, but not the unauthorized access portion, ECC 5.26.030. She concluded that the storage portion of the ordinance was preempted by state law.

¶ 6 Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the entire ordinance and that the ordinance was preempted by state law. City of Edmonds v. Bass , 16 Wash. App. 2d 488, 495, 497, 481 P.3d 596 (2021). We granted review. 198 Wash.2d 1009, 497 P.3d 349 (2021). The city is supported by the cities of Seattle, Walla Walla, Olympia, and Kirkland, as well as Brady and Washington Alliance for Gun Responsibility.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 This case is here on review of summary judgment, presenting only issues of law. Our review is de novo. Wash. Ass'n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State , 174 Wash.2d 642, 652, 278 P.3d 632 (2012) (citing Pierce County v. State , 150 Wash.2d 422, 429, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) ). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material question of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). Municipal ordinances are presumed valid, and the burden is on the challenger to establish otherwise. Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima , 52 Wash.2d 617, 624, 328 P.2d 873 (1958) (citing City of Spokane v. Coon , 3 Wash.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36 (1940) ).

1. Standing

¶ 8 The city does not contest the plaintiffs' standing to challenge the storage portion of the ordinance. It contends that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the unauthorized access portion of the ordinance because they have not established they are likely to violate it. We conclude the plaintiffs have standing.

¶ 9 The plaintiffs brought their case under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, chapter 7.24 RCW, and sought injunctive relief under chapter 7.40 RCW. Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, "[a] person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute[ ] [or] municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute[ ] [or] ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights." RCW 7.24.020. The city has challenged the plaintiffs' standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. We use the common law test for standing to determine whether someone has standing under this act. Wash. State Hous. Fin. Comm'n v. Nat'l Homebuyers Fund, Inc. , 193 Wash.2d 704, 711, 445 P.3d 533 (2019) (citing Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake , 150 Wash.2d 791, 802, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) ). Under that test, a person has standing if (1) the interest they seek to protect " ‘is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question’ " and (2) " ‘the challenged action has caused injury in fact, economic or otherwise, to the party seeking standing.’ " Id. at 711-12, 445 P.3d 533 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grant County , 150 Wash.2d at 802, 83 P.3d 419 ). Courts take a more liberal approach to standing for questions of major public importance. See Farris v. Munro , 99 Wash.2d 326, 330, 662 P.2d 821 (1983) (quoting Wash. Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County , 77 Wash.2d 94, 96, 459 P.2d 633 (1969) ).

¶ 10 Standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act "is not intended to be a particularly high bar. Instead, the doctrine serves to prevent a litigant from raising another's legal right." Wash. State Hous. Fin. Comm'n , 193 Wash.2d at 712, 445 P.3d 533 (citing Grant County , 150 Wash.2d at 802, 83 P.3d 419 ). Plaintiffs plainly meet the first element of the common law test—the plaintiffs own and store firearms. They are within the zone of interests regulated.

¶ 11 The city, in essence, argues that to satisfy the second element, the plaintiffs must show " ‘actual, concrete harm’ " and that they have failed to do so because they have not shown they are likely to violate the statute. Pet'r City of Edmonds' Suppl. Br. at 20 (quoting Walker v. Munro , 124 Wash.2d 402, 412, 879...