Batista v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority

JORGE BATISTA, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY Defendant.

No. 20-cv-1254 (LJL)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 9, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

LEWIS J. LIMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Jorge Batista (“Batista” or “Plaintiff”) and Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA” or “Defendant”) each move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.

For the following reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligence is granted. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is thus denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed for purposes of the present motion except where otherwise indicated.

Defendant is a public benefit corporation created by and organized under the New York State Public Authorities Law. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1263 et seq. The MTA Police Department (“MTAPD”) is a branch of the MTA created by statute. Id. § 1266-h. Metro-North Commuter Railroad (“Metro-North”) which is a public benefit corporation and subsidiary of the MTA, id. § 1265, operates the Brewster train station along Metro-North's Harlem line.

Plaintiff joined the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) as a police officer on January 10, 2005 and then joined the MTAPD as a police officer in January 2006. He is still employed as a police officer with the MTAPD.

In the late evening of March 3, 2017, Batista and his partner officer John King (“King”), were working for the MTAPD. Batista and King were answering radio calls and making security checks at train stations along Metro-North's Harlem line. From midnight until 1:00 am on March 4, 2017 they were assigned to the Brewster station. While they were in the adjacent parking lot on the opposite side of Brewster station, Batista and King saw a person making graffiti in the station's overpass and went to confront the subject, later identified as Joseph Rothenbucher (“Rothenbucher”) in the overpass. Rothenbucher resisted arrest. He grabbed his skateboard to swing it at Batista and King; King knocked the skateboard out of his hand and grabbed onto Rothenbucher. As Rothenbucher was resisting arrest, Rothenburger, Batista, and King fell through a set of double doors, with Batista closest to one of the doors and his back against the door. Batista claims that the three men just “flew through the door, ” Dkt. No. 24-3 at 44:12-15, but also testified that “it was more like [he] was pushed” against the door during the struggle, id. at 50:19-24. As soon as Batista went through the door, he fell down a three-story staircase that led from the overpass to the street below. When Batista stood up, he noticed King was running after Rothenburger away from the staircase and ran after them. Batista began to notice he was having difficulty breathing and requested an ambulance. He later discovered that he had suffered compression fractures in four vertebrae and was placed on sick leave.^[1] He returned to full duty five months later, on August 10, 2017.

Batista filed the instant complaint against the MTA on February 12, 2020, seeking $2, 000, 000 in damages together with the costs of the action. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 20. The complaint alleges that the MTA caused Plaintiff's injuries by failing to provide a safe place to work, failing to promulgate safety rules, failing to warn Plaintiff of dangers, and failing to provide necessary tools and equipment. Id. ¶ 18. The complaint additionally alleges various defects in the configuration of the door, landing, and stairs at Brewster station: the lack of a lock, check, or resistive mechanism, the direction in which the door opened, and the existence of the door at the top of the stairs. Id. After Defendant filed an answer on April 14, 2020, the parties engaged in discovery before cross moving for summary judgment on March 31, 2020. See Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” WWBITV, Inc. v. Vill. of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2009)).

In determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must view all facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, ” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008), and the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the movant meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). It may not rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts, ” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), or “on the allegations in [its] pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible, ” Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), and demonstrating more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). If “the party opposing summary judgment propounds a reasonable conflicting interpretation of a material disputed fact, ” summary judgment shall be denied. Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1983). Where each party moves for summary judgment, “each party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Morales v. QuintelEnt., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ., 667 F.2d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 1981)).

DISCUSSION

FELA provides in relevant part: “Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or employees of such carrier.” 45 U.S.C. § 51.

To recover damages under FELA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:

(1) the defendant is a railroad engaged in interstate commerce; (2) the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant in interstate commerce, acting in the course of his employment; (3) the defendant or one of its employees or agents was negligent; and (4) such negligence played a part, no matter how slight, in bringing about an injury to the plaintiff.

Mele v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 2006 WL 2255080, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (quoting Mueller v. Long Island R.R. Co., 1999 WL 1201747, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1999)).

A plaintiff must also “prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation.” Tufariello v. Long IslandR.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Sinclair v. Long Island R.R. Co., 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1993)). “At the same time, the plaintiff's burden in making a showing of causation and negligence is lighter under FELA than it would be at common law because ‘the theory of FELA is that where the employer's conduct falls short of the high standard required of him by the Act and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability ensues.'” Id. (quoting Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1958)). “Despite this lenient standard, ‘claimants must at least offer some evidence' as to each element of negligence.” Houser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 264 F.Supp.3d 470, 478 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Sinclair, 985 F.2d at 77).

Neither party disputes that the first two elements are met—that the MTA is a railroad engaged in interstate commerce or that Plaintiff was an employee acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See Mele, 2006 WL 2255080, at *2 (“The MTA operates as an interstate common carrier within the meaning of the FELA.”) (citing Greene v. Long IslandR.R. Co., 280 F.3d 224, 240 (2d Cir. 2002)). Instead, the parties dispute whether the MTA was negligent and whether that negligence caused Plaintiff's injury.

In particular, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the theories that: (i) the configuration was unsafe because it was reasonably foreseeable that someone could come into unwanted contact with a door that offered no resistance and fall down the stairs given the short landing platform; (ii) the MTA had actual notice of the hazardous configuration, based on deposition testimony offered by Metro-North employee Wesley Kennen (“Kennen”), or at least constructive notice because the hazards of the configuration were “obvious and persistent”; and (iii) the MTA had a non-delegable duty to inspect the configuration that it inappropriately delegated to Metro-North.^[2] As to causation, Plaintiff argues that the configuration of the stairs, not the actions of third-party Rothenburger, caused him to fall down the stairs and resulted in his injuries.

Defendant moves for summary...