Battle v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Transp.

WANDA SMITH BATTLE, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-682 (RMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

January 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants District of Columbia, District of Columbia Department of Transportation, Jeff Marootian, and Soumaya Dey move to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on Wanda Smith Battle's claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety.

I. FACTS

The Court takes its facts from the Amended Complaint and Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which are not contested by the Plaintiff.

Wanda Smith Battle is an African-American female employed by the District of Columbia Department of Transportation (DC DOT). She works in the Traffic Operations and Safety Division of DC DOT, where she serves as a Program Management Analyst. Ms. Battle's direct supervisor is James Strange, and her second-level supervisor is Soumaya Dey.

In June 2018, Ms. Battle submitted a request to attend two seminars, which her direct supervisor, Mr. Strange, approved. However, Mr. Dey approved only one of the two seminars, denying her request to attend the Traffic Flow Theory and Characteristics Committee Workshop and Midyear Meeting in Woods Hole, MA in August 2018. Up to that time, Ms. Battle and Mr. Dey had had very little contact but Ms. Battle went directly to him to ask about her request to attend the program in Woods Hole. Mr. Dey told her that he had not approved the request because the program would be attended by engineers and professors and she would not "comprehend" it. Am Compl. [Dkt. 9] ¶ 22. Ms. Battle alleges that Mr. Dey also made derogatory statements concerning her experience and intelligence.¹ Ms. Battle informed Mr. Dey that she holds a "double master's degree" but he "still seemed unsure" and "would have to think about it." Mot., Ex. 7, Pl.'s EEO Charge of Discrimination [Dkt. 10-9]. Ms. Battle considered Mr. Dey's comments to be discriminatory.

She did, nonetheless, attend the workshop. She appealed Mr. Dey's denial to his superior, an unnamed individual, who approved it. Ms. Battle was informed that she could attend the Committee Workshop and Midyear Meeting on July 27, 2018. She registered for the program on July 30, 2018 and attended the meeting from August 7 to August 9, 2018.

In her position as a Program Management Analyst, Ms. Battle was responsible for bringing the department into compliance and she completed that task. See Am. Compl. ¶ 28. But before she received credit for this work, she was transferred to another position where she was again assigned responsibility for turning around another non-compliant program; she complains that an employee "with less credential and experience" replaced her in the original position. Id. ¶ 31. Ms. Battle asked Jeff Marootian, another employee at DC DOT, whether she would receive a promotion for her work in the original position and he responded "you wannastay here don't you," which Ms. Battle interpreted to mean she should not complain for fear of losing her job. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.

On November 28, 2018, Ms. Battle filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Since that charge is at the heart of the dispute, the Court quotes it in whole:

I have been employed with the [DC DOT] since July of 2017 as a program management analyst. My supervisor, James Strange, approved two training seminars relevant to my job in July of 2018, which were then passed up to the Assistant Director, Soumya [sic] Dey. I noticed that he only approved one out of the two trainings, so I went to him to bring it to his attention. Mr. Dey and I have near to no interaction before this date, and when I went to him this was our first real conversation. When I went into his office and mentioned that he didn't approve the second training, he explained that he didn't think I would be able to comprehend the information in the training because everyone there would be an engineer or professor, and I didn't have the qualifications for that. Once I explained that I actually had a double master's degree, he still seemed unsure and told me he would have to think about it. The training was never approved.

I believe I have been discriminated against based on my race (Black/African American), and my sex (female), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as my age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.

Pl.'s EEO Charge of Discrimination.

Ms. Battle alleged discrimination due to her race, sex, and age. Id. The EEOC dismissed her charge on December 11, 2018 and issued a Right to Sue Letter to Ms. Battle, who filed a Complaint on March 11, 2019 and followed it with an Amended Complaint on June 14, 2019. Ms. Battle sues the District of Columbia Department of Transportation, Jeff Marootian, Soumaya Dey, and the District of Columbia under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. She also names two additional civil rights laws, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The Amended Complaint alleges that Ms. Battle suffered discrimination dueto her race, African American, and gender, female. Defendants move to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The motion is ripe for review.²

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment

Motions to dismiss are properly raised in response to a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint is facially plausible when it pleads facts that allow a court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although the standard is deferential, it "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," id., and is unsatisfied when a complaint pleads facts that are "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). While courts considering Rule 12(b)(6) motions accept as true the factual allegations in a complaint, they are not forced to accept the plaintiff's conclusory legal determinations. See id.

Alternatively, motions for summary judgment should be granted when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party can move for summary judgment at any time before thirty days after the close of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no material dispute of fact, and under our Local Rules can do so by providing a list of material facts not indispute which are to be taken as true unless controverted by the nonmoving party in their opposition filing. LCvR 7(h)(1). Once such facts are established, courts rely on them to determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[W]here a defendant has moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 as an alternative to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), 'the decision regarding whether or not to treat motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Tyson v. Brennan, 306 F. Supp. 3d 365, 369-70 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Ross v. U.S. Capitol Police, 195 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192 (D.D.C. 2016)).

B. Title VII

In order to bring an actionable discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. See Edwards v. Gray, 7 F. Supp. 3d 111, 115 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Nguyen v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174 (D.D.C. 2012). "[A]n employment discrimination plaintiff is not required to plead every fact necessary to establish a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss." Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 642 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)). A plaintiff must, however, plead sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible right to relief. Jones v. Castro, 168 F. Supp. 3d 169, 184 (D.D.C. 2016).

Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace because of an individual's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. "Under Title VII . . . , the two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, [or] national origin." Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A plaintiff can prove her casewith either direct or circumstantial evidence. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009).

If a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that support an inference of discrimination; (2) the defendant may then come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions; if the defendant does so, (3) the plaintiff must demonstrate that such legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual justifications to hide discrimination. See Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Once an employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action(s) taken, the need to analyze...