Bauta v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 14-CV-3725 (RER)

JOSE BAUTA, Plaintiff, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., SABRINA ANDERSON, AKOS GUBICA,KAROLY GUBICA, C.A.V. ENTERPISE, LLC, andFIRSTGROUP AMERICA, INC., Defendants.

14-CV-3725 (RER)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 6, 2019

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

RAMON E. REYES, JR., U.S.M.J.:

Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound") has moved "to vacate and set aside" a $1,536,625 punitive damages verdict awarded to Jose Bauta ("Bauta" or "Plaintiff") following a two-week jury trial. (Dkt. No. 787). Greyhound also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, or in the alternative seeks leave to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue. (Id.) For the reasons which follow, Greyhound's motion is granted in part.¹

BACKGROUND

In the early morning on October 9, 2013, a Greyhound bus driven by defendant Sabrina Anderson ("Anderson") collided with the rear of a tractor trailer on Interstate 80 in Pennsylvania (the "accident"). Many of the bus passengers, including Bauta, were injured, some seriously, as a result of the accident.² Several bus passengers injured in the accident sued Greyhound andAnderson (collectively, "Greyhound Defendants") in Pennsylvania and Ohio.³

In Pennsylvania, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County consolidated for trial two multi-plaintiff actions. In July 2016, a Pennsylvania jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor, finding the Greyhound Defendants 100% liable for the accident. (Dkt. No. 671-2 at 4). The other defendants, Akos and Karoly Gubica (the "Gubicas"), the driver and owner of the tractor trailer involved in the accident, and CAV Enterprises ("CAV"), the corporate owner of the tractor trailer, were found not liable. (Id.). The Pennsylvania jury awarded the four plaintiffs compensatory damages totaling $3,050,000 and punitive damages of $500,000 each. (Id. at 5-7).

While the Pennsylvania case was proceeding, Bauta filed suit against the Greyhound Defendants and the Gubicas in New York state court. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ("Compl.") ¶ 18). Defendants removed the action to this Court on June 12, 2014 (the "Bauta action"). (Dkt. No. 1).⁴ On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion based on collateral estoppel, asserting that the Pennsylvania court had denied the Greyhound Defendants' post-trial motions and ruled that the jury's liability determination was final for collateral estoppel purposes. (Dkt. No. 196); see Livingston v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 208 A.3d 1122, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2019)). The undersigned granted Bauta's motion over the Greyhound Defendants' objections, "subject to reconsideration following a decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court." (Order dated 3/10/2017).⁵

The Court's collateral estoppel ruling decided the issue of liability for compensatory and punitive damages but not the amount of such damages. With respect to punitive damages, Bauta was given the option of accepting the same amount the Pennsylvania jury awarded to each of the plaintiffs or trying the amount of punitive damages to an Eastern District jury. (Dkt. No. 307 at 17-18). Bauta chose the latter. (Dkt. No. 313).

Bauta's claims for compensatory and punitive damages were bifurcated for trial. (Order dated 4/14/2018 granting Dkt. No. 343). On May 21, 2018, following four weeks of testimony, the jury awarded Bauta compensatory damages for past and future medical costs and pain and suffering. (Minute Entry dated May 21, 2018). On June 1, 2018, following two weeks of testimony from Greyhound employees, other bus passengers, and multiple experts in accident reconstruction and sleep science, the jury awarded Bauta $3,235,000 in punitive damages: $1,536,625 against Greyhound and $1,698,375 against Anderson.⁶ (Dkt. No. 697). On July 3, 2018, the Court entered judgment in Bauta's favor. (Dkt. No. 710).⁷

Following entry of the judgment, the parties filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. Nos. 726 and 729). On January 4, 2019, the Court issued its decision on those motions. (Dkt. No. 744). The Greyhound Defendants' motion was largely denied, except for their request for judgment as a matter of law on Bauta's claim for future internal medicine expenses. (Id. at 12-13). Bauta's motion was also largely denied, except for his request for a new trial on the issues of past and future pain and suffering. (Id. at 45-49). The retrial was scheduled for June 10, 2019. (Dkt. Entry dated January 16, 2019).

While the parties were preparing for the June 10^th retrial, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued its decision on the Greyhound Defendants' consolidated appeals from the judgments below. See Livingston v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 208 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2019). Under Pennsylvania law, which applies here,⁸ "punitive damages can be awarded against a defendant only if the plaintiff shows that the defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and acted or failed to act in conscious disregard of that risk." Id. at 1130 (citing Hutchinson v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. 2005); Dubose v. Quinlan, 125 A.3d 1231, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2015), aff'd, 173 A.3d 634 (Pa. 2017)). On appeal the Greyhound Defendants argued that the evidence at trial failed to establish that Anderson had subjective knowledge that she was too fatigued to drive on the night of the accident and that Greyhound had subjective knowledge of an allegedly inadequate driver fatigue prevention program. Id. Accordingly, the Greyhound Defendants contended that the Pennsylvania plaintiffs did not establish their liability for punitive damages so the Pennsylvania trial court erred in denying their post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 1127-28.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed with the Greyhound Defendants with regard to Anderson's subjective knowledge of her fatigue on the night of the accident, finding that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to conclude that she had such knowledge, and therefore affirmed the punitive damages award against her. Id. at 1131. The court agreed, however, that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Greyhound as a company had subjective knowledge or consciously disregarded the risk. Id. at 1132. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the punitive damages judgment against Greyhound because Pennsylvania law allows a jury to hold anemployer liable for punitive damages based entirely on the reckless conduct of an employee. Livingston, 208 A.3d at 1133 (citing Dillow v. Myers, 916 A.2d 698, 702 (Pa. Super. 2007); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Genteel, 499 A.2d 637, 643 (Pa. Super. 1985)).⁹ In other words, the court determined that while Greyhound was not individually liable for punitive damages based on its own conduct, it was vicariously liable for punitive damages based on Anderson's conduct.

After the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its decision, Greyhound saw an opportunity to challenge the Bauta punitive damages verdict and filed the instant motion. (Dkt. No. 787). Greyhound's argument is simple: the Pennsylvania appellate court's "explicit determination that the evidence adduced at trial in the Pennsylvania Action did not support a finding that Greyhound's individual conduct warranted the imposition of punitive damages strips the jury's finding to the contrary of its preclusive effect" in this case, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying judgment was affirmed. (Dkt. No. 787-6 at 12) (citing Speyer, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 295 A.2d 143, 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972); Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein, 11 N.Y.3d 195, 197 (N.Y. 2008); Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 493 F.3d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27 cmt. o (1982)). "In other words, the Pennsylvania Action can no longer serve as a basis for applying collateral estoppel with respect to Greyhound's individual conduct" because "the legal basis for imposing punitive damages against Greyhound has dissipated." (Id. at 12-13).

Bauta opposes Greyhound's motion because, as he argues, the Superior Court's decision affirmed the determination of Greyhound's liability for punitive damages; "Once collateral estoppel attaches, it remains in place, unless and until the prior court overturns or modifies thatjudgment on the merits." (Dkt. No. 789 at 5 (citing Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa.2d 526, 673 A.2d 872 (1996)). Bauta argues that following the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision the underlying judgment was not reversed and Greyhound remains liable for the entire amount of punitive damages, even if it is based on a theory of vicarious liability, and thus the judgment has not lost its preclusive effect. (Id. at 15).

LEGAL STANDARD

Greyhound moves this Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court's Order dated March 10, 2017, leaving open reconsideration of the applicability of collateral estoppel, and the Court's "inherent power to revisit a prior decision." (Dkt. No. 787 at 1). Greyhound seeks an Order that vacates and sets aside the jury's award of punitive damages against it and further dismisses any claim of punitive damages against the company, or in the alternative, allows Greyhound to file a motion for summary judgment as to Bauta's punitive damages claims against it. (Id.).

Rule 54 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. states in pertinent part:

(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . .. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.

Entry of a final judgment...