Bauza v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

KATHRINE M. BAUZA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

18-CV-1434-MJP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 4, 2020

DECISION & ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pedersen, M.J. Kathrine M. Bauza ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income Benefits ("SSI"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the disposition of this case by a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 23.)

BACKGROUND

On February 13, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and DIB, alleging disability beginning June 7, 2013. (R.¹ 16, 187.) Plaintiff also filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on February 13, 2014, alleging disability beginning on May 1, 2009. (R. 19, 189.) Plaintiff's claims were initially denied on July 17, 2014. (R. 16, 116-21.) Plaintifftimely requested a hearing on August 27, 2014. (R. 16, 125.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing held on June 26, 2017, before an Administrative Law Judge ("A.L.J.") and was represented by an attorney (R. 36.) A vocational expert also testified at the hearing. (Id.) On October 2, 2017, the A.L.J. issued an unfavorable decision. (R. 13-30.) Plaintiff timely filed a request for review by the Appeals Council on December 4, 2017. (R. 180-86.) The Appeals Council denied the request for review on October 15, 2018, thereby making the A.L.J.'s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6.) Plaintiff timely filed this civil action in District Court, seeking judicial review of the A.L.J.'s decision. (Compl., Dec. 7, 2018, ECF No. 1.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants jurisdiction to district courts to hear claims based on the denial of Social Security benefits. Section 405(g) provides that the district court "shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2007). It directs that when considering a claim, the Court must accept the findings of fact made by the Commissioner, provided that such findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 149 (1997).

To determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, the Court must "examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn." Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). Section 405(g) limits the scope of the Court's review to two inquiries: whether the Commissioner's findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and whether the Commissioner's conclusions are based upon an erroneous legal standard. Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-6 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1038 (finding a reviewing court does not try a benefits case de novo.)

A person is disabled for the purposes of SSI and disability benefits if he or she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A.) In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, the A.L.J. must employ a fivestep sequential analysis. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam.) The five steps are:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) if not, whether the claimant has any "severe impairment" that "significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities";

(3) if so, whether any of the claimant's severe impairments meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of the relevant regulations;(4) if not, whether despite the claimant's severe impairments, the claimant retains the residual functional capacity [("RFC")] to perform his past work; and

(5) if not, whether the claimant retains the [RFC] to perform any other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d at 467. "The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four[;] . . . [a]t step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to 'show there is other gainful work in the national economy [which] the claimant could perform.'" Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998).)

ANALYSIS

The A.L.J.'s Decision

In his decision, the A.L.J. followed the required five-step analysis for evaluating disability claims. (R. 17.) The A.L.J. found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2014 (R. 19.) Under step one of the process, the A.L.J. found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2009, the onset date. (R. 19.) At step two, the A.L.J. concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and unspecified personality disorder with borderline traits. (R. 19.) At step three, the A.L.J. determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments. (R. 20.) At step four, the A.L.J concluded that Plaintiff has theResidual Functional Capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with various non-exertional limitations as follows:

[Plaintiff] could frequently understand, remember and carry out complex instructions. She can handle low stress defined as including no supervisory duties and she is subject to only occasional independent decision-making, with no strict production quotas. The claimant further is limited to occasional changes in work routine and processes, occasional interaction with supervisors and no or only incidental interaction with coworkers and the public. She could perform no team or tandem working or co-working.

(R. 21.) The A.L.J. also found that Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work. (R. 28.) The A.L.J. proceeded to step five and found that jobs existed in the national and regional economy that Plaintiff could perform. (R. 29.) Therefore, the A.L.J. found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 29.)

Plaintiff's Assessment of Errors

Plaintiff contends that the A.L.J. erred in three respects. First, Plaintiff claims that the A.L.J. failed to properly weigh the opinion of treating clinician, Ann M. McLaughlin, Licensed Clinical Social Worker ("LCSW"). (Pl.'s Mem. of Law at 1, Jan. 21, 2020, ECF No. 20-1.) Second, Plaintiff asserts that the A.L.J. improperly excluded evidence under the five-day rule and that the A.L.J. should have included the evidence under the A.L.J.'s affirmative duty to develop the record. (Id. at 1 & 20.) Third, Plaintiff claims that the A.L.J. improperly relied on the July 22, 2017, opinion of one-time consultative examiner Susan Santarpia, Ph.D. to support his residual functional capacity assessment. (Id. at 1.)The A.L.J. properly weighed the April 7, 2015 opinion of Ann M. McLaughlin, LCSW.

Plaintiff contends that the A.L.J. erred in assigning little weight to McLaughlin's April 7, 2015, employability assessment of Plaintiff. (Id. at 16.) In the opinion, McLaughlin found that Plaintiff was very limited in her ability to understand and remember information, carry out instructions, interact appropriately with others, maintain socially appropriate behavior, and maintain consistent pace. (R. 524.) Additionally, McLaughlin's assessment found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to maintain concentration, make simple decisions, and maintain appropriate hygiene and grooming. (Id.) The A.L.J. assigned little weight to this opinion due to his finding that it was inconsistent with Plaintiff's reported activity level at the time, specifically because Plaintiff was preparing for and traveled to Disney World with her family around the time of McLaughlin's assessment. (R. 26.)

This opinion also contrasted with an employability assessment conducted by McLaughlin on April 29, 2014, in which she found Plaintiff to be only moderately limited in her ability to carry out instructions, maintain attention and concentration, interact with others, maintain socially appropriate behavior, and function at a consistent pace. (R. 392.) Additionally, in the April 29, 2014, assessment McLaughlin found that Plaintiff had no limitations in her ability to understand and remember instructions, make simple decisions, and maintain hygiene and grooming. (Id.) The A.L.J. assigned significant weight to this opinion considering McLaughlin's familiarity with Plaintiff and the assessment's consistency with the overall record. (R. 25.)

The A.L.J. did not err in assigning McLaughlin's April 2015 assessment little weight. A licensed clinical social worker is not considered to be an acceptable medical source and, therefore, McLaughlin's opinion is not given controlling weight. Martino v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 339 F. Supp. 3d 118, 128 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) ( licensed...