Bayles v. N.D. Dep't of Transp.

872 N.W.2d 626

Neil Christopher BAYLES, Appellee

v.NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant.

No. 20150200.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Dec. 22, 2015.

Douglas Bruce Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for appellant.

Danny Lee Herbel, Bismarck, ND, for appellee.

McEVERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] The North Dakota Department of Transportation appeals from a district court judgment reversing the administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Neil Bayles' driving privilege for ninety-one days because the Department failed to timely file the hearing transcript within the twenty-day period under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06. We reverse, concluding the district court erred as a matter of law by summarily reversing the hearing officer's decision based on statutory noncompliance and because Bayles failed to show prejudice caused by the claimed delay or demonstrate the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law. We remand with instructions for the district court to consider Bayles' appeal on the merits.

I

[¶ 2] On October 9, 2014, Bayles was arrested and charged with driving under the influence. He timely requested an administrative hearing. On November 10, 2014, an administrative hearing officer suspended Bayles' driving privileges for ninety-one days. On November 17, 2014, Bayles filed with the district court a notice of appeal, specifications of error, and certificate of service certifying he mailed the filings to the Department. On January 6, 2015, Bayles' counsel emailed the Department asking about the status of the administrative hearing transcript. The Department responded they did not receive Bayles' notice of appeal. On January 7, 2015, Bayles' counsel emailed the Department the documents filed in the district court. On January 21, 2015, the district court's calendar control clerk notified the parties by letter stating the district court had not received the record, and the case would be reviewed on February 17, 2015. On January 26, 2015, the Department filed the transcript with the district court. No notice of hearing was provided to the Department by Bayles. Bayles filed a motion titled "Request to Grant Appeal," requesting the district court to reverse the hearing officer's decision. In Bayles' reply to the Department's response to the motion, Bayles requested reversal as a sanction for the Department's "institutional noncompliance and systemic disregard of the law" evidenced by the Department's failure to timely file transcripts on four other unrelated matters. No affidavit or other evidence was offered to the district court in support of Bayles' request. Bayles did not request a hearing on his "Request to Grant Appeal."

[¶ 3] The Department responded to Bayles' request, arguing the Department complied with the calendar control clerk's request to file the administrative record by February 17, 2015. The Department further argued the twenty-day period to file a transcript under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06 is not jurisdictional and a violation does not require automatic dismissal. The Department also claimed a legitimate dispute of fact existed as to when Bayles served his notice of appeal on the Department.

[¶ 4] The district court summarily reversed the hearing officer's decision, without reaching the merits and restored Bayles' driving privileges, on the basis that "the transcript of the testimony of Bayles' ... administrative hearing was not filed with the district court within the time period specified by N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06." The Department appeals.

II

[¶ 5] This Court's review of an administrative agency decision to suspend a person's driving privileges is governed by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28–32.

Berger v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2011 ND 55, ¶ 5, 795 N.W.2d 707. Generally, on appeal from the district court, this Court reviews the agency's decision. Berger, at ¶ 5; Masset v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2010 ND 211, ¶ 6, 790 N.W.2d 481. "Courts exercise limited review in appeals from administrative agency decisions, and the agency's decision is accorded great deference." Berger, at ¶ 5. We review an administrative agency decision under N.D.C.C. § 28–32–49 in the same manner as the district court under N.D.C.C. § 28–32–46. Berger, at ¶ 5. Section 28–32–46, N.D.C.C., provides in part:

[T]he court must affirm the order of the agency unless it finds that any of the following are present:

1. The order is not in accordance with the law.

2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.

3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.

4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.

5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.

7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.

8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency's rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.

The district court did not reverse for any reason set forth in N.D.C.C. § 28–32–46. Rather, the only analysis provided reflects the district court reversed on the basis that the transcript was not filed within the time frame specified by N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06, as the sanction or remedy for the alleged statutory violation as requested by Bayles. The district court's analysis in an administrative appeal, if sound, is entitled to respect. Dettler v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54, ¶ 10, 676 N.W.2d 799. Whether facts meet a legal standard is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal. Id.

[¶ 6] The Department argues the district court erred by reversing the hearing officer's decision suspending Bayles' driving privileges for ninety-one days on the grounds the Department failed to timely file the transcript under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06. According to the Department, Bayles failed to prove prejudice by the delay in filing the transcript and failed to demonstrate a systemic disregard of the law. Further, the Department argues it has demonstrated it filed the transcript within twenty days of receipt of Bayles' notice of appeal.

A

[¶ 7] The only basis for reversal provided by the district court was the Department's failure to file the transcript within the statutory time frame specified in N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06. Section 39–20–06, N.D.C.C., provides in part:

The court shall set the matter for hearing, and the petitioner shall give twenty days' notice of the hearing to the director and to the hearing officer who rendered the decision. Neither the director nor the court may stay the decision pending decision on appeal. Within twenty days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the director or the hearing officer who rendered the decision shall file in the office of the clerk of court to which the appeal is taken a certified transcript of the testimony and all other proceedings.... The court shall affirm the decision of the director or hearing officer unless it finds the evidence insufficient to warrant the conclusion reached by the director or hearing officer.

"This Court has explained the 20–day filing period is not jurisdictional, and a violation does not require automatic summary dismissal of a license suspension decision." Sayler v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2007 ND 165, ¶ 9, 740 N.W.2d 94. Bayles concedes that noncompliance with N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06 does not require automatic reversal. The district court erred as a matter of law for reversing the hearing officer's decision when the only basis provided was failure to file the transcript within the statutory period.

B

[¶ 8] Bayles argues the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law by failing to file the hearing transcript with the district court within the twenty-day period under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–06. We disagree.

[¶ 9] To warrant a reversal based on noncompliance with the twenty-day filing period, a defendant must show either prejudice caused by the delay or the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law. See May v. Sprynczynatyk, 2005 ND 76, ¶¶ 15, 17–18, 695 N.W.2d 196 ("When a governmental agency systemically disregards the requirements of the law, a court may reverse a decision in favor of the government to prophylactically ensure that the government acts consistently and predictably in accordance with the law."). "To establish a systemic disregard, a party must demonstrate some persistent pattern of improper agency conduct, and more than a single miscue by the government is required to evidence institutional noncompliance which amounts to systemic disregard of the law." Id. at ¶ 17. "Reversal for conduct which is merely potentially prejudicial, without a showing of actual prejudice, may be warranted as a sanction for institutional noncompliance and systemic disregard of the law if the conduct is commonplace." Id.

[¶ 10] Bayles relies on Madison v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 503 N.W.2d 243 (N.D.1993), as support to show the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law. In Madison, we explained that the North Dakota Legislative Assembly had amended N.D.C.C. § 28–32–06¹ to require the application of the rules of evidence in administrative proceedings. 503 N.W.2d at 246. However, the Department continued using a "Notice of Administrative Hearing" form that contained a blanket waiver of the use of the Rules of Evidence in administrative hearing proceedings. Id. at 244–45. This Court stated:

[T]he Department obviously has misread or ignored the amended statute. Its Notice of Hearing form contains a preprinted, blanket waiver of the Rules of Evidence, contrary to Section 28–32–06, NDCC, as amended. The hearing officer perpetuated the institutional non-compliance when she

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