Baylets-Holsinger v. Pa. State Univ.

ANTOINETTE A. BAYLETS-HOLSINGER, pro se Plaintiff v. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant

Civil No. 4:18-CV-60

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 10, 2020

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil action brought by the pro se plaintiff, Antoinette Baylets-Holsinger, against her former employer, The Pennsylvania State University ("Penn State"). In her Second Amended Complaint, Baylets-Holsinger alleges that she was discriminated against because of her gender, subjected to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against when she reported the discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.¹ Penn State now moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims, arguing that Baylets-Holsinger has failed toidentify any issues of material fact with respect to her Title VII claims. For the reasons set forth below, we agree, and we will grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

The factual background of the instant case has been aptly summarized in our prior filings in this case. In short, Antoinette Baylets-Holsinger was employed by Penn State as a senior-level Contract Coordinator and Licensing Administrator in the IT Department from August 1990 to January 2017. (Doc. 28, ¶ 1). In August of 2015, she met with Senior Director Martin to discuss issues with her workplace climate, which allegedly included an inequitable balance of workload between male and female employees, being overlooked for promotional opportunities, and inappropriate sexual behavior by a male coworker. (Id., ¶¶ 1, 4). One week later, at Martin's direction, she had a meeting with representatives from the Human Resources department to discuss these concerns. (Id., ¶ 5). In November of 2015, some three months after she raised these concerns, Baylets-Holsinger contends that she was then put on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) by her immediate supervisor, Susan Taylor, action which Baylets-Holsinger believed to be caused by her report of workplace concerns. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 8). Notably, nothing beyond her subjective impression of discrimination connects these disparate events, and substantial uncontradicted evidence refutes this causal inference.

During the PIP process, Baylets-Holsinger had several progress meetings with Taylor and Deb Johnson, a Human Resources representative. (Doc. 63, at 75-77). The notes from these meetings indicate that Taylor's issues with Baylets-Holsinger included her excessive tardiness and her inability to meet project deadlines. (Id., at 75). Baylets-Holsinger expressed that she believed her contract administration workload was more than that of her coworkers; however, it was noted that one of her male coworkers, with whom Baylets-Holsinger had compared her workload, had other responsibilities than solely performing contract administration. (Id., at 75-76). After a November 23, 2015 meeting, Taylor noted that "Toni is not willing to accept personal responsibility for any of her deficiencies. Spending lots of time deflecting attention and blaming others." (Id., at 76). Similarly, following a progress meeting on December 15, 2015, while it was noted that Baylets-Holsinger had been arriving to work on time, meeting notes indicate that Baylets-Holsinger still was not accepting responsibility for her inadequate job performance and that she thought she was performing her job well. (Id., at 77).

Baylets-Holsinger asserts that she did not receive updates on her PIP from December 2015 until her annual evaluation in June 2016. The evaluation was completed by Taylor, who indicated that she was disappointed that the PIP process did not result in improvements in Baylets-Holsinger's work performance. (Id., at 78). Specifically, she noted Baylets-Holsinger's "lack of commitment and continuedfailure to meet the required expectations." (Id.) Then in July of 2016, Baylets-Holsinger was informed that she was being placed in a formal HR-78 process. Indeed, on July 8, 2016, Baylets-Holsinger received a letter from Susan Taylor, which outlined the reasons that Baylets-Holsinger was being placed in the HR-78 process. (Id., at 92). Among these reasons were issues with Baylets-Holsinger's contract management, which led to income deficits for the university; poor preparation for audit meetings; poor time management and tardiness; and inability to work independently on projects. (Id., at 93-94). In addition, the letter specifically recognized Baylets-Holsinger's lack of self-awareness regarding her performance deficiencies and noted that she continually blamed others for her mistakes. (Id., at 94). For her part, Baylets-Holsinger believes that the HR-78 was initiated in retaliation for her reporting a one million dollar overspend in May 2016, rather than because of her work performance.

Baylets-Holsinger and Taylor continued to have bi-weekly meetings in July, August, and September of 2016 to discuss her progress during the HR-78 process. (Id., at 92, 95, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 112, 117). After each meeting, Taylor memorialized the meeting in a letter to Baylets-Holsinger, and these letters consistently indicated that Baylets-Holsinger's performance was not improving, particularly the subject areas of contract management, time management, and administration. (Id.) Baylets-Holsinger disagreed with the overall evaluation of herwork performance, and in mid-September 2016, she took FMLA leave for what she described as work-related PTSD, stress, and anxiety. (Doc. 66, at 3). She also filed a complaint with the EEOC dated October 10, 2016, describing the issues she was having at work and asserting that she had been facing discriminatory and retaliatory actions from her supervisor, Susan Taylor. (Doc. 63, at 162).

On October 19, 2016, while she was out on FMLA leave, Baylets-Holsinger contacted the University President and the Vice President of Human Resources, requesting intervention with her situation at work. (Id., at 119). In her letter, Baylets-Holsinger asserts that she had been retaliated against on two separate occasions, and that she had endured "health-harming discriminatory bullying and retaliation actions." (Id.) She provided a timeline of the alleged retaliatory events, i.e. her PIP process and HR-78, and requested that these officials intervene, as she was about to enter "no pay" status. (Id., at 123). She then had a meeting with two individuals, Susan Morse and Kari Allatt, on November 11, 2016, wherein Baylets-Holsinger was presented with three options for her return to work: accept a three-level lower position while maintaining her current salary, and the HR-78 would be closed; returning to her current position and the HR-78 would be closed; or voluntary resignation/retirement with two months of severance pay. (Id., at 128).

Dissatisfied with these three options, and after an email exchange discussing these options, Baylets-Holsinger opted to resign her position with Penn State in aletter dated December 22, 2016. (Id., at 50). Around the same time as her resignation, Baylets-Holsinger received an offer of employment from Bucknell University on December 16, 2016, which she subsequently accepted. (Id., at 64).

Baylets-Holsinger filed the instant action January 9, 2018. (Doc. 1). She then filed two amended complaints, the latter being the operative complaint in this case. (Docs. 20, 28). After a series of motions to dismiss and amendments to the plaintiff's complaint, this court dismissed Baylets-Holsinger's claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. (Docs. 26, 27, 35, 36). Thus, the only remaining claims in this case are Baylets-Holsinger's claims of discrimination and retaliation brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. The defendants filed the current motion for summary judgment on April 29, 2020 (Doc. 61), and the motion is fully brief and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 64, 66, 69).

After careful consideration, we find that there are no genuine disputes of material facts from which a reasonable juror could find in favor of the plaintiff. Accordingly, for the following reasons, we will grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movantshows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine "whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). A disputed issue is only "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable factfinder could find for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is "material" only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Gray v. York Papers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Court is not tasked with resolving disputed issues of fact, but only with determining whether there exist any factual issues that must be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 271; Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009). Where...