Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan v. Okla. Dep't of Corr.

362 P.3d 241

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF BRYAN, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 112,277.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.

Nov. 4, 2015.

Emily Redman, District Attorney, Greg Jenkins, Assistant District Attorney, Atoka County District Attorney's Office, Atoka, Oklahoma, for Petitioner/Appellee.

David Cincotta, General Counsel, Margie Weaver, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent/Appellant.

P. THOMAS THORNBRUGH, Judge.

¶ 1 The Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) appeals the declaratory judgment of the district court holding that 57 O.S.2011 §§ 37 and 38 act unconstitutionally if counties are required to spend more than the maximum reimbursement stated by § 38 to hold a state inmate. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This case involves the interaction between a state statute and the Oklahoma Constitution. The statute, 57 O.S.2011 § 38, sets a maximum reimbursement rate of $27 per day for any county keeping a state inmate at a county facility after judgment and sentencing. The constitutional provisions are Oklahoma Constitution, Article 10, Section 9 (which prohibits the use of ad valorem tax revenue for state purposes), and Article 21, Section 1 (which requires the State to fund penal institutions). In 2011, Senator Josh Brecheen of District 6 requested an opinion from the State Attorney General as to the constitutionality of this reimbursement cap.

¶ 3 In the resulting opinion, 2011 OK AG 8, the Attorney General opined that, if the $27 per day payment was insufficient to defray the full cost to a county of housing state inmates who were retained in the county's jail facilities after sentencing, paying any excess cost from the county's funds would violate Article 10, Section 9, and Article 21, Section 1. The Attorney General also opined Article 21 required the State to fully reimburse a county if the statutory reimbursement was insufficient. DOC determined it could not follow this opinion, finding that it was statutorily bound to limit reimbursement to $27 per day by § 38, and was not required to follow the Attorney General's opinion regarding the constitutionality of a statute.

¶ 4 In June 2012, the Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County (County) filed a petition in Oklahoma County District Court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the § 38 reimbursement cap. The district court reached the following conclusions despite jurisdictional and other objections by DOC:

10. The housing of inmates sentenced to incarceration within the Department of Corrections in county jails prior to their transfer to the Department of Corrections is a State purpose for purposes of Article X, Section 9(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution and is additionally a function of penal institutions of the State of Oklahoma for purposes of Article XXI, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

11. The reimbursement provided by 57 O.S. Secs. 37 and 38 for inmates sentenced to incarceration within the Department of Corrections for the cost of housing said inmates in county jails until their transfer to a Department facility violates the provisions of Article X, Section 9(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution where such reimbursement does not defray the full cost to a particular county of housing such inmates for any particular day as such requires counties to expend ad valorem tax revenues for State purposes, i.e. payment of the shortfall for the actual cost of housing Department of Corrections inmates in county jails.

12. Additionally, any reimbursement under 57 O.S. Secs. 37 and 38 which does not defray the full cost to a particular county of housing such inmates for any particular day violates the provisions of Article XXI, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution in that, in such situation, counties are forced to use county resources to support a state institution by paying the shortfall between the statutory reimbursement and the actual cost of housing said inmates.

13. Whenever a county's cost of housing an inmate sentenced to incarceration within the Department of Corrections exceeds the reimbursement received by said county pursuant to Sections 37 and 38 of Title 57 for any particular day or period, said county is entitled to reimbursement from the State of Oklahoma in an amount sufficient to fully reimburse the costs of housing incurred by the county for such inmate without being limited by the cap limit provided by 57 O.S. Sec. 38to avoid violation of the provisions of Article XXI, Section 1 and Article X, Section 9(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution. (Emphasis added.)

DOC now appeals these findings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 County's constitutional challenge to this statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. An appellate court will exercise its "plenary, independent and non-deferential authority" when reexamining a trial court's legal rulings. Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Inv. Corp., 1996 OK 125 n. 1, 932 P.2d 1100. This Court's standard of review is de novo and gives no deference to the legal rulings of the trial court. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Serv. ex rel. Jones v. Baggett, 1999 OK 68, ¶ 4, 990 P.2d 235. Regarding questions of constitutionality, this Court will not declare an act of the Legislature "void unless it is clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution." Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Walker, 1945 OK 176, ¶ 4, 195 Okla. 470, 159 P.2d 268.

ANALYSIS

I. JURISDICTION

¶ 6 DOC's first argument is that County did not demonstrate it had actually used County funds to "top off" the maximum allowed reimbursement of $27 per day per inmate. Therefore, DOC argues, County failed to show a justiciable controversy, or failed to show that the controversy is ripe for judicial determination by declaratory judgment.

¶ 7 The proof required for County to establish its right to pursue declaratory relief is set out in Gordon v. Followell, 1964 OK 74, ¶ 8, 391 P.2d 242 (internal quotation marks omitted):

The requisite precedent facts or conditions which the courts generally hold must exist in order that declaratory relief may be obtained may be summarized as follows: (1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.

¶ 8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently addressed standing in a declaratory judgment action by a county in Murray County v. Homesales, Inc., 2014 OK 52, 330 P.3d 519. That opinion contains an extensive and detailed analysis of a similar standing issue, and the result is instructive.

¶ 9 In Murray County, a group of counties sued for declaratory judgment regarding the liability of the defendant Homesales, Inc., pursuant to the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, 68 O.S.2011 §§ 3201 through 3206. Defendant Homesales received deeds to four properties that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., had purchased at mortgage foreclosure sales. The conveyances stated that the deeds were exempt from documentary taxes. The counties sought a declaratory judgment that these transactions were not exempt because the exemption from documentary tax applied only to the purchaser, Chase Bank, and not its transferee, Homesales. The district court agreed, finding the transactions were subject to the documentary tax.

¶ 10 On appeal, Homesales challenged the counties' standing to seek declaratory relief, partly on the basis that tax was due only if the conveyance was made for consideration exceeding $100, and the conveyances in question did not recite consideration. The Murray County opinion reached the conclusion that: (1) the involved counties had standing to challenge the exemptions from documentary taxes claimed in the case, but (2) the counties failed to prove that any of the properties subject to those conveyances were "sold" for purposes of § 3201, because there was no evidence of whether the consideration exceeded the statutory $100 trigger. Murray County therefore held that, although the counties had standing to pursue the tax question and obtain a judgment that the transfers would be subject to tax if the consideration exceeded $100, they had not shown taxes were actually due on the specific transactions in question.¹

¶ 11 The situation in this case is strongly analogous. Here, County has not shown that its expenditures actually exceeded the $27 cap set by the Legislature, just as Murray County had not shown that the consideration for the challenged transfers was greater than $100. However, Murray County had standing to seek, and receive, a declaration that taxes were due if and when the consideration at transfer exceeded $100. Likewise, County has standing to seek a declaration that 57 O.S.2011 §§ 37 –38 act against Article 10, Section 9, and Article 21, Section 1, of the Oklahoma Constitution, and that reimbursement is due if and when County is required to expend more than the statutorily capped reimbursement to maintain state inmates awaiting transfer. "If standing exists, the case must proceed on the merits." Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 9 v. Glass, 1982 OK 2, ¶ 10, 639 P.2d 1233.

¶ 12 We further note that this issue is of broad policy and constitutional dimensions, and may involve officials, who have sworn an oath to uphold the state Constitution, being required, as part of their official duties, to violate that same Constitution. It further involves competing policy considerations expressed in the state Constitution and in a legislative enactment. Thus, the matter appears to fall under the rule of Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd., ...