Bd. of Educ., Joliet Tp. v. Bd. of Educ.

897 N.E.2d 756

231 Ill.2d 184

The BOARD OF EDUCATION, JOLIET TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 204, Appellee, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION, LINCOLN WAY COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 210 et al. (The Illinois State Board of Education et al., Appellants).

No. 105018.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 17, 2008.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Timothy J. Rathbun, Robert M. Shupenus, of Rathbun, Cservenyak & Kozol, LLC, Joliet, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

In 1998, the registered voters of a 320-acre parcel of land in Will County filed a petition to detach the parcel from Joliet Township High School District No. 204 and annex it to Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210, pursuant to section 7-2b of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/7-2b (West 1998)). District 204 objected to the petition and argued inter alia that section 7-2b violates the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) (20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2000)). The hearing officer for the Illinois State Board of Education (Board) found that the conditions of section 7-2b were met and recommended that the petition be granted. District 204's EEOA claim was not considered when the hearing officer made this recommendation, as the hearing officer found that the claim was outside the scope of the Board's authority under section 7-2b. The Board accepted the hearing officer's findings and granted the petition for detachment/annexation. The circuit court of Will County affirmed the Board's order and found that the order did not violate the constitution or federal statute. On appeal, the appellate court found that section 7-2b was preempted by the EEOA and was, therefore, unconstitutional. 373 Ill.App.3d 563, 311 Ill.Dec. 337, 868 N.E.2d 337. The appellate court remanded the cause to the Board to consider District 204's EEOA claim. The Board filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 317 (210 Ill.2d R 317) and 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315). This court granted the Board's petition and for the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for consideration of District 204's EEOA claim.

BACKGROUND

In July of 1998, four individuals who made up all of the registered voters of a contiguous 320-acre parcel of farm land in Will County filed a petition with the Illinois State Board of Education (Board) to detach their property from Joliet Township High School District No. 204 (District 204) and attach it to Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210, pursuant to section 7-2b of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/7-2b (West 1998)).

The parcel of land in question is situated in an area of the state where the grade schools and high schools are split into separate school districts and the boundaries of these districts are not coterminous. The children who reside on the disputed parcel of land currently attend grade school in the New Lenox Elementary School District No. 122. The high school district that generally serves the New Lenox Elementary School District is Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210. However, the parcel of land in question does not fall within the boundaries of High School District 210, it falls within the boundaries of Joliet High School District No. 204. Thus the children who reside on the parcel will not attend the same high school as the majority of their former grade school classmates.

Section 7-2b allows for the detachment of land from one district and annexation to another where the affected land lies within elementary and high school districts with noncoterminous boundaries. Section 7-2b allows the land to be detached and annexed at either the elementary or high school level. Thus, it is the petitioner's choice which district they leave and which they join. 105 ILCS 5/7-2b(a) (West 1998). A parcel of land is eligible for detachment and annexation only if (1) it represents 10% or less of the equalized assessed value of the district; (2) the parcel constitutes 10% or less of the territory of the district;¹ (3) two-thirds of the registered voters of the parcel support the petition; and (4) the annexation will make the boundaries of the grade school and high school districts for the affected parcel identical. 105 ILCS 5/7-2b(a) (West 1998). Before this court, neither party disputes that these four conditions are met.

Before the Board's hearing officer, District 204 argued inter alia that the detachment and annexation of the parcel increased segregation in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2000). The EEOA prohibits a state from denying "equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin." 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000). The EEOA delineates a number of activities that constitute discrimination. Among these are the assignment of a student to a school within the district in which he or she resides other than the one closest to his or her residence "if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation." 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (2000). The EEOA also prohibits the transfer of a student from one school to another if "the purpose and effect of such transfer is to increase the segregation of students." 20 U.S.C. § 1703(e) (2000).

District 204 claimed the detachment and annexation of the parcel increases segregation because the four individuals who petitioned for annexation are white while the population of District 204, from which they seek to be detached, is "60% minority."² District 204 further asserted that allowing the "land to be detached * * * from a largely minority school district (60%) and annexed to an almost completely white school district" would increase segregation based on race. On this basis, District 204 described section 7-2b as a "mechanism for `white flight'" and stated that it fostered "division among the races" in violation of the EEOA.

The hearing officer refused to hear District 204's EEOA claim because section 7-2b contains a limiting clause that prohibits the Board from hearing any evidence or considering any issue except those necessary to determine if the four conditions of section 7-2b have been met. See 105 ILCS 5/7-2b (West 1998) ("The [Board] shall have no authority or discretion to hear any evidence or consider any issues except those that may be necessary to determine whether the limitations and conditions of this Section have been met"). The hearing officer expressly stated in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that District 204's EEOA claim was "beyond the scope of the [Board's], and by extension the Hearing Officer's authority."³ The Board accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the section 7-2b petition. Thereafter, District 204 filed a complaint for administrative review with the circuit court.

On administrative review, the circuit court confirmed the Board's decision to grant the petition, noting that there was "no Constitutional problem with the actions of the [Board]." The circuit court also stated that "mere suspicion" is not sufficient to establish racial motivation. District 204 appealed this ruling.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed that the EEOA claim was beyond the Board's authority, but vacated the circuit court's ruling on the merits of the EEOA claim and remanded the cause to the hearing officer to develop a record on the EEOA claim.

The appellate court agreed that the limiting clause of section 7-2b prohibited the Board from hearing or considering District 204's EEOA claim. Specifically, the appellate court held that the Board "acted in accord with its mandate when it refused to determine whether section 7-2b or the proposed detachment/annexation violated the [EEOA]." 373 Ill.App.3d at 568, 311 Ill.Dec. 337, 868 N.E.2d 337.

The appellate court went on to conclude that section 7-2b not only stripped the Board of jurisdiction over the EEOA claim, but also denied jurisdiction over the claim to the circuit court under administrative review law. The appellate court noted that the circuit court's power to review the decisions of administrative agencies is limited in scope to the statutory powers provided by the General Assembly. 373 Ill. App.3d at 569, 311 Ill.Dec. 337, 868 N.E.2d 337, quoting Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 9 ("Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law"). The Code of Civil Procedure provides that a hearing for administrative review is limited to questions of law and fact that are presented to the court by the record. "No new or additional evidence * * * shall be heard by the court." 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2006). The appellate court reasoned that because section 7-2b limited the Board's authority to reviewing only the procedural requirements for a petition for detachment and annexation, the circuit court's authority on administrative review was similarly "limited to determining whether the Board erred in finding those requirements met." 373 Ill.App.3d at 570, 311 Ill.Dec. 337, 868 N.E.2d 337. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the circuit court's determination that the Board's actions did not violate federal law, reasoning that the Board itself "did not have jurisdiction to even develop a record which the circuit court could then rely upon in formulating any constitutional decision." 373 Ill.App.3d at 570, 311 Ill.Dec. 337, 868 N.E.2d 337. Thus, the "circuit court lacked both the jurisdiction and the evidence to make such an independent finding." 373 Ill.App.3d at 569, 311 Ill. Dec. 337, 868 N.E.2d 337.

Finally, the appellate court found that section 7-2b was preempted by the EEOA and remanded the cause to the Board to conduct a hearing on...