BE v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

BE, through parent Gillian Stallworth; KL,through parent Gillian Stallworth;and GILLIAN STALLWORTH, Plaintiffs, v. SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action Number 2:20-cv-00526-AKK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

December 4, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gillian Stallworth brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children, B.E. and K.L., against the Shelby County Board of Education (the "Board"), Celita Deem, Tina Neighbors, and Courtney King.¹ Doc. 1. In a nutshell, this action arises from alleged issues relating to B.E.'s education, the services and treatment he received from the defendants, and a due process hearing resulting in a decision in favor of the Board. This action is before the court on the defendants'motions to dismiss, docs. 19; 23; 29, and on the court's own review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons—in particular, (1) the appeal of the due process hearing is untimely, (2) Stallworth has no right to represent her children in federal court, and (3) the claims fail to state a viable claim for relief—the motions are due to be granted.

I.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere "'labels and conclusions'" or "'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'" are insufficient. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts "the allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Hunt v. AimcoProps., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must . . . 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Ultimately, this inquiry is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.

Additionally, because Stallworth is proceeding pro se, the court must construe the complaint more liberally than it would pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). Finally, because Stallworth is proceeding in forma pauperis, doc. 6, the court must dismiss this case if it determines that the complain fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II.

B.E. and K.L. attended Mount Laurel Elementary School in Shelby County, Alabama. Doc. 1 at 1. B.E. was diagnosed with sensory processing disorder, oppositional defiance disorder, insomnia, and "autistic characteristics" at an early age, and, therefore, Stallworth referred him for special education services before he started kindergarten in August 2018. Id. at 2. In September 2018, the Board changedB.E.'s placement to homebound instruction before changing his placement again to the HANDS program from October to December 2018.² Id. According to Stallworth, B.E. received only one two-hour homebound service in September 2018, and "received no qualified academic instruction at HANDS." Id.

Beginning in January 2019, B.E. returned to Mt. Laurel, and remained there through at least October 2020. Id. Stallworth entered into a settlement agreement with the Board in June 2019 relating to issues regarding the services and education the Board provided to B.E. Id. at 2, 6; Doc. 19-1. However, issues surrounding B.E.'s education continued, and Stallworth filed a due process hearing request in October 2019. Doc. 1 at 2. Following a hearing in January 2020, the hearing officer issued a decision in favor of the Board. Id.; Doc. 19-2.

III.

This lawsuit is Stallworth's appeal from the hearing officer's decision. In addition, Stallworth asserts federal claims on her own behalf and on behalf of B.E. and K.L., based on alleged violations of B.E.'s constitutional rights and violations § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II the Americans with Disabilities Act. Doc. 1 at 9-11. Stallworth also asserts state law claims for alleged violations ofAlabama statutes, breach of contract, and a claim on B.E.'s behalf for battery and false imprisonment. Id. at 11-12. The court addresses these claims in turn.

A.

The Board contends that Stallworth's appeal from the hearing officer's decision is untimely. Doc. 19 at 4-5. Indeed, under the relevant Alabama Administrative Code, Stallworth had up to 60 days to file the appeal:

The party bringing the civil action [to appeal a due process hearing] must file a notice of intent to file a civil action within 30 days after receipt of the hearing decision. The party must file the civil action within 30 days of the filing of the notice of intent.

Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.08(9)(c)(16). And, here, the hearing officer in this case issued a decision on February 13, 2020. Doc. 19-2. Significantly, the officer notified Stallworth of the time limits for appealing the decision. Id. at 31-32. Thus, Stallworth knew she had until March 16 to file a notice of intent, and until April 15 to file a civil action in this court.

However, Stallworth did not file her complaint until April 20, 2020—five days late. Doc. 1. Recognizing that her appeal is untimely, Stallworth asked the court to consider it timely in light of Governor Kay Ivey's Stay at Home Order³ and because Stallworth was without power and internet services for an unidentifiedperiod of time around April 12, 2020 and had to "quarantine to the maximum extent possible" to protect her children from COVID-19. Doc. 2 at 1-2. Stallworth also contends that the court should accept her late filing because the COVID-19 pandemic and the court's March 11, 2020 General Order restricting visitors to the courthouse made it necessary for her to mail her complaint for filing, which caused delays. Doc. 30 at 2. But, even if Stallworth had to mail her complaint rather than filing it in person, nothing explains why she could not have done so in time to meet the April 15, 2020 deadline, or why she did not mail her complaint until the day after the deadline for filing. See doc. 1 at 13-15; see also doc. 2 at 2-3. Moreover, she presents nothing to suggest that she met the earlier notice of intent deadline, see docs. 1; 2, which is a prerequisite to filing an appeal, see Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.08(9)(c)(16). Consequently, because Stallworth did not file a timely appeal and because "pro se litigants are [] expected to comply with procedural requirements," Frith v. Curry, 812 F. App'x 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007)), Stallworth's claim appealing the due process decision is due to be dismissed.⁴

B.

In the second claim for relief, Stallworth asserts § 1983 claims on behalf of B.E. for alleged violations of B.E.'s constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 9-10. In particular, Stallworth contends that the defendants: (1) violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating B.E. differently than his non-disabled peers, (2) deprived B.E. of his right to substantive due process, (3) violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by secluding B.E. in a room with the door blocked or held shut and by feeding him food that had not been properly stored, and (4) violated B.E.'s right to privacy. Id.

As an initial matter, contrary to Stallworth's contention otherwise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) does not permit a parent who is not an attorney to assert claims pro se on behalf of their minor children. Devine v. Indian River County School Bd., 171 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, because Stallworth is not an attorney, the § 1983 claims Stallworth asserts on behalf of B.E. necessarily fail and are due to be dismissed.⁵ See FuQua v. Massey, 615 F. App'x611, 612-13 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[T]he district court properly granted the motion to dismiss because FuQua sought to represent her minor daughter, but, as a non-attorney, she was not permitted to do so.") (citing Devine, 121 F.3d at 581); Whitehurst, 306 F. App'x at 449. And, for the reasons explained below, even if Stallworth could assert claims on behalf of B.E., the § 1983 claims are due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

1.

In support of her contentions that the defendants violated B.E.'s rights under the Equal Protection Clause, Stallworth alleges that the defendants treated B.E. differently than his non-disabled peers and that disabled students are subject to different rules and not given the same rights as non-disabled students at Forest Oaks. Doc. 1 at 8-9. But, such conclusory allegations of differential treatment are not sufficient to state a viable equal protection claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, individuals with intellectual disabilities are not members of a suspect class based on their disabilities. See City of...