Beachside Assocs. v. SBRMCOA, LLC

2020 VI Super 9

BEACHSIDE ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. SBRMCOA, LLC, d/b/a SAPPHIRE BEACH RESORT AND MARINACONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. ST-06-CV-498

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

January 16, 2020

ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

APPEARANCES

Neil D. Goldman

510 King Street, Suite 416

Alexandria, VA 22314

Gregory H. Hodges

Dudley, Newman and Feuerzeig, LLP

1000 Frederiksberg Gade

St. Thomas, VI

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq.

Hodge & Hodge

1340 Taarneberg

St. Thomas, VI

Attorney for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

¶1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Beachside Associates, LLC's (hereinafter "Beachside") October 27, 2016 Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice.¹

Defendant SBRMCOA, LLC d/b/a Sapphire Beach Resort and Marina Condominium Owners Association (hereinafter "the COA") seeks dismissal with prejudice and requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs. For the reasons set forth below the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and deny COA's request for costs and attorneys' fees.

FACTS

¶2 This dispute arises out of an action that commenced thirteen years ago concerning a parcel of land located on the East End of St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. On September 26, 2006, Beachside, the holder of a first priority mortgage on Parcel No. 11-N Estate Smith Bay, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands ("the Property"),² filed a complaint alleging that the COA, an association of condominium owners at Sapphire Beach resort, tortiously interfered with Beachside's rights to access, use, and fence the Property when the COA denied Beachside's contractor and crew through a guard station it erected on Parcel No. 16-1-2 Estate Smith Bay. Beachside sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the COA from further interference, as well as compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages. The COA argues that it has an easement over the Property and that fencing would interfere with its easement. On October 10, 2006, the COA filed a Rule 12(b)6 Motion to Dismiss. Following a host of procedural rulings—including a ruling on December 11, 2011³ on Beachside'smotion to consolidate—the COA withdrew its Motion to Dismiss and filed its answer on September 29, 2014. The matter was eventually referred to mediation and scheduled for trial. The trial was continued on at least two occasions and eventually the final pre-trial conference was scheduled for November 3, 2016, with jury selection to occur on November 28, 2016.

¶3 Just prior to the pre-trial conference, on October 27, 2016, Beachside filed a Motion to Dismiss this action without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)2. The COA filed a Response to Beachside's Motion to Dismiss requesting that the Court deny Beachside's motion, or alternatively, grant dismissal of the action with prejudice, subject only to Beachside's payment of the COA's costs and fees. Beachside argued that its motion to dismiss was a favor to the COA and if the Court intended to grant fees to the COA, Beachside would withdraw its motion to dismiss and take the matter to trial. The COA's sur-reply, filed after the trial had been cancelled, seems to abandon the demand for trial and requests that the matter be dismissed with prejudice, conditioned upon an award of fees and costs to the COA.

MOTION TO DISMISS

¶4 Beachside has moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) on the grounds "that the underlying legal issues are encompassed in another case pending in this Court, which was tried in September [2016], namely, SBRMCOA, L.L.C. v. Beachside Associates, L.L.C., ST-2014-CV-0138 (the "Easement Case")." Beachside further defends its request for dismissal without prejudice by stating that it will "forego monetary damages in this proceeding." In opposition, the COA argues that Beachside's motion comes as a result of the Plaintiff's "fear[] that a jury may rule against its strongly disputed claim" and further asserts that the COA "would be severely prejudiced by dismissal. . .at this very late date." The COA initially opposed the motion to dismiss and demanded that the matter proceed to trial, but later seemed to abandon that position (after the trial date had lapsed) and requests the matter be dismissed with prejudice with an award of fees and costs to the COA.

LEGAL STANDARD

¶5 Federal Rule 41 was previously applicable to this Court through Superior Court Rule 7. However, "effective March 31, 2017, this Court adopted the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, which supersede all previous civil procedure rules applicable to the Superior Court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that had been applicable through former Superior Court Rule 7." Mills-Williams v. Mapp, 67 V.I. 574, 585 (V.I. 2017). "[The Virgin Islands] rules govern ... proceedings in any action pending on the effective date of the rules or amendments, unless ... the Supreme Court ... specifies otherwise by order ... or ... the Superior Court makes an express finding that applying them in a particular previously pending action would be infeasible or work an injustice." V.I. R. Civ. P. 1-1(c). For this reason, the Court applies V.I. R. Civ. P. 41 to Beachside's motion. Since V.I. R. Civ. P. 41 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 are substantively identical, the change of the rule applied is merely nominal. See Yearwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Antilles Gas Corp., 69 V.I. 863, 867 n.2 (V.I. 2018) (finding "Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 41 is identical to the previously applicable federal rule"); Victor-Perez v. Diamondrock Frenchman's Owner, Inc., No. ST-15-CV-387, 2017 WL 4538920, at *7 n. 50 (V.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2017) (finding "decisions interpreting the [Fed. R. Civ. P.] are persuasive authority where the V.I. R. Civ. P. and the [Fed. R. Civ. P.] are substantively identical").

¶6 V.I. R. Civ. P. 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order if the opposing party has not filed an answer or motion for summary judgment, or if all parties stipulate to dismissal. See Yearwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Antilles Gas Corp., 69 V.I. 863, 867 (V.I. 2018). In all other circumstances, "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." V.I. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The "main purpose" of requiring the Court's approval under 41(a)(2) "is to prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly affect the rights of the defendant." Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 V.I. 596, 618 (V.I. 2012); see also Beaver Associates v. Cannon, 59 F.R.D. 508, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13708, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.) ("[A] motion . . . for a voluntary dismissal of a suit, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), calls for the exercise of judicial discretion to avoid an unfair effect on anyone else incident upon such a termination of the suit."). Accordingly, if a dismissal would not unfairly affect the rights of the defendant, the Court should grant the motion. See Island Tile, 57 V.I. at 618.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Unless otherwise stated, a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is without prejudice as to all defendants. Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303, 304 (3d Cir. 1951); Holloway v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 69 V.I. 496, 508 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2018) (quoting Island Tile, 57 V.I. at 610).⁴ When a plaintiff moves to dismiss without prejudice, the Court has discretion to permit dismissal. See Ockert, 190 F.2d at 204 ("The view that. . . the grant or denial of voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a matter of judicial discretion has been accepted by the great majority of the District Courts and the Courts of Appeals.") (collecting cases); Williams v. Cost-U-Less, Inc., No. 2011-025, 2013 WL 450368 at *2 (D.V.I. Feb. 6, 2013) (citations omitted); Virgin Islands Housing Finance Authority v. Browne, No. 2017-48, 2018 WL 4558983, at * 2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2018) (citation omitted); see also 9 CharlesAlan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2367 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Wright & Miller].⁵ A court should grant a voluntary dismissal unless the defendant "can show that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result." Christopher v. V.I. Taxi Ass'n, No. ST-09-CV-444, 2009 V.I. LEXIS 24, at *3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2009) (citing Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005)); see also Hayden v. Westfield, 586 Fed.Appx. 835, 843 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that motions for voluntary dismissal should be granted unless the defendant will suffer legal prejudice). The Court may consider "whether the [plaintiff] has presented a proper explanation for its desire to dismiss; whether dismissal would result in a waste of judicial time and effort; and whether a dismissal will prejudice the defendants." In re Alumina Dust Claims, 2019 VI Super 139, ¶25 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Browne, 2018 WL 4558983, at * 2 ("In ruling on such a motion, the Court must decide the presence or extent of any prejudice to the defendant. . . .").⁶ Dismissals should "be granted with prejudice when defendants may be subject to extreme financial prejudice; when a defendant confronts the possible loss of a substantial right; or when a defendant otherwise experiences substantial prejudice." Del Valle v. OfficeMax N. Am., Inc., No. CV-13-24, 2015 WL 1187627, at *3 (D.V.I. Mar. 11, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. Cost-U-Less,Inc., 2013 WL 450368, *2 (D.V.I. Feb. 6, 2013)), aff'd sub nom. Del Valle v. Officemax N. Am., 680 F. App'x 51 (3d Cir. 2017). The Court now turns its attention to these considerations.

¶8 In its motion, Beachside states that "[t]he reason for its request is that the underlying legal issues are encompassed in [the Easement Case]. . . ."⁷ The Easement Case was tried before the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands (Honorable Judge Michael C. Dunston presiding) on September 21 and 22, 2016 and...