Beal v. Davids

LATAVIOUS BEAL, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DAVIDS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-522

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

July 13, 2021

Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendant ICF Mail Room. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the remaining Defendants.

Discussion

I. Factual allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the ICF Mail Room, ICF Warden John Davids and the following ICF employees whose positions Plaintiff does not indicate: Phyllis Clement, Scott Koster, and Unknown Karber.

Plaintiff alleges that he received stimulus funds from the federal government as part of its effort to address issues posed by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, but ICF staff used those funds to pay Plaintiff's various debts. On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff received a tax refund of $1,800 from the federal government. He asserts that the government dispensed $1,200 of the funds pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, see 26 U.S.C. § 6428(a)(1), and the federal government dispensed an additional $600 pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (CAA), see 26 U.S.C. § 6428A(a)(1). To request these funds, Plaintiff filed a tax return claiming $1,800 in tax credits, as authorized by the stimulus bills, which resulted in his $1,800 income tax refund. (See Ex. B to Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PageID.15.) Those funds were deposited into his prisoner trust account.

On May 3, 2021, soon after Plaintiff received his $1,800 refund, Plaintiff sent a kite requesting information and noting that the "second round payment [was] exempt from collection from M.D.O.C." (Ex. D to Compl., ECF No. 1-4, PageID.25.) On May 5, 2021, before he received a response to his May 3 kite, he sought to purchase three magazine subscriptions. ICF staff denied his request because he lacked sufficient funds. At some point, Plaintiff learned that a hold had been placed on the full $1,800 to pay debts he owed to state and federal courts and to the MDOC. (See Ex. A to Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12; Ex. D to Compl., ECF No. 1-4, PageID.25.)MDOC later deducted funds from his account on May 10, 2021, to pay Plaintiff's state and federal court costs. (ECF No. 4-1, PageID.39.) MDOC deducted further funds to pay Plaintiff's MDOC debts on May 31, 2021. (Id., PageID.39-42.)

Plaintiff alleges that $600 of the funds were issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6428A, and therefore were exempt from any type of seizure to pay debts other than child support. For support, Plaintiff relies upon an MDOC internal memorandum issued on January 14, 2021, which advised that "MDOC cannot satisfy debts with the second-round payment" and that staff should log the payment as a different type of income. (Ex. B to Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PageID.14.) Plaintiff further alleges that Michigan's Office of the Attorney General has acknowledged in uncited court filings that funds issued pursuant to the CAA must not be seized or garnished to pay debts. Thus, believing that the $600 issued to him pursuant to the CAA had been improperly applied to his debts, Plaintiff filed a grievance. In the response to his Step-I grievance, Defendants Karber and Clement asserted that because the IRS had issued the entire $1,800 payment as a tax refund, MDOC did not classify the funds as a protected economic impact payment. Defendant Davids upheld that determination on Plaintiff's Step-II appeal.

Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $23,000, costs, and fees. In Plaintiff's statement of jurisdiction, he further asserts that he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)

II. Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "'to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

III. Sovereign Immunity

To the extent Plaintiff intends to name the ICF Mail Room as a party, his claims against it fail. The ICF Mail Room is a location within ICF; it is not an individual, office, or organization. Reading the complaint with all due liberality, see Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, the Courtwill presume that Plaintiff intends to name ICF as a Defendant. An express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a "person." See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ICF is an administrative unit of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

Furthermore, Plaintiff's claim against this Defendant is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). That amendment prohibits suits in federal court against the state or any of its agencies or departments. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is in the nature of a jurisdictional defense and may be raised on the court's own motion. Est. of Ritter v. Univ. of Mich., 851 F.2d 846, 852 (6th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has squarely held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against state departments of corrections. Alabama, 438 U.S. at 782. ICF is therefore not subject to a section 1983 action.

IV. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff's due process claim against the remaining Defendants is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Parratt, a person deprived of property by a "random and unauthorized act" of a state employee has no federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not "without due process of law." Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional deprivations of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff's claim is premised upon allegedly unauthorized acts of a state official, he must plead andprove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a prisoner's failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due-process action. See Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Plaintiff has not alleged that state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting "any...