Beam v. Johnson & Johnson

ERIN MELCHER BEAM, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-19217 (MAS) (RLS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

December 28, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL A. SHIPP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Johnson &amp Johnson (“J&J”), Johnson & Johnson Healthcare Services, Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc (“JJS”), Ethicon, Inc. (“Ethicon”) Ethicon U.S. LLC, and Todd Tetreault's (“Tetreault,” and collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Erin Melcher Beam's (“Beam”) First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 36.) Beam opposed (ECF No. 42), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 43). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion and further grants Beam leave to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined in this Memorandum Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a case about alleged discrimination and retaliation, brought by a former employee. (See generally First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”), ECF No. 19.) From 2001 to 2010, and from 2011 until her termination in 2019, Beam worked for Defendants in various capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.) The alleged harassment and gender discrimination against Beam began in 2015 when she transitioned to a role as Senior Manager in Marketing and began working under the supervision of Matt Knipmeyer (“Knipmeyer”). (Id. ¶¶ 18-22.) Beam claims that, among other things, Knipmeyer regularly excluded her from discussions, commented on her status as a working mother, and, on one occasion, compared her to his wife in a derogatory manner. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.) She further alleges that Knipmeyer retaliated against her because she objected to the termination of a Black employee and, on numerous occasions, had reported her concerns about Knipmeyer's conduct to various members of Human Resources (“HR”), such as to Parvin Sharma (“Sharma”), and to Janis Smith-Gomez (“Gomez”), the Vice President of Marketing. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 25-28.) Knipmeyer's alleged retaliation consisted of, among other things, removing Beam from working on more visible projects, bullying Beam, and encouraging Beam to quit. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Beam attempted to remedy this retaliation through making further complaints to various personnel. (Id. ¶¶ 32-35.) For example, in January 2016, Beam met with Gomez to discuss Knipmeyer's retaliatory conduct, yet Gomez rebuffed her and asked her to leave. (Id. ¶ 36.) Beam then made more complaints to various members of HR, which resulted in, what Beams alleges to be, an internal, flawed investigation of Beam's complaints that ultimately proved unfruitful. (Id. ¶¶ 37-39.)

Much of the FAC revolves around Beam's contentions that Defendants failed to provide certain higher performance ratings and bonuses to which Beam believes she was entitled based on her job performance. (Id. ¶¶ 38-50.) For example, Beam alleges that in February 2016, she received a lower bonus than she previously received only as a result of Knipmeyer's retaliation; this lower compensation continued, even after Beam began a new position in June 2016 as Senior Deal Manager with a different group, where she reported to Senior Director Ruth Chang (“Chang”). (Id.) Beam also alleges that Tetreault, who was a Vice President and Manager, began to retaliate against her for participating in an investigation by another employee of Tetreault in August 2017; such retaliation again included lower compensation. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 52-56.)

The FAC then switches gears to focus on Beam's medical history and Defendants' response to it. Beam alleges that various medical conditions rendered her disabled at times and led to her taking a medical leave of absence in February 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 58-61.) She contends that prior to taking leave, she had to disclose her medical condition in front of various team members and that Chang disclosed her medical condition without Beam's permission. (Id. ¶ 63.) When Beam returned to work around May 2018, she alleges various other wrongful acts ensued, including that she was denied an accommodation to participate in a team meeting remotely despite informing her team of medical travel restrictions. (Id. ¶¶ 67-68.) In November 2018, Katie Fischer (“Fischer”) became Beam's new manager. (Id. ¶ 72.) With her, Beam discussed her medical situation and need to take another medical leave in the future. (Id. ¶¶ 74-75.) Shortly thereafter, Fischer presented Beam with a document that was critical of Beam's performance and advised Beam that she had thirty days to comply with it. (Id. ¶ 76.) Despite receiving positive feedback from Fischer, at the end of the thirty-day period, Beam was put on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). (Id. ¶¶ 76-78.) Beam subsequently filed a complaint with Employee Relations (“ER”) and, in March 2019, requested and received intermittent family leave in connection with an upcoming surgery. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81.) ER subsequently informed Beam that no action would be taken against her at the end of the PIP period in April 2019, although Fischer expressed her displeasure at Beam's leave request. (Id. ¶¶ 82, 111.) When Beam returned to work in May 2019, Fischer advised Beam that she was terminated for “performance.” (Id. ¶ 85.) In October 2019, Defendants initiated a lawsuit-which was ultimately dismissed-to recover $10,000 in tuition reimbursement that they contributed to Beam's law school education. (Id. ¶¶ 91, 144-45; Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 9, ECF No. 42.) Beam further alleges that both her termination and the post-termination lawsuit constitute retaliation. (FAC ¶ 93.)

On December 14, 2020, Beam filed this action. (ECF No. 1.) On December 16, 2021, the United States of America declined intervention (ECF No. 11) and the Honorable Freda L. Wolfson directed the Clerk of the Court to unseal the matter and restore it to the Court's active docket (ECF No. 12).^[1] The FAC followed in April 2022 and alleges as follows: (1) violation of the antiretaliation provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (“Count One”); (2) disability and/or perceived disability discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (the “NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq. (“Count Two”); (3) interference in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“Count Three”); (4) discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FMLA (“Count Four”); (5) gender discrimination in violation of the NJLAD (“Count Five”); (6) retaliation in violation of the NJLAD (“Count Six”); and (7) aiding and abetting illegal discrimination in violation of the NJLAD (“Count Seven”). (See generally FAC 18-28.) Beam alleges all Counts against Defendants except for Count Seven, which Beam alleges solely against Tetreault. (Id. 28-29.)

Defendants move to dismiss Counts Two, Five, Six, and Seven of the FAC, the NJLAD claims. (ECF No. 36.) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)^[2] “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (June 6, 2011). “First, the [C]ourt must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of a plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In doing so, however, the court is free to ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Finally, the court must determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants primarily move to dismiss the FAC on the basis that the NJLAD, as a matter of law, does not apply to the conduct underlying Beam's claims. (See Defs.' Moving Br. 4-5, ECF No. 36-1.) Specifically, Defendants contend that Beam was not employed in New Jersey and has not sufficiently alleged that any discriminatory conduct took place in New Jersey, given that she has lived and worked for the last twenty years in Ohio. (Id. at 12.) Defendants further contend that although the NJLAD could apply to the claims of a nonresident, it is inapplicable to...