Beane v. Util. Trailer Mfg. Co.

934 F.Supp.2d 871

Monique L. BEANE, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child, Jeb

v.UTILITY TRAILER MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association.

No. 2:10–CV–0781.

United States District Court,

W.D. Louisiana,

Lake Charles Division.

March 6, 2013.

Chad E. Mudd, David P. Bruchhaus, Michael Keith Prudhomme, Mudd & Bruchhaus, Lake Charles, LA, John M. Lane, Paul F. Ferguson, Jr., Ryan M. Schaper, Provost Umphrey, Beaumont, TX, for Monique L. Beane, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child, Jeb.

Edward E. Rundell, Lottie L. Bash, Raymond L. Brown, Jr., Gold Weems, et al., Alexandria, LA, Glen M. Darbyshire, Inglesby Falligant Law Firm, Savannah, GA, for Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company and Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association.

MEMORANDUM RULING

PATRICIA MINALDI, District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 242], filed by the defendant, Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company (“UTM”). The plaintiff, Monique Beane, timely filed a response [Doc. 286], and UTM then filed a reply [Doc. 302]. As the motion is fully briefed, the undersigned finds that it is ripe for consideration. For the foregoing reasons, UTM's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In this lawsuit, the plaintiff claims damages as a result of a May 5, 2009 tractor-trailer accident in which her husband, Robert Beane (“the decedent”), was killed when his Suburban collided with a UTM trailer on U.S. Highway 1 in Caddo Parish. The petition alleges that Beane's Suburban struck the side of the UTM trailer at a ninety degree angle, causing his Suburban to travel beneath (a collision the plaintiff describes as a “side underride”) the trailer.¹

The plaintiff originally filed this suit in the 36th Judicial District Court of Beauregard Parish, Louisiana.² The defendants then removed to this court based on diversity jurisdiction.³ In a separate action (“Beane I”), the truck driver, his employer, and his insurance company settled with the plaintiff.⁴ In this action (“Beane II”), the plaintiff originally sued the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (“TTMA”) and UTM. She alleged that UTM had defectively designed the trailer involved in the decedent's accident, in violation of the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”), and also asserted claims against UTM for negligence, punitive damages, and wrongful death damages.⁵ She additionally alleged that the trade organization, TTMA, contributed to this defect by failing to recommend side underride protection to TTMA members like UTM, and providing false and misleading information to government agencies regarding underride issues.⁶

In a Memorandum Ruling issued February 2, 2011, this court dismissed TTMA based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligence, punitive damages, and wrongful death damages for pain and suffering against UTM, finding that the Louisiana Products Liability Act established the plaintiff's exclusive framework for recovery.⁷ Thus, the plaintiff's sole claim remaining after this ruling was a claim against UTM that it had manufactured a trailer that, because it lacked side underride protection, was defective and unreasonably dangerous in design under the provisions of the LPLA. SeeLa.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54, et seq.

The parties' contention in this motion is whether the plaintiff's biomechanical expert, Dr. Paul France, actually addressed a specific alternative design to the UTM trailer which would have prevented the decedent's death or injuries. The plaintiff retained Dr. Paul France as her expert in biomechanical engineering, and Dr. France rendered his written report in this matter on June 7, 2012 (“the France Report”).⁸

While UTM alleges that the France Report does not identify or reference a particular alternative design that was capable of preventing the decedent's death,⁹ the plaintiff counters that Dr. France did indeed describe and reference “effective and safe underride protection as an alternative design that was capable of preventing [the decedent's] death or injuries.” ¹⁰ Further, while UTM alleges that the France Report does not offer an opinion on whether the decedent would have survived a crash into a trailer equipped with the side guard proposed by the plaintiff's design experts, Bruce Enz and Perry Ponder,¹¹ the plaintiff expressly disavows this argument. She argues that instead, it was Dr. France's unequivocal opinion that such protection would have prevented the fatal injuries sustained by the decedent.¹² Finally, while UTM alleges that the France Report does not offer any opinion on how the decedent would have survived the crash into a trailer equipped with Enz and Ponder's alternative design,¹³ the plaintiff argues that it was Dr. France's unequivocal opinion that such protection would have resulting in non life-threatening, non-incapacitating injuries to the decedent.¹⁴

UTM now moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff's LPLA claim.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, including the opposing party's affidavits, “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment is initially responsible for demonstrating the reasons justifying the motion by identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.1995). If the dispositive issue is one that the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely identifying evidence in the record that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response.” Id.

If the movant satisfies this burden, however, then the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954. In evaluating motions for summary judgment, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted when the record as a whole “could not lead a rational finder of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Id.

LAW & ANALYSIS

As this case's subject matter jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship, the substantive law of Louisiana governs this dispute. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). As noted supra, in this instance, the plaintiff's claims against UTM are governed by the framework of the LPLA. The plaintiff alleges that (1) UTM failed to implement or utilize designs that would have reduced or eliminated side underrides like the one experienced by the decedent and (2) the trailer was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because it lacked side guards.

The LPLA provides, inter alia:

A. The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity.

B. A product is unreasonably dangerous if and only if:

(1) The product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition as provided in R.S. 9:2800.55;

(2) The product is unreasonably dangerous in design as provided in R.S. 9:2800.56;

(3) The product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about the product has not been provided as provided in R.S. 9:2800.57; or

(4) The product is unreasonably dangerous because it does not conform to an express warranty of the manufacturer about the product as provided in R.S. 9:2800.58.

C. The characteristic of the product that renders it unreasonably dangerous under R.S. 9:2800.55 must exist at the time the product left the control of its manufacturer. The characteristic of the product that renders it unreasonably dangerous under R.S. 9:2800.56 or 9:2800.57 must exist at the time the product left the control of its manufacturer or result from a reasonably anticipated alteration or modification of the product.

D. The claimant has the burden of proving the elements of Subsections A, B and C of this Section.

La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54.

The LPLA then proceeds to define unreasonable dangerousness in design under § 9:2800.56 as follows:

A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control:

(1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant's damages; and

(2) The likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product.

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving these elements. See Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir.2000).

I. The Parties' Arguments

UTM argues that, as Dr. France's expertise as a biomechanical engineer involves “the application of engineering to medical science, the opinion of [the plaintiff's] biomechanical engineer is necessary to establish this essential element of [her] case:” namely, that the Enz Side Underride Guard (“Enz guard”) proposed by Enz and Ponder would have prevented the decedent's death.¹⁵ As such, UTM alleges that the plaintiff's claim fails because she has failed, through Dr. France, to meet her burden on two elements of § 9:2800.56: (1)...