Beasley v. Buncich

CHARLES BEASLEY, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF JOHN BUNCICH, solely in his official capacity as Lake County Sheriff;JEFFERY KUMOREK, solely in his official capacityas Lake County Jail Administrator; and OFFICER M. BUEHRLE, Defendants.

Cause No.: 2:13-CV-23-PRC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

So ORDERED: July 22, 2014

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Sheriff Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 35], filed by Defendants Sheriff John Buncich, Jeffrey Kumorek, and Officer M. Buehrle on April 14, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Charles Beasley filed his Complaint against Defendants Lake County, Indiana; Lake County Board of Commissioners; Sheriff John Buncich, solely in his official capacity as Lake County Sheriff; Jeffery Kumorek, solely in his official capacity as Lake County Jail Administrator; Officer M. Buehrle; John Doe; Jeff Doe; Jack Doe; Joseph Doe; Jane Doe; Janet Doe; and other Unknown Parties on January 15, 2013. Counts I through IV of the Complaint are federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the United States Constitution. Counts V and XIV allege violations of Article I, Sections 11, 12, 15, 21, 23, and 37 and of Article 1, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, respectively. The Complaint also alleges Indiana state law claims of false arrest, confinement, and imprisonment (Counts VI, IX, XI, XII, XIII); humiliation (Count VII); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII); and criminal confinement (Count X).

Defendants Lake County, Indiana, and Lake County Board of Commissioners filed an Answer on April 30, 2013. Defendants Sheriff Buncich and Officer Buehrle filed an Answer on May 7, 2013. Defendant Jeffery Kumorek filed a separate Answer, also on May 7, 2013. On May 8, 2013, the Doe Defendants were severed as party defendants.

Defendants Sheriff Buncich, Jeffery Kumorek, and Officer Buehrle filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on April 14, 2014. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on May 12, 2014, and Defendants filed a reply on May 23, 2014.

On April 15, 2014, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Lake County, Indiana, and Lake County Board of Commissioners were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the parties' stipulation.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate—in fact, is mandated—where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party."Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly addressanother party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).

In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

MATERIAL FACTS

On Saturday, January 29, 2011, Plaintiff was invited by his friend, James Sweeney, to visit Club 83 in Merrillville, Indiana. Sweeney picked Plaintiff up in Chicago, drove them back to Northwest Indiana, and acted as Plaintiff's "designated driver" for the evening. Plaintiff and Sweeney socialized with some of Sweeney's coworkers that afternoon and evening before going to the club. Plaintiff, Sweeney, and two of Sweeney's coworkers went to Club 83 sometime that night, where they stayed for two to three hours. Over the course of twelve hours, Plaintiff consumed atleast six alcoholic beverages, including two beers, two or three "Captain and Cokes," and two Jägermeister shots.

At approximately 2:46 a.m. on Sunday, January 30, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested by Officer Buehrle on charges of public intoxication and disorderly conduct. In his Investigation Narrative, Officer Buehrle wrote that he saw Plaintiff yelling about being forced to leave the bar and that Plaintiff was causing a disturbance. (Def. Br., Exh. 3). While speaking with Plaintiff, Officer Buehrle detected "a strong odor commonly associated with an intoxicating beverage" and observed "extremely slurred speech" and "red watery eyes." Id. He wrote that Plaintiff was swaying while speaking with the officers. When Plaintiff was advised to lower his voice and leave the area, Plaintiff refused and continued yelling. Officer Buehrle advised Plaintiff a second time to leave the area, to which Plaintiff responded, "'Take me to jail, I don't care.'" Id. Officer Buehrle warned Plaintiff a third time to leave or he would be taken to jail for public intoxication and disorderly conduct, to which Plaintiff replied, "'[T]ake me to jail, I dont [sic] care, we can talk about this in court.'" Id. Officer Buehrle then placed Plaintiff under arrest.

In contrast, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that Officer Buehrle's report was "completely fabricated," (Def. Br., Exh. 1, p. 33, l.15), and an "elaborate story he has written . . . nowhere close to what occurred," id. at p. 34, ll. 6-7. Plaintiff further testified that the only conversation he had with Officer Buehrle was Officer Buehrle saying, "I'll take you to jail," and Plaintiff responding, "If that's what you want to do." (Pl. Br., Ex. 1, p. 29, ll. 6-22). When asked at his deposition whether he "had a strong odor of intoxicants," Plaintiff first responded, "No. I would say no. I mean, I certainly had some drinks . . . ." (Def. Br., Ex. 1, p. 34, l. 12). Then when asked whether he agreed or disagreed that he smelled of "intoxicants," he responded, "I don't agree. I don't disagree. I don'tknow what I smelled like at that point. I had been dancing and I had some drinks. I don't know." Id. at ll. 21-23. He testified that he believed that his eyes were not bloodshot and watery, that he was not unsteady or swaying, that he was not falling, and that he was not crying. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that, when he left the club, he knew what was going on around...