Beatty v. PruittHealth Inc.

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LATICIA N. BEATTY, Plaintiff, v. PRUITTHEALTH, INC., PRUITTHEALTH-CAROLINA POINT, LLC, KURTIS JONES, individually and in his official capacity, and DELLA MERVIN, individually and in her official capacity, Defendants.

No. 1:21CV818

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

August 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Before this court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 14), filed by Defendants PruittHealth, Inc. PruittHealth-Carolina Point, LLC, Kurtis Jones, and Della Mervin. Plaintiff Laticia N. Beatty has not responded. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

Defendants have also filed a Motion for Expansion of Word Limit, (Doc 13). That motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016)). The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff has worked in nursing home administration for twelve years. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 7.)^[1] PruittHealth, Inc. operates PruittHealth-Carolina Point, LLC in Durham County, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 2.) Kurtis Jones is the Area Vice President of PruittHealth and was Plaintiff's supervisor. (Id. ¶ 4.) Della Mervin is the Director of Partner Services at PruittHealth and was Plaintiff's direct contact to Human Resources. (Id.)

Plaintiff first began working for PruittHealth in 2014 and worked there for four-and-a-half years. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was rehired by PruittHealth on March 23, 2020. (Id. ¶ 10.)

A week later, Plaintiff was diagnosed with COVID-19. (Id. ¶ 24.) She began working from home on April 7, 2020. (Id.) On May 27, 2020, Plaintiff received a doctor's note recommending Plaintiff “work four hours per day for two weeks then increase.” (Id. ¶ 25; Doc. 1-7.) Plaintiff provided this note to Defendants on May 29, 2020. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 25.) Plaintiff was required to report to work the next day. (Id.)

Plaintiff returned to work in-person “[o]n May 30, 2020, against doctor's restrictions, . . . working for no more than 4 hours.” (Id. ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff was recovering from COVID-19, she “was responsible for interviewing housekeeping, nurses, certified nursing assistants and department heads.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that because of her disability “Jones unilaterally removed [Plaintiff] from emails making it difficult for her to complete her duties.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff told Defendants “that the duties that were placed on her could not be done in 4 hours due to the issue that the other employees had no training of the new changes in the system that PruittHealh was implementing.” (Id. ¶ 33.) On or around June 8, 2020, Plaintiff called the Company Hotline to complain about “disability harassment.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 30.)

On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff texted Jones that she felt ill. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiff decided to work outside. (Id.) Jones and Mervin told Plaintiff “it was unprofessional” for Plaintiff to work outside. (Id.)

Plaintiff reported “continuous threats and disability harassment” to Mervin. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff also alleges a coworker resigned “[a]s an intimidation and retaliatory tactic.” (Id. ¶ 36.)

On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff was reinfected with COVID-19 and returned to work six days later. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) Plaintiff alleges when she returned to work “the discrimination and harassment continued.” (Id. ¶ 38.) She also alleges that “[o]n July 7, Tiffany Ray DHS exposed [a] plot to conspire against Plaintiff and replace her with Alexander Parker per Defendant AVP Jones instruction.” (Id. ¶ 40.) On July 31, 2020, Plaintiff experienced shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting while at work. (Id. ¶ 39.) A nurse practitioner found Plaintiff in her car in pain, and Plaintiff ended up hospitalized. (Id.)

On August 7, 2020, Plaintiff “sent a letter of harassment and complaint of discrimination to Neal Pruitt, the owner of [PruittHealth].” (Id. ¶ 42; see also Doc. 1-4.) She did not receive a response. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 42.) The next day Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge. (Id. ¶ 43; Doc. 1-11.)^[2]

On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff sent Defendants a doctor's note stating that Plaintiff could not come into work until further notice. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 44-45.) Defendants did not discuss any accommodations with Plaintiff. (Id.) On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff submitted an Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) physician's certification indicating Plaintiff's condition would likely last a year. (Id. ¶ 46; Doc. 1-8 at 3.) On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff texted Mervin a message “in reference to the Family Medical Leave ‘FMLA' and ADA.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 47; see also Doc. 1-9.) In her reply, Mervin did not mention accommodation proposals. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 47.)

Plaintiff received her last paycheck and PTO payment on November 10, 2020. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff alleges she was constructively terminated and retaliated against because of her disability. (Id.) On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff contacted Mervin. (Id. ¶ 49.) Mervin provided no updates regarding accommodations. (Id.) On February 8, 2021, Plaintiff was terminated. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff alleges this was the first time she received information about the ADA. (Id.) On July 23, 2021, Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 54; Doc. 1-10.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against her because of her disability, race, color, and national origin, and committed several other violations of federal and state laws. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 93-204.)

B. Procedural Background

On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint. (Compl. (Doc. 1).) Defendants filed a Motion for Expansion of Word Limit, (Doc. 13), given the length of Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, (Doc. 14), along with a brief in support, (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. (“Defs. Br.”) (Doc. 15)).

On March 23, 2022, the Clerk sent Plaintiff a letter advising her of the motion to dismiss and her right to respond. (Doc. 16.) On May 4, 2022, the Clerk sent Plaintiff a second letter regarding Plaintiff's lack of response to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff has yet to file a response.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” and demonstrates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true. Id. Further, this court liberally construes “the complaint, including all reasonable inferences therefrom . . . in the plaintiff's favor.” Est. of Williams-Moore v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 646 (M.D. N.C. 2004). This court does not, however, accept legal conclusions as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “[C]ourts are not required,” however, “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Deabreu v. Novastar Home Mortg., Inc., 536 Fed.Appx. 373, 375 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)). “The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.” Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For that reason alone, this court could grant Defendants' motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). However, despite this court's inherent authority to sanction a party with dismissal of an action, see Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Projects Mgmt. Co. v. Dyncorp Int'l LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 2013), this court is mindful that dismissal is a harsh sanction, and the need “to prevent delays must be weighed against the sound public policy of deciding cases on their merits.” Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 810 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Riezakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974)). Considering Plaintiff's pro se status, this court will consider Defendants' motion on the merits notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to respond. As explained, this court will dismiss all but two of Plaintiff's claims.

A. Title VII Claims

Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff because of her race, color, and national origin in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 57, 120.)^[3] Defendants argue Plaintiff's Title VII allegations should be dismissed because Plaintiff's EEOC charge asserted discrimination on the basis of her disability. (Defs.' Br. (Doc. 15) at 5-6.)^[4]

“Before a Title VII plaintiff can bring a formal suit, he must file an administrative charge with...