Beauchamp v. City of Paducah & Paducah Human Rights Comm'n

STANLEY BEAUCHAMP Plaintiff v. CITY OF PADUCAH and PADUCAH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-00090-TBR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAH DIVISION

Date: June 20, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants City of Paducah and Paducah Human Rights Commission's (PHRC) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 27.) Defendants have supplemented their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 34.) Plaintiff Stanley Beauchamp has responded. (Docket No. 38.) Defendants have replied. (Docket No. 39.) Defendants have supplemented their reply. (Docket No. 40.) This matter is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants City of Paducah and the PHRC's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 27.)

Plaintiff Stanley Beauchamp has filed a Motion for Jury Trial. (Docket No. 37.) Because the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Docket No. 27), it will DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Jury Trial, (Docket No. 37).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Stanley Beauchamp was hired by the PHRC as its Executive Director on February 28, 1994. (Docket No. 1, at ¶ 13.) Previously, in a separate action on September 25,2008, he filed a complaint in this Court against Paducah and its former City Manager alleging they subjected him to unlawful race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of his civil rights under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. (Docket No. 1, at 3-4; see also 5:08-cv-00156.) In that case, this Court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, in any event, had failed to overcome the defendants' evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons justifying any adverse employment action he may have suffered. (5:08-cv-00156, Docket No. 41, at 3-6.)

The Complaint in this current action was filed on July 2, 2012. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges unlawful retaliation against him by the Defendants, the City of Paducah and the PHRC, for engaging in activities protected by: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA).¹ (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2324.) Specifically, he alleges the PHRC and the City of Paducah "embarked on a deliberate, intentional unlawful course of harassing, discriminatory, and retaliatory conduct against Beauchamp from the time that the Defendants learned of Beauchamp's intent to file the Charge underlying Civil Cause No. 5:08-cv-00156 through their unlawful termination of Beauchamp's employment." (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff's retaliation claims are based upon: (1) his termination on April 21, 2010; (2) an imposition of a written warning on February 26, 2010; (3) a negative jobperformance evaluation on February 26, 2010; and (4) a salary reduction on June 2, 2009.² (Docket No. 1, at ¶¶ 16-20.)

Defendants deny that any retaliation occurred as a result of Plaintiff's previous lawsuit, 5:08-cv-00156, and his previous EEOC Charges of Discrimination. (Docket No. 27-1, at 3.) Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and that all but one of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. (Id.) Finally, with respect to the City of Paducah, Defendants argue Plaintiff's Title VII claims must also be dismissed because the City is not Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. (Id. at 13.)

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

"[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must present evidence on which thetrier of fact could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). The plaintiff may accomplish this by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment; "the mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate." Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lews v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

I. The City of Paducah is Not Plaintiff's Employer for Title VII Purposes

Regarding the City of Paducah, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because the City is not Plaintiff's employer within the meaning of Title VII. (Docket No. 27-1, at 13.) The crux of Defendants' argument is that the PHRC and the City should not be considered a single employer for Title VII purposes.

A. Standard For Determining Whether the City and the PHRC Are a Single Employer

The Sixth Circuit has not promulgated a standard for determining whether governmental entities should be considered a single employer for Title VII purposes. See Buckhard v. Henry Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 2005 WL 1863828, at *2 (N.D. Ohio. Aug. 3, 2005). However, the Eleventh Circuit has delineated a standard, which at least three other district courts in theSixth Circuit have adopted, for determining when governmental entities should be considered a single employer:

To summarize, we hold that when assessing whether multiple governmental entities are a single "employer" under Title VII, we begin with the presumption that governmental subdivisions denominated as separate and distinct under state law should not be aggregated for purposes of Title VII. That presumption may be rebutted by evidence establishing that a governmental entity was structured with the purpose of evading the reach of federal employment discrimination law. Absent an evasive purpose, the presumption against aggregating separate public entities will control the inquiry, unless it is clearly outweighed by factors manifestly indicating that the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that they should be counted together under Title VII.

The standard we adopt is not whether a fact finder reasonably could conclude the plaintiff has overcome the presumption. Instead, the standard is whether the fact finder reasonably could conclude the plaintiff has clearly overcome the presumption . . . Absent evidence of evasive purpose, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff will have to show that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the presumption of distinctness is clearly outweighed.

Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Finding the reasoning of Lyes convincing, this Court will apply this standard.³

B. Application of Standard

1. Presumption of Separateness Between the PHRC and the City

In this case, the presumption of distinctness of the PHRC and the City of Paducah is established by Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 344.310 and 344.320 and the ordinance creating the PHRC, (Docket No. 27-4). See Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1346 (finding Florida law established the presumption when legislation established the Community Redevelopment Agency was a separate and distinct entity). § 344.310 permits any city or county to create a human rights commission. § 344.320outlines the powers those commissions may be authorized to have, including the power to "[e]mploy an executive director, attorneys, hearing examiners, clerks and other employees." The ordinance creating the PHRC essentially gives it all the powers authorized by § 344.320, including the power to employ an executive director and other employees and agents. (Docket No. 27-4, at 3.) Therefore, this clear distinction drawn between the PHRC and the City raises the presumption that they are separate and distinct entities.

2. Plaintiff Cannot Rebut The Presumption of Separateness

As outlined above, the presumption of separateness may only be rebutted by evidence of a purpose to evade federal employment discrimination law or evidence that "the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship" that a reasonable fact finder could conclude the plaintiff has clearly overcome the presumption. Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1345; see also Dumas v. Hurley Medical Center, 905 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (finding employee who worked for public hospital was not an "employee" of the City under Title VII). Plaintiff alleges he is City employee, and the presumption should be rebutted because the Paducah City Commissioners approved his hire, the city manager and finance director's signatures were embossed across his checks, the PHRC Commissioners are appointed by the City Commissioners, and his office was on the first floor of City Hall. (Docket No. 38, at 14-15.)

Regarding Plaintiff's allegation that the Paducah City Commissioners approved his hire, while from 1994-1996 it appears the City may have been Plaintiff's employer, in 1...