Beckwitt v. State

DANIEL BECKWITT v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 794

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

April 7, 2021

September Term, 2019

January 28, 2021

GROSS NEGLIGENCE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER—RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE—LESS CULPABLE FORM OF SECOND-DEGREE DEPRAVED HEART MURDER

SECOND-DEPRAVED HEART MURDER—EXTREME DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE—HEIGHTENED FORM OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER—REQUIRES LIKELIHOOD OR CERTAINTY OF DEATH

Askia Khafra met Daniel Beckwitt in an internet chatroom where Khafra was seeking investors for his business idea—Equity Shark—a smartphone application that streamlined the process for ordinary people to invest in starter companies. Beckwitt agreed to invest in Equity Shark, and for approximately $10,000 he received a 5% stake in the business.

When Equity Shark failed to take off as expected, Khafra needed to repay Beckwitt for the $10,000 investment. Because Beckwitt feared a nuclear war between the United States and North Korea, he had been digging tunnels and a bunker underneath his home. Beckwitt allowed Khafra to repay the $10,000 debt by digging such tunnels at Beckwitt's home. On numerous occasions in 2017, Beckwitt would pick up Khafra and drive him back to his house to dig. Concerned with his privacy and in order to conceal his actual address, Beckwitt required Khafra to wear a blindfold during such drives. Additionally, Beckwitt did not allow Khafra into the first and second floors of the residence; Khafra was free to roam in the basement and the tunnels. Because Beckwitt did not own a cellular phone, he generally communicated with Khafra by using computer programs.

On September 10, 2017, in the early morning hours, Khafra sent Beckwitt a text message indicating that the power had gone out in the tunnels, that there was no airflow, and that he believed he smelled smoke. Khafra shortly thereafter clarified that he no longer detected smoke, but asked Beckwitt to fix the issue. Beckwitt, who was sleeping, did not see the messages until the next morning. When he saw the messages, Beckwitt notified Khafra that there had been a "pretty major electrical failure" and then switched power to the tunnels over to a different circuit. Beckwitt then went back to sleep.

Beckwitt awoke in the afternoon at approximately 3:00 p.m. and headed to the kitchen for some food. At about 4:00 p.m., he heard a beeping sound which he understood to be the carbon monoxide detector indicating a loss of power. After waiting twenty to thirty minutes for the breaker to automatically reset, Beckwitt went to the basement to manually reset the breaker. While in the basement, Beckwitt did not see Khafra.

Beckwitt reset the breaker and as he headed upstairs, he heard an explosion and immediately saw smoke rising out of the kitchen floor. Beckwitt immediately returned to the basement to tell Khafra about the fire. Although Beckwitt did not see Khafra, he heard him yell "yo dude." Beckwitt was soon overcome by smoke and had to exit the basement. Once outside, Beckwitt yelled for his neighbors to call 9-1-1.

Firefighters quickly responded to the scene, but noted unusual challenges in putting out the relatively small fire. The unusual challenges stemmed from the fact that Beckwitt was a hoarder, and the floor of his basement was completely covered with trash, debris, and other objects that rendered navigation difficult. When the smoke cleared, the firefighters found Khafra's body in the middle of the basement.

The State charged Beckwitt with second-degree depraved heart murder and two theories of involuntary manslaughter: gross negligence and failure to perform a legal duty. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to second-degree depraved heart murder, and guilty as to involuntary manslaughter. The verdict sheet did not distinguish between the two theories of manslaughter. Beckwitt timely appealed.

Held: Conviction for second-degree depraved heart murder reversed. Conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter affirmed. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for depraved heart murder, but is sufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Whereas gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the "junior varsity" of depraved heart murder, requires a reckless disregard for human life, second-degree depraved heart murder requires an extreme disregard for human life.

The evidence in this case shows that Beckwitt demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life by hiring Khafra to dig tunnels underneath his home where Khafra was completely dependent upon Beckwitt for food and supplies, there was a history of electrical failures in the tunnels, the basement was completely cluttered with trash and debris making escape difficult in the event of an emergency, Khafra could not easily call for or receive emergency assistance because Beckwitt had sought to conceal his location, and the door leading from the basement to the outside may have been locked. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter.

Although the case law fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between "reckless disregard" and "extreme disregard," the cases discussing the sufficiency of evidence for depraved heart murder intimate that the likelihood or certainty of death distinguishes it from mere gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Although the circumstances in this case were dangerous enough to sustain a conviction for gross negligence involuntarymanslaughter, they were not so egregious as to indicate that death was the likely, if not certain result, so as to satisfy the malice element of depraved heart murder. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for depraved heart murder.

As to Beckwitt's challenges regarding the prosecutor's closing arguments, Beckwitt generally failed to preserve his arguments for our review because the trial court, for the most part, sustained his objections as to the issues he raises on appeal. Beckwitt's challenges as to the jury instructions are unpersuasive. Finally, Beckwitt failed to preserve for our review his argument that the court erred by failing to hold a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) because he failed to indicate what evidence should have been excluded from his trial based on the court's failure to hold such a hearing.Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 133838C

REPORTED

^*Meredith, Kehoe, Beachley, JJ.

Opinion by Beachley, J.

^*Meredith, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court. He participated in the adoption of this opinion after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A.

Following a trial that spanned over two weeks, a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found appellant, Daniel Beckwitt, guilty of second-degree depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced appellant to twenty-one years' imprisonment, suspending all but nine, for depraved heart murder, and merged the conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following four issues for our review:

1. Was the evidence legally sufficient to sustain [appellant's] convictions for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter?

2. Did the trial court err by giving flawed jury instructions on murder and manslaughter?

3. Did the prosecutor's repeated improper remarks during closing and rebuttal closing arguments result in reversible error?

4. Did the suppression court err in denying [appellant's] request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware¹?

We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, but was insufficient to sustain the depraved heart murder conviction. We reject appellant's remaining allegations of error. We shall therefore reverse appellant's conviction for depraved heart murder and remand for sentencing on the previously merged involuntary manslaughter conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves the tragic death of Askia Khafra, a twenty-one-year-old who died while trying to escape a fire in appellant's basement. At the time of the fire, appellant wastwenty-six years old. The unfortunate series of events that brought Khafra and appellant together arose from Khafra's idea to create a smartphone application or "app" called Equity Shark. Khafra envisioned Equity Shark as streamlining the process for average people to invest in "starter companies" or small businesses that had not yet gone public and needed funding. Khafra expended considerable effort in developing the app. In furtherance of that goal, Khafra browsed internet chatrooms looking for investors. Khafra found his first investor—appellant—in such a chatroom.

Khafra pitched his business idea to appellant, and explained that he was looking for approximately $5,000 to go to San Francisco to apply for a Thiel Fellowship.² According to the parties' briefs, appellant invested approximately $10,000 for a 5% stake in Equity Shark.³ Khafra and appellant went on to develop a close friendship. Khafra apparently became fascinated with appellant due to appellant's wealth and financial success. Khafra looked to appellant as someone who could help him grow Equity Shark, not just financially, but by assisting with computer coding and other efforts needed to develop the app into a viable business. Unfortunately, Equity Shark never took off as planned, and Khafra was not accepted for the Thiel Fellowship.

In order to repay appellant's $10,000 investment, Khafra agreed to dig tunnels underneath appellant's house. Appellant had been building tunnels and an underground bunker beneath his home because he apparently feared a nuclear war with North Korea.

Khafra was not the first person to dig tunnels for appellant. Douglas Hart, who was...