Bedford Pub. Sch. v. Bedford Educ. Ass'n

305 Mich.App. 558

853 N.W.2d 452

BEDFORD PUBLIC SCHOOLS

v.BEDFORD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA.

Docket No. 314153.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 1, 2014, at Lansing.

Decided June 10, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.

Collins & Blaha, PC, Sterling Heights (by Gary J. Collins and John C. Kava ), for the Bedford Public Schools.

White, Schneider, Young & Chiodini, PC, Okemos (by Michael M. Shoudy and William C. Camp), for the Bedford Education Association, MEA/NEA.

Before: WILDER, P.J., and FITZGERALD and MARKEY, JJ.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The charging party, the Bedford Education Association (BEA), appeals by right the order of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) determining that MCL 423.215b(1) prohibits a public-school employer, “ after the expiration date of a collective bargaining agreement and until a successor collective bargaining agreement is in place,” from increasing a public-school employee's salary on the basis of additional educational achievement. We conclude that MCL 423.215b does not unconstitutionally deprive public employees of any vested right and that MERC correctly applied the statute. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On December 8, 2011, the BEA filed its charge against respondent, Bedford Public Schools (hereinafter, “the board”), alleging that the parties had entered a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) effective July 1, 2007, that expired on June 30, 2010. The BEA also alleged that in May 2010 the parties began negotiating for a new CBA but that the negotiations continued to be unsuccessful. The BEA charged that the board had violated MCL 423.210(1)(a) by interfering with public employees' rights and MCL 423.210(1)(e) by refusing to bargain collectively under the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq. The BEA also charged that the board had violated § 15b of PERA, MCL 423.215b, by failing to increase the wages of teachers who had acquired additional education before the 2011–2012 school year.

According to the expired CBA, a teacher's salary could be raised by a “step increase” based on years of work for the employer, i.e., seniority, or by a “lane change” based on how much graduate education the teacher had completed. A lane change is also occasionally referred to as a “rail increase.” A teacher's salary would be determined from a table in the CBA, with the vertical axis being years of work experience and the horizontal axis accounting for the extent of the teacher's graduate education.

Under previous Michigan law, when a CBA expired and a new CBA had not been reached, a public-school employer was obligated to pay its teachers both step increases and lane changes in accordance with the terms of the expired CBA while negotiations were ongoing and an impasse had not yet been reached. But 2011 PA 54, which became effective on June 8, 2011, added § 15b to PERA. The added section provides in relevant part:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, after the expiration date of a collective bargaining agreement and until a successor collective bargaining agreement is in place, a public employer shall pay and provide wages and benefits at levels and amounts that are no greater than those in effect on the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement. The prohibition in this subsection includes increases that would result from wage step increases. Employees who receive health, dental, vision, prescription, or other insurance benefits under a collective bargaining agreement shall bear any increased cost of maintaining those benefits that occurs after the expiration date. The public employer is authorized to make payroll deductions necessary to pay the increased costs of maintaining those benefits.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the parties to a collective bargaining agreement shall not agree to, and an arbitration panel shall not order, any retroactive wage or benefit levels or amounts that are greater than those in effect on the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement.

(3) For a collective bargaining agreement that expired before the effective date of this section, the requirements of this section apply to limit wages and benefits to the levels and amounts in effect on the effective date of this section. [MCL 423.215b.]

The BEA argued that MCL 423.215b(1) only prohibits step increases, not lane changes, while negotiations for a new CBA are ongoing. The BEA notes that in previous decisions, MERC stated that step increases and lane changes are distinguishable components of wages. On the other hand, the board argued that MCL 423.215b(1) prohibits paying all wage increases while negotiations are ongoing.

The hearing officer presiding over the case issued a decision and recommendation that concluded that MCL 423.215b(1) does not prohibit lane changes in the absence of an effective CBA, resulting in the board having breached its duty to bargain, MCL 423.210(1)(e), by unilaterally altering existing terms and conditions of employment when it withheld lane changes for the 2011–2012 school year. The hearing officer reasoned that MCL 423.215b(1) explicitly refers to step increases but not lane changes; consequently, lane changes were not within the statute's scope. The hearing officer also reasoned that the purpose of MCL 423.215b is to pressure public employees to reach a new CBA without undue delay. The hearing officer further reasoned that this purpose was advanced by prohibiting step increases because nearly all public employees receive step increases. On the other hand, prohibiting lane changes would not pressure all public employees because relatively few earn lane changes.

The board timely filed exceptions to the hearing officer's recommended order, and MERC ruled that MCL 423.215b does prohibit paying lane changes in the absence of an effective CBA. MERC first determined that MCL 423.215b is unambiguous. It then explained that according to its previous decisions, both step increases and lane changes are contractually mandated terms that the employer has no discretion in paying to the employee. In addressing the ultimate issue, MERC reasoned that in its prior decisions it had “treated lane changes or rail increases as a type of step increase” and that under principles of statutory construction, the Legislature must be presumed to have been aware of these prior rulings. Consequently, MERC concluded that “Act 54 prohibits the payment of step increases whether based on increased years of service or educational advancement.”

On the basis of this reasoning, MERC ruled that the board had acted in compliance with MCL 423.215b when it refrained from making lane-change wage adjustments. Consequently, the board had not violated its duty to bargain under MCL 423.210(1)(e). MERC therefore dismissed the BEA's unfair labor charge in its entirety. The BEA now appeals by right.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

MERC's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. MCL 423.216(e) ; Const 1963, art 6, § 28. “Legal rulings of an administrative agency are set aside if they are in violation of the constitution or a statute, or affected by a substantial and material error of law.” Amalgamated Transit Union v. Southeastern Mich. Transp. Auth., 437 Mich. 441, 450, 473 N.W.2d 249 (1991). We review de novo whether an error of law has occurred, and, if so, whether it is substantial and material. Macomb Co. v. AFSCME Council 25 Locals 411 & 893, 494 Mich. 65, 77, 833 N.W.2d 225 (2013). We also review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Id.

The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to identify and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Mich. Ed. Ass'n v. Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich. 194, 217, 801 N.W.2d 35 (2011). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither permitted nor required, and the statute must be enforced as written. Mt. Pleasant Pub. Sch. v. Mich. AFSCME Council 25, 302 Mich.App. 600, 608, 840 N.W.2d 750 (2013). “As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute.” Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). Only when the statutory language is ambiguous is it “proper for a court to go beyond the statutory text to ascertain legislative intent.”

Whitman v. City of Burton, 493 Mich. 303, 312, 831 N.W.2d 223 (2013). A provision of a statute is ambiguous only if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning. Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury, 477 Mich. 170, 177 n. 3, 730 N.W.2d 722 (2007).

B. DISCUSSION

We conclude that the plain language of MCL 423.215b unambiguously prohibits a public employer from paying any wage increases in the absence of an effective CBA. Therefore, we affirm without adopting MERC's reasoning.

“The PERA governs the relationship between public employees and governmental agencies.” Macomb Co., 494 Mich. at 77–78, 833 N.W.2d 225. Michigan's judiciary traditionally accords deference to MERC's interpretation of PERA. See Southfield Police Officers Ass'n v. Southfield, 433 Mich. 168, 176–177, 445 N.W.2d 98 (1989). Although not bound by an agency's determination on a question of law, this Court will respectfully consider the agency's construction of a statute and provide cogent reasons for construing the statute differently. Pontiac Sch. Dist. v. Pontiac Ed. Ass'n, 295 Mich.App. 147, 152, 811 N.W.2d 64 (2012).

The BEA argues—as it did in the proceedings before MERC—that the Legislature's explicit reference to “step increases” in MCL 423.215b(1) but not “lane changes” or “rail increases” means that the Legislature intentionally allowed for lane changes during negotiations for a successor CBA.¹ Although much of the parties' argument addresses whether and to what extent lane changes are included within the scope of MCL 423.215b, the...