Beenick v. Lefebvre, Case No. 4:14-CV-01562

MICHAEL BEENICK, JR., Plaintiff, v. Mr. LEFEBVRE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:14-CV-01562

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 26, 2016

(Judge Brann)

(Magistrate Judge Saporito)

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court for disposition are Plaintiff Michael Beenick, Jr.'s (hereinafter "Plaintiff") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants Michael Lefebvre, Lee Mandichak-McConnell, Wallace Dittsworth, John Weaverling, and Tammy Fagan's (hereinafter "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. has prepared a Report and Recommendation concerning these matters. For the following reasons, this Report and Recommendation will be adopted in its entirety. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 13, 2013, Plaintiff Michael Beenick, Jr., then an inmate of SCI- Benner Township, was employed in the prison kitchen. Plaintiff was assigned by food service instructor Michael LeFebvre to slice watermelons using an electric slicing machine, a Globe Slicer Model 3600P. Two other inmates were also assigned to slice watermelons on electric slicing machines. While Plaintiff used the electric slicer, Defendant LeFebvre was in and out of the prep area, supervising Plaintiff and other inmates working in the kitchen.

Plaintiff had trouble manipulating the wet watermelon into the electric slicer's blade. The watermelon was placed in the electric slicer's "food chute," which had an "endweight" designed to hold it in place. Plaintiff found, however, that, when his right hand was placed on the "food chute handle," the endweight did not hold the watermelon in place. Beenick thereafter used his left hand—his dominant hand—to hold the watermelon in place. His left hand then slipped off the watermelon and into the electric slicer's rotary blade. Plaintiff sustained lacerations to his ring and pinky fingers, and was taken to the local hospital for medical treatment.

At the hospital, the wound on Plaintiff's pinky finger was closed with stitches. Because some bone at the tip of his ring finer had been severed by the blade of the slicer, a bone fragment was removed, some nonviable skin was trimmed, and the wound was closed with stitches. Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication and instructed on wound care before he was returned to prison. Back atSCI-Benner Township, Plaintiff claims that Defendant LeFebvre ridiculed him by yelling "Finger check!" whenever he saw him. Defendants, however, dispute this accusation.¹

Prior to the July 13, 2013 incident, Plaintiff and other inmates at SCI-Benner Township had sliced watermelons manually with a knife. Defendant LeFebvre, however, previously had inmates at another institution use an electric slicer, without incident, to slice watermelons. Plaintiff and other inmates were not provided with access to an instruction manual or any safety equipment, such as cut-resistant gloves. No warning labels were affixed to the electric slicer, nor were any safety charts posted on nearby kitchen walls. The electric slicer was, however, equipped with a "knife cover" that shielded much of the rotary blade's circumference. The portion of exposed rotary blade permitted the slicing of food products. The slicer would not operate without the knife cover in place.

On June 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint² alleging five counts against Defendants under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff specifically alleged in Count I that Defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments state-created danger doctrine. In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment through a deliberate indifference in failing to protect him against harm. In Count III,Plaintiff asserted, against Defendant Mandichak-McConnell, a violation of the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference in failing to intervene. Count IV constituted an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Dittsworth, Weaverling, and Fagan alleging deliberate indifference through failure to supervise. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Dittsworth, Weaverling, and Fagan violated the Eighth Amendment through their deliberate indifference to violations of his constitutional rights by his subordinates.

On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.³ On April 1, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.⁴ Magistrate Judge Saporito subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation on July 29, 2016 recommending that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be denied and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.⁵ Plaintiff timely filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation on August 4, 2016;⁶ the matter has since been fully briefed.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Upon designation, a magistrate judge may "conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and ... submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of factand recommendations."⁷ Once filed, this Report and Recommendation is disseminated to the parties in the case who then have the opportunity to file written objections.⁸ When objections are timely filed, the District Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report to which objections are made.⁹ Although the standard of review for objections is de novo, the extent of review lies within the discretion of the District Court, and the court may otherwise rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.¹⁰

For portions of the Report and Recommendation to which no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, "satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation."¹¹ Regardless of whether timely objections are made by a party, the District Court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.¹²

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."¹³ A fact is "material" where it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."¹⁴ A dispute is "genuine" where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury," giving credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant and making all inferences in the nonmovant's favor, "could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."¹⁵

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for summary judgment.¹⁶ The moving party may satisfy this burden by either (i) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or (ii) demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's case.¹⁷

Where the moving party's motion is properly supported, the nonmoving party, to avoid summary judgment in his opponent's favor, must answer by setting forth "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of factbecause they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."¹⁸ For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must" be supported by "materials in the record" that go beyond mere allegations, or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."¹⁹

"When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must 'identify those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.'"²⁰ Furthermore, "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion."²¹

In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.²² Credibility determinationsare the province of the factfinder, not the District Court.²³ Although the court may consider any materials in the record, it need only consider those materials cited.²⁴

III. DISCUSSION

Having reviewed those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which no objections were made, the Court is satisfied that, on its face, it has no clear error. Furthermore, following a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which an objection was made, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation in its entirety and thus grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

1. The Report and Recommendation Did Not Err In Advising the Dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment "State-Created Danger" Claim.

Plaintiff first objects to the Report and Recommendation's finding that his "state-created danger" claim under the Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff specifically contests the Report's determination, following PLRA screening,²⁵ thathis state-created danger claim should be dismissed under the "more specific provision rule."²⁶ Following de novo review, the Court agrees with this finding. Furthermore, the Court has reviewed the factual record and concludes that, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a favorable verdict on this claim.

The state-created danger theory stipulates that "liability may attach where the state acts to create or enhance a danger that deprives the plaintiff...