Begole v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr.

DR. MARY BEGOLE PLAINTIFF v. NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., NORTH MISSISSIPPI HEALTH SERVICES, INC., TUPELO EMERGENCY CARE ASSOCIATES, LLC, and DR. JOSEPH JOHNSEY DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-33-SA-DAS

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division

February 28, 2022

ORDER

SHARION AYCOCK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Now before the Court is the Plaintiff, Dr. Mary's Begole's, Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's Award [32]. The Motion [32] has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication. The Court is prepared to rule.

Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

This civil action was initially commenced on February 27, 2017 when Begole filed her Complaint [1] in this Court. In her Complaint [1], Begole made several allegations of misconduct that allegedly occurred when she was providing emergency physician services for North Mississippi Medical Center's Emergency Department. She brought claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in addition to multiple state law claims.

On March 23, 2018, this Court granted the Defendants' request to compel this matter to arbitration. See [24]. In its Memorandum Opinion [24], the Court explained its reasoning and ultimately concluded that “the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate which covers the claims sought to be asserted by the Plaintiff.” [24] at p. 10. Begole appealed that ruling to the Fifth Circuit. See [27]. The Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed this Court's decision and held that the claims were in fact subject to arbitration. See [29]. The parties then commenced with arbitration. On July 13, 2021 the arbitrator issued a 63-page opinion granting summary judgment in the Defendants' favor on all claims. See [32], Ex. 1.

Now Begole comes back to this Court. On October 12, 2021, she filed the present Motion [32], asking the Court to vacate the arbitrator's decision. Begole contends that the arbitrator: (1) “committed misconduct and deprived [Begole] of a fair hearing;” and (2) “exceeded her powers.” [33] at p. 2-4. The Defendants oppose the request and assert that Begole has come forward with nothing to support such extraordinary relief.

Analysis and Discussion

“The [Federal Arbitration Act] provides the means for enforcing arbitral awards by way of a judicial decree confirming vacating, modifying or correcting an award.” Hancock Fabrics, Inc. v. Rowdec, LLC, 2013 WL 6078960, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 19, 2013) (citing Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008)). The FAA sets forth the circumstances when a district court may vacate an arbitration award:

(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).

“In light of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow.” Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brook v. Peak Int'l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit also characterized judicial review of arbitration awards as “exceedingly deferential.” Hamstein Cumberland Music Group. v. Williams, 532 Fed.Appx. 538, 542 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). And “an arbitrator's decision will be vacated ‘only in very unusual circumstances.'” Rainier DSC 1, LLC v. Rainier Capital Mgmt., LP, 828 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)). Importantly, “[t]he party moving to vacate the arbitral award bears the burden of proof.” Hancock Fabrics, 2013 WL 6078960 at *2 (citation omitted).

As the Supreme Court has phrased it, “[c]ourts . . . do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.” United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. MISCO, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). “Section 10(a) does not provide for vacatur of an arbitration award based on the merits of a party's claim.” The Householder Grp. v. Caughran, 354 Fed.Appx. 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2009). Stated differently, “[a]n arbitration award ‘may not be set aside for a mere mistake of fact or law.'” Cooper v. Westend Capital Mgmt., LLC, 832 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rain CII Carbon, LLC, 674 F.3d at 472). “If parties could take full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals, arbitration would become merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial-review process.” Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568-69, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 186 L.Ed.2d 113 (2013) (quoting Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Simons v. Brown, 444 F.Supp.3d 642, 650 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020) (noting that if a full judicial review was permitted, arbitration would essentially only be an “opening act”).

Against this backdrop, the Court turns to Begole's arguments that the arbitrator's decision should be overturned. She first argues that, by granting summary judgment in the Defendants' favor without first holding a hearing, the arbitrator's conduct violated 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). In addition, she claims that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated because the arbitrator “refused to consider one of [her] legal claims.” Id. at p. 3. Finally, Begole asserts that the award should be vacated because the arbitrator “failed to follow the express provisions of the arbitration agreement” and “failed to follow the arbitration rules for which the parties contracted.” Id. at p. 4-5. The Defendants raise opposition to each argument.

I. Ruling without a hearing

Begole specifically avers that “an arbitrator commits misconduct warranting vacation when the arbitrator deprives a party of an opportunity to orally present proof and arguments at a realtime event.” [33] at p. 2. In other words, Begole contends the arbitrator's decision must be vacated because she did not hold a hearing before entering an order and opinion granting summary judgment.

To support this argument, Begole quotes a 2018 case from the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi: “A fundamentally fair hearing by an arbitrator is one that ‘meets the minimal requirements of fairness-adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator.'” [33] at p. 2 (quoting Skiba v. Sasser, 2018 WL 5116096, at *4 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 19, 2018)) (additional citation omitted). Begole also quotes a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition that an arbitrator's award must be vacated if the arbitrator makes an error that “so affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hearing.” Id. at p. 1-2 (quoting Rainier, 828 F.3d at 364). Relying on those cases, she contends that “[t]he law is therefore clear that a ‘hearing on the evidence' must be held.” Id. at p. 2.

Noticeably absent from Begole's briefing on this issue is a reference to any case wherein a district court has held that an arbitrator's decision must be set aside simply because the arbitrator decided the pertinent issues via summary judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing.

On the other hand, however, the Defendants cite several cases wherein courts have held that an arbitrator does not deny a party's due process rights by deciding an arbitration case via summary judgment. They first cite Burns v. Covenant Health & Rehab of Picayune, LLC, a 2017 case from the Southern District of Mississippi. 2017 WL 11318979 (S.D.Miss. Nov. 8, 2017). In Burns, the arbitrator granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor on the plaintiff's claims arising from purported nursing home negligence which caused the plaintiff's mother's death. Id. at *1-2. After finding that the plaintiff had failed to designate an expert qualified to testify as to causation and diagnostic impressions, the arbitrator granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at *2. The district court declined to vacate the award, holding that “[e]very indication is that Plaintiff received a fair hearing before the arbitrator, in that she had notice of and an opportunity to respond to Defendant's request for summary judgment.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added).

The Defendants also emphasize a 2009 decision from the District Court of Minnesota, wherein that court held that the parties seeking vacation of an arbitration panel's summary judgment decision had waived their right to do so:

AFLAC also contends that Plaintiffs waived any objections to the arbitrators' use of summary judgment. The Court agrees. “The parties to an arbitration may waive procedural defects by failing to bring such issues to the arbitrator's attention in time to cure the defects.” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs Int'l Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 134 F.3d 1325, 1331 (8th Cir. 1998); see Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Even when a neutral arbitrator is challenged for evident

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