Bell v. Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc., 8:99CV536 (D. Neb. 2/14/2001)

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RACHELLE BELL, an individual v. AEROQUIP-VICKERS, INC., a corporation.

8:99CV536.

United States District Court, D. Nebraska.

February 14, 2001.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BATAILLON, District Judge.

Before this Court is motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 42) filed by defendant Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. ("Vickers"). The defendant seeks summary judgment on plaintiff Rachelle Bell's ("Bell") sexual harassment complaint. Vickers and Bell have submitted briefs and indexes of evidence for my consideration in compliance with NELR 7.1(a) and (b). I have reviewed the record, the parties' briefs, the indexes o evidence, and the applicable law, and I conclude that Vickers' motion for summary judgment should be denied.

BACKGROUND

On June 23, 2000, Judge William G. Cambridge issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order (Filing No. 28) granting Vickers' motion to dismiss on Counts I, II, and V (claims of race discrimination and negligent hiring) of the complaint, and denying the motion as to Counts III and IV (claim of sexual harassment). Judge Cambridge treated Vickers' motion to dismiss as to Counts III and IV as a motion for summary judgment. In a well-written opinion, Judge Cambridge determined that a factual issue existed as to whether Bell was subjected to a hostile work environment, specifically holding that "in light of the case law on hostile environmental claims, it becomes clear that a jury could find that she was subjected to odious and humiliating behavior such that her working conditions or her work performance was affected." (Filing No. 28 at 23). As to Vickers' affirmative defense, the Court further noted that it would defer to the finder of fact as to whether "Vickers exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior." (Filing No. 28 at 25). As requested by Vickers, this Court will consider whether the new evidence presented in support of the present motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 42) is sufficient to change the conclusion that a genuine factual issue remains on Bell's claim of sexual harassment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harder v. Acands, 179 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1999). "In making this determination, the function of the court is not to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations, or to attempt to determine the truth of the matter, but is, rather, solely, to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see Hedges v. Poletis, 177 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 1999). The court must "look to the substantive law to determine whether an element is essential to a case, and `[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Dulany v. Carhahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is the isolation and disposition of factually unsupported claims or defenses; hence, summary judgment is available for that purpose. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion. See Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Systems, Inc., 128 F.3d 656, 657 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (the movant must show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case"). Accordingly, a party moving for summary judgment must "set forth in the brief in support of the motion for summary judgment a separate statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue . . . ." NELR 56.1(a).

DISCUSSION

In his opinion, Judge Cambridge relied on the following to support a conclusion that a jury could find that a hostile work environment did in fact exist at Vickers during Bell's employment: 1) Bell experienced at least three instances of alleged sexually hostile occurrences; 2) Bell was aware of the victimization of other female employees; 3) Bell was subjected to demeaning behavior when her supervisor asked her to write "I will not snitch on Mike" 100 times; and 4) Bell's knowledge that other female employees were asked to take compromising photos.

In Vickers' present motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 42), Vickers argues that in light of new evidence received through discovery, summary judgment should be granted. Vickers asserts the following new evidence in support of its summary judgment motion: 1) Bell acknowledged her allegations of harassment consisted of no more the two incidents over a four-month period; 2) Bell never witnessed any alleged harassment toward her co-workers; and 3) Bell admits that she was aware of the anti-harassment policy that required her to report harassment to a supervisor or to the human resources department (Def. Br. in Supp. of Sum. J. at 2).

Hostile Work Environment

Bell has the burden to demonstrate that the alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. See Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999). This requires the establishment of both an objectively hostile environment and a subjective perception of a hostile environment. See Delph v. Dr Pepper Bottling Co. of Paragould, Inc. 130 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 1997). An "objectively hostile or abusive work environment" occurs "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." White v. Honeywell Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1275 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Whether a hostile work environment existed is determined by looking at the "frequency of the discriminatory...