Bell v. City of Southfield

GENE RAYMOND BELL, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SOUTHFIELD, ET AL., Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-13565

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

November 3, 2020

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT [#7] AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [#3]

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff Gene Raymond Bell, Jr. ("Plaintiff") filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant City of Southfield ("Defendant"), as well as three City of Southfield police officers in their individual capacities, in the Oakland County Circuit Court. On December 3, 2019, Defendant timely removed Plaintiff's action to this Court.¹ ECF No. 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings forth several claims related to a traffic stop on or about June 23,2019, when the City of Southfield police officers allegedly used excessive physical force to remove him from his vehicle. See generally id.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, Order Directing the Clerk to Issue Summons, and an Order Allowing Plaintiff an Additional Forty-Five Days to Serve the Individual Defendants (hereinafter, "Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint"), which was filed on August 3, 2020. ECF No. 7. Defendant filed a Response on August 17, 2020. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed his Reply on September 2, 2020. ECF No. 13.

Upon review of the parties' submissions, the Court concludes that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve Plaintiff's Motion on the briefs. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend [#7], rendering Defendant's outstanding Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [#3] MOOT.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's claims stem from a traffic stop in Southfield, Michigan on or about June 23, 2019. ECF No. 7, PageID.62. The three City of Southfield officers initiated this traffic stop after discovering that Plaintiff was driving a vehicle with an expired license plate. Id. at PageID.62-63. According to Plaintiff, the officers "forcefully removed [him] from his car and violently threw him to the ground" after he"complied [with the officers' instructions] in a completely law-abiding manner[.]" Id. at PageID.63-64. Plaintiff avers that one of the officers, Anthonie Korkis, used degrading and racially charged language while threatening him to exit the vehicle. Id. at PageID.63. Once Plaintiff was removed from his vehicle, one of the officers tased him while he remained on the ground. Id. at PageID.64.

Defendant disputes many of Plaintiff's allegations in its Response brief. It alleges that Plaintiff resisted Officer Korkis' instructions for Plaintiff to provide his license, registration, and insurance. ECF No. 9, PageID.124. Moreover, Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff "admitted that the officers gave him instructions on the scene and that he did not follow those instructions" during his plea hearing in the 46th District Court for the City of Southfield. Id. (quoting ECF No. 9-3, PageID.156-57).

On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff, through his former counsel, filed his Complaint in the Oakland County Circuit Court against Defendant and three City of Southfield police officers. ECF No. 1, PageID.7. The Complaint contains six counts, including excessive force (Count I); assault and battery (Count II); municipal liability, premised on Defendant's alleged failure to supervise, train, and discipline its police officers (Count III); false arrest (Count IV); malicious prosecution (Count V); and abuse of process (Count VI). On December 3, 2019, Defendant timely removed this matter to this Court. In its removal filing, Defendant indicated that theindividual police officers had not yet been served, but they each consented to the removal. Id. at PageID.4. The Court takes notice that Plaintiff attaches a copy of the summons, which was issued to the individual officers on December 5, 2019, to his present Motion. See ECF No. 7-3.

On December 4, 2019, Defendant filed its Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint in this Court. ECF No. 2. Defendant subsequently filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on March 19, 2020. ECF No. 3. The Court issued a notice for this hearing on July 16, 2020. ECF No. 4. Approximately two weeks after this notice, Plaintiff's present counsel filed his appearance. ECF No. 5. Another attorney filed his appearance on Plaintiff's behalf three days later. ECF No. 6.

Plaintiff now moves the Court for leave to file his proposed First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 7, PageID.65. In Plaintiff's proposed First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seek to (1) eliminate his Monell claim against Defendant (Count III); and (2) eliminate all other counts except for the excessive force claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I). Id. Moreover, Plaintiff requests an order directing the Clerk to issue summons for the City of Southfield police officers and allowing Plaintiff forty-five days from the date of the Court's Order to serve these officers as defendants in the present action.

In its Response, Defendant characterizes Plaintiff's Motion as an attempt "to pursue a new cause of action against three individuals who have never been subjectto the jurisdiction of any court[.]" ECF No. 9, PageID.120. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied because his proposed amendment is futile. Id. at PageID.129. Moreover, Defendant contends that summonses should not be issued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) as to the City of Southfield police officers. Id. at PageID.139.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Leave to Amend

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the amendment of pleadings. In a case where a responsive pleading has been filed, a party may amend its pleading only with the written consent of the opposing party or by leave of the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Defendants here do not concur in Plaintiff's Motion; it is thus within this Court's discretion whether to grant Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. See United States ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist., No. 15-4406, 2016 WL 6832974, at *7 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2016) ("[D]istrict courts have discretion to permit or deny amendment after a defendant files an answer to a plaintiff's complaint"); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971) (explaining that the decision as to whether justice requires the amendment is committed to the district court's sound discretion). Pursuant to Rule 15, "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." FED. R.CIV. P. 15(a)(2). "The thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings." Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).

Despite this liberal amendment policy, denial may be appropriate when there is "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc." Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). A proposed amendment is "futile" if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Peffer v. Thompson, 754 F. App'x 316, 320 (6th Cir. 2018); Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000)).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff's proposed First Amended Complaint would (1) eliminate his Monell claim against Defendant (Count III); and (2) eliminate his assault and battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process counts against all Defendants. ECF No. 7, PageID.60. The amendment thus results in an action exclusively against the individual City of Southfield police officers, Anthonie Korkis, Arthur Bridgeforth, and Thomas Langewicz, II, for one count of excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 7-4, PageID.93. Defendant opposes Plaintiff'sMotion on the basis of futility. ECF No. 9, PageID.129. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's allegations "border on misrepresentation and the individuals would be entitled to qualified immunity under the indisputable evidence." Id.

The futility standard requires this Court to consider whether Plaintiff's proposed amendment "could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To reiterate, Plaintiff's amendment seeks to distill his case into one count of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Southfield police officers—not Defendant City of Southfield. "To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Claims regarding an officer's use of excessive force in the context of an arrest, as is the case here, are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see also Malory v. Whiting, 489 F. App'x 78, 82 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372, 278 (6th Cir. 2009)) ("The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a person from being subject to excessive physical force during the course of an arrest ....").

The Court determines whether an officer has exerted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under an "objective reasonableness" standard.Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. This "reasonabl...