Bell v. Dist. of Columbia

1

BARON BELL, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 23-cv-2036 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

June 5, 2024

Re Document No.: 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Baron Bell brings this action against Defendant District of Columbia, raising fourteen claims related to his employment with the District of Columbia Department of Health and his termination from that agency in 2022. He contends that the District violated (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2) the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code § 1615.51 et seq., by retaliating against him; (3) the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401, et seq., by discriminating against him on the basis of sex, sexual orientation and religion; and (4) the District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”), DC Code § 1-603.01, et seq., by subjecting him to a hostile work environment and constructive discharge. He also presents claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence.

The District of Columbia moves to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Bell's Complaint is unclear and overly long in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and alternatively, that some of the fourteen counts in the Complaint fail to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with the District that the Complaint is inconsistent with Rule 8, and GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint. It will, however, provide Mr. Bell with an opportunity to file an amended complaint.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As discussed below, the Complaint is sprawling, and it is not easy to discern the essential facts underlying Mr. Bell's claims. Nevertheless, with the benefit of the summaries provided by the parties in their briefing on the instant motion, the Court will make its best effort to summarize the core allegations.

Mr. Bell is a Black fifty-four-year-old heterosexual male. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 282, ECF No. 1. He was employed with the District of Columbia's Department of Health, and specifically the HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, STD and TB Administration (“HAHSTA”) for four years before his termination in 2022. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. In 2020, Mr. Bell joined an “Anti-Racism Group” organized by a HAHSTA administrator. Id. ¶ 7. In January 2021, while part of this group, he believed that he witnessed a coworker, who was a Black woman, being bullied over email by another coworker, Mr. Ivan Eaton. Id. ¶¶ 9-15. Mr. Bell was “extremely uncomfortable” about this situation and believed it was linked to his female colleague's gender. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Mr. Bell was unsatisfied with Mr. Eaton's apology at another meeting, and he later reported the incident to the human resources department. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21-22.

In response, Mr. Eaton launched a retaliation plot, which resulted in an “Employee and Labor Relations Manager” questioning Mr. Bell about a private chat communication he had with Mr. Eaton, followed by management ordering Mr. Bell to “submit an affidavit that he did not intend to kill or physically harm anyone at HAHSTA.” Id. ¶¶ 21-27. Mr. Bell was then summoned to several mediation meetings to address allegations that he created a hostile work environment for his “very close” friend Ms. Sherita Grant, who is also a “very close, intimate friend” of Mr. Eaton. Id. ¶¶ 28, 38-39, 41. According to the Complaint, Ms. Grant reported Mr. Bell for a hostile work environment because of his interactions with Mr. Eaton and because Mr.

Bell “hurt [her] feelings.” Id. ¶ 38. Around this time, Mr. Bell's supervisor told him that his desk would be moved to a less desirable location and that some of his job duties would be reassigned. Id. ¶ 42. Having “had enough,” Mr. Bell filed a 17-page complaint with the District of Columbia Department of Human Resources. Id. ¶ 43. He requested unpaid extended leave, which was denied, and he was placed on “absent without leave (AWOL)” status. Id. ¶¶ 44-48. After four months he received a proposed separation letter accusing him of job abandonment, which Mr. Bell responded to by notifying the District about his hostile work environment. Id. ¶¶ 54-55.

In June 2022, Mr. Bell emailed Ms. Grant's private email account from his private account, telling her that he intended to sue her and the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 57. In the following days he was informed that his “Proposed Separation was being rescinded” and then told shortly afterward that “the rescindment of the Proposed Separation was being rescinded.” Id. ¶¶ 58-59. That same week, he was presented with a “Temporary Peace Order Protection Petition taken out against [him] by Ms. Grant and issued by the Maryland District Court of Prince George's County.” Id. ¶ 60. The order included, as an exhibit, an email exchange where Ms. Grant forwarded Mr. Bell's email to the Director of the District's Department of Health and the Director promised Ms. Grant to figure out the best way to assist her. Id. ¶¶ 60, 150.

In July 2022, Mr. Bell received a “Final Summary Removal” notice from the Director, based on his email to Ms. Grant. Id. ¶¶ 64-65. The notice accused him of being a threat to Ms. Grant. Id. ¶ 65. Mr. Bell alleges that a police investigation later found that he did not threaten Ms. Grant, and that the peace order petition was “dismissed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Maryland.” Id. ¶¶ 60, 107-08. He asserts that these events at HAHSTA were part of an “outrageous plot to stigmatize him as a threatening, violent, angry Black man.” Id. ¶ 262. He also alleges that his complaints about the workplace were not taken seriously, and that he was targeted for retaliation, because he is a man and because he is heterosexual. Id. ¶¶ 250-51, 27071. Mr. Bell also says that he was misinterpreted and discriminated against after he invoked God and his religion in several emails. Id. ¶¶ 294-301.

Mr. Bell filed this action on July 14, 2023. See Compl. He brings fourteen counts against the District of Columbia: (1) violation of the First Amendment; (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) violation of the Fifth Amendment, including several different due process theories; (4) violation of the District of Columbia's Whistleblower Protection Act; (5) sex discrimination under the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act; (6) sexual orientation discrimination, also under the Human Rights Act; (7) religious discrimination, again under the Human Rights Act; (8) violation of the CMPA; (9) constructive discharge; (10) hostile work environment; (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (12) libelous defamation; (13) invasion of privacy false light; and (14) negligence. Id. ¶¶ 68-116, 117-32, 133-212, 213-23, 224-51, 252-86, 287-305, 306-25, 326-51, 352-79, 380-405, 406-22, 423-34, 435-58.^[1] The District of Columbia, after receiving an extension of time, filed a motion to dismiss on October 10, 2023. Def. District of Columbia's Mot. Dismiss Compl. (“Mot. Dismiss”), ECF No. 5. Mr. Bell, also after receiving an extension, filed an opposition on November 27, 2023. Pl.'s Answer Def. Mot. Dismiss. Compl. (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), ECF No. 12. The District filed a reply on December 6, 2023. Def. District of Columbia's Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 14.

Mr. Bell was represented by counsel when he filed the Complaint, but on November 20, 2023, his counsel moved to withdraw because “Plaintiff has advised that he wishes to represent himself or retain other counsel and has asked counsel to withdraw from the case.” Consent Rule LCvR 83.6(c) Motion to Withdraw Appearance of Attorney, ECF No. 10. The Court granted that motion. Dec. 14, 2023 Min. Order. Mr. Bell's opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed pro se, and he remains pro se as the Court now decides the motion. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 45.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Relatedly, under Rule 8(d)(1), “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). “Taken together, Rules 8(a) and [8(d)(1)] underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The requirements of Rule 8 are meant “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, Rule 8 places limits on the contents of a complaint “so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Spence v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., No. 19-cv-1947, 2022 WL 3354726, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022) (quoting Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977)).

“[W]hat is a proper length and level of clarity for a pleading is largely a matter that is left for the discretion of the trial court” and varies from case to case depending on “the nature of the action, the relief sought, and the respective positions of the parties in terms of the availability of information and a number of other pragmatic matters.” Jiggetts v. District of Columbia, 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &...