Bell v. Twp. of Quinton

GARY L. BELL, SR., Plaintiff, v. TOWNSHIP OF QUINTON, Defendant.

Civ. No. 14-1789 (NLH/KMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

December 17, 2014

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Richard Etienne Incremona, Esquire

Helmer Comley & Kasselman

92 West Main Street

Freehold, New Jersey 07728

Counsel for Plaintiff

Allan E. Richardson, Esquire

Richardson & Galella

142 Emerson Street

Suite B

Woodbury, New Jersey 08096

Counsel for Defendant

HILLMAN, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court by way of motion [Doc. No. 4] of Plaintiff, Gary L. Bell, Sr., seeking to remand this matter to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County. The Court has considered the parties' submissions, including their responses to the Order to Show Cause dated November 13, 2014, and decides this matter pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 78.

For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the averments of the complaint, Plaintiff is a citizen of the Township of Quinton, Salem County, New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was previously employed by Defendant, Township of Quinton, as a Housing Official. (Id. ¶ 3.) During his term of employment, in the summer of 2010, Plaintiff in his official capacity inspected a dwelling at 18 Beasley Neck Road, Block 18 Lot 2, in the Township of Quinton, and issued an unsafe structural notice condemning the dwelling. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 9.) The dwelling was owned by Plaintiff's father, Albert Bell. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's father gave Plaintiff verbal permission to arrange the demolition of the condemned dwelling. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff spoke with the local fire chief concerning the use of the dwelling as a possible live-fire training exercise for the volunteer firefighters of the Quinton Volunteer Fire Company. (Id. ¶ 11.) Although the fire chief at the time did not know if he could conduct such a training exercise, he subsequently notified Plaintiff that the fire company intended to conduct the exercise. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) The condemned structure owned by Plaintiff's father was burned down on December 21, 2010. (Id. ¶ 14.)

An investigation into the fire was then conducted, and Plaintiff was arrested on July 26, 2011 and charged with aggravated arson and official misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.) On July 27, 2011, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave without pay. (Id. ¶ 18.) On May 28, 2013, all criminal charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. (Id. ¶ 21.) Nonetheless, in July 2013, the Township of Quinton retained a law firm to conduct an administrative investigation of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff was advised by letter dated September 4, 2013 that the Township sought his termination based on ten disciplinary charges against him, which included allegations that he violated the Township's Employee Handbook, violated established safety and fire regulations, asked the fire department to burn down a structure for his or his family's sole monetary benefit, and failed to obtain the necessary permits. (Id. ¶ 23.)

Upon receipt of a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action on September 5, 2013, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (Id. ¶ 24.) An administrative hearing was held on November 20, 2013, at which time Plaintiff appeared pro se. (Id. ¶ 26.) The hearing officer sustained nine of the ten charges against Plaintiff, and the Township Committee voted to uphold the recommended findings and conclusions of the hearing officer. (Id. ¶¶ 27-29.) A Final Notice of Disciplinary Action was signed on December 19, 2013, which terminated Plaintiff's employment asof the date of his suspension, July 26, 2011. (Id. ¶ 29.) The Final Notice of Disciplinary Action advised Plaintiff of his right to appeal the decision to the Superior Court of New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff served a notice on the Township of Quinton stating his intent to request a trial de novo in the Superior Court. (Id. ¶ 30.)

On or about January 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County. (Not. of Removal, Ex. 1.) The complaint contains five counts generally alleging that the Township, through the manner in which it conducted the disciplinary hearing, violated Plaintiff's constitutional and statutory rights to due process. Defendant removed the case to federal court on March 20, 2014, alleging that the Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in the complaint. (Not. of Removal ¶ 5.) Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant motion to remand this matter back to New Jersey state court.

II. STANDARD FOR REMAND

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction to hear the matter in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A federal court has original jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States[,]" and cases "where the matter in controversy exceeds thesum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between citizens of different States[.]" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

The removability of a legal matter is determined from the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14, 71 S. Ct. 534, 95 L. Ed. 702 (1951). "The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). The rule makes the plaintiff "the master of his complaint," and the plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law. Id.

Once the case has been removed, the court may nonetheless remand the case to state court if the removal was procedurally defective or if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."). Any doubts should be resolved in favor of remand. Boyer v. Snap-on Tools, 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S. Ct. 959, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1046.

III. DISCUSSION

On November 13, 2014, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause with respect to Plaintiff's motion to remand. The Court noted therein that Plaintiff pleads in Count Five a federal claim for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 6] ¶ 3.) The Court concluded that it therefore has original jurisdiction over the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Id.)¹ Therefore, to the extentPlaintiff seeks remand of the entire case, the motion is denied. Plaintiff asserts a federal-law claim, and the Court may not remand a claim over which it has original jurisdiction. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 596 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Where a party seeks to have remanded to state court a case that has been removed, as in this instance, a district court has no discretion to remand a claim that states a federal question."); 75-80 Prop., LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'r of Frederick Cnty., Civ. A. No. RDB 09-2977, 2010 WL 917635, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2010); cf. Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[N]othing in § 1367(c) authorizes a district court to decline to entertain a claim over which it has original jurisdiction and, accordingly, that section clearly does not sanction the district court's remand of this entire case, including the civil rights claims, to the state court.").²

The only issue remaining at this time is whether the Court should remand the four remaining counts of the complaint, which the Court concluded in the Order to Show Cause assert state-law causes of action. (Order to Show Cause ¶ 7.) The claims in Counts One through Four fall within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because they arise out of the "same case or controversy," or a common nucleus of operative fact, as Plaintiff's Due Process claim under the United States Constitution. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966). As such, they may be removed to federal court and the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

The Court's power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is rooted in "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants . . . [.]" Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may in its discretion decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendentstate-law claims if they "substantially predominate[] over the [federal] claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). The "substantially predominates" standard is a "limited exception to the operation of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction[,]" and the Court should only utilize its authority under Section 1367(c)(2) "where there is an important countervailing interest to be served by relegating state claims to the state court." Borough of W. Mifflin, 45 F.3d at 789. Such interest may be served when "'a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage,'" such that "permitting litigation of all claims in the district court can accurately be described as allowing a federal tail to wag what is in substance a state dog." Id. (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S. Ct. 1130).

The Third Circuit has set forth three ways in which a state-law claim may predominate for purposes of Section 1367(c)(2). First, there may be a substantial quantity of evidence supporting the state claims that would not be relevant to the federal claims. Id. at 789. Second, the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought for the state claims may substantially predominate over the remedy sought on the federal claims. Id. Lastly, the scope of the issues...