Bell v. Valenza

CHRISTENA DENIS BELL, Plaintiff, v. DONALD VALENZA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. Act. No. 1:20-cv-131-ECM (wo)

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division

September 10, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (doc. 39), filed by the Defendants, Donald Valenza (“Valenza”), James Brazier (“Brazier”), Houston County, Alabama (“Houston County”), and Neil Pollen (“Pollen”).

The Plaintiff, Christena Denis Bell (“Bell”), has filed a complaint and two amended complaints in this case. (Doc. 1, 23 & 38). The second amended complaint was filed after the Court granted a motion for more definite statement. (Doc. 37). The claims in the second amended complaint are for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs brought against Houston County, Valenza, and Brazier (count I) deliberate indifference to health/safety brought against Houston County, Valenza, and Brazier (count II), unlawful search and seizure brought against Pollen (count III) excessive force brought against Pollen (count IV), violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) brought against Houston County, Valenza, and Brazier (count V), supervisor liability brought against Valenza and Brazier (count VI), and inadequate training/municipal liability brought against Valenza and Brazier (count VII).

For reasons to be discussed, the motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations that are merely “conceivable” and fail to rise “above the speculative level” are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678. Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id.

III. FACTS

The second amended complaint alleges that Bell was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia on February 24, 2018, and taken to the Houston County jail. Valenza was the Houston County Sheriff who was responsible for supervision of the Houston County Jail, along with Brazier, the jail Commander.

After Bell was booked into the jail, Pollen, a booking officer, withheld Bell's food tray until she showed him her breasts, which he proceeded to grab. (Doc. 38 para. 19-21). On February 26, Pollen told Bell that female inmates would flash him or do other sexual things when he looked into their cells, but he did not complain about it. (Id. para. 26). The second amended complaint alleges that on February 27, Pollen came into Bell's cell with her, ran his hand down the front of her jumpsuit and assaulted her. (Id. para. 29).

On February 28, 2019, Bell's request for anxiety and sleeping medication was denied by Valenza and Brazier. (Id. para. 30).

On that same day, February 28, Bell was taken to the Dothan city police department to talk to an investigator about another case and, while there, Bell complained about Pollen's actions at the Houston County jail. (Id. para. 32). Bell was asked to “wear a wire” as part of an investigation of Pollen (Id.). Upon Bell's return to the jail, Pollen acted inappropriately, and investigators rushed in and removed him. (Id. para. 33). Bell was informed that Pollen would be placed on administrative leave. (Id.). Bell never saw the investigators again and was never taken to another jail, which caused her anxiety. (Id.). Bell alleges that Valenza and Brazier knew or should have known that nationally female inmates are subject to sexual harassment and abuse. (Id. para. 46). Bell also alleges that she “reported sexual harassment and abuse by Pollen after the Plaintiff informed jail officials of Pollen's actions violating her constitutional rights to be free from such abuse and harassment . . .” but Valenza and Brazier “failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the wrong . . . .” (Id. para. 63).

The second amended complaint also alleges that Houston County inadequately funded the Houston County Sheriff, resulting in a failure to provide psychological care and treatment, (id. para. 37), and that Houston County cut funding to the Sheriff and the jail and re-allocated funds elsewhere. (Id. para. 44).

IV. DISCUSSION

Before the Court can address the merits of the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court must determine the scope of that motion. The Defendants request that the Court dismiss the entire second amended complaint, but the Defendants do not address in any way counts III and IV, which are the claims against Pollen for unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. Furthermore, in invoking the defense of qualified immunity in their motion to dismiss, the Defendants specifically assert that “Sheriff Valenza and Commander Brazier are entitled to qualified immunity on the Plaintiff's claims, ” but do not refer to Pollen. (Doc. 40 at 9). The only reference to Pollen in the brief in support of the motion to dismiss is in a footnote which notes that for purposes of the argument that Bell failed to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Order, “Defendants” refers to Pollen, Valenza, Brazier and Houston County. (Doc. 40 at 12, n.5). The Court concludes, therefore, that the Defendants have neither invoked qualified immunity as to Pollen, nor met their burden in moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to counts III and IV which are asserted against Pollen, and that the claims in counts III and IV are due to proceed.

A. Claims Against Valenza and Brazier in Counts I and II

The Defendants address together the claims asserted in counts I and II, arguing that Bell has failed to plead facts to show that the Defendants personally participated in any alleged constitutional violation.^[1] The Defendants also have invoked the defense of qualified immunity.^[2]

Bell has alleged that she was sexually harassed and assaulted by Pollen while she was a pre-trial detainee. Bell's claims against Valenza and Brazier in counts I and II are attempts to hold them liable for their own deliberate indifference to her safety and to her medical needs. The Court will address each of these in turn, but begins with the deliberate indifference to safety claim in count II.

1. Deliberate Indifference to Safety

The Eleventh Circuit has given guidance to district courts on how to evaluate a claim of deliberate indifference to safety by a pretrial detainee in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2013). In Franklin, a pretrial detainee alleged that she had been sexually assaulted by a jail guard, she complained about the assault, an investigation was made, and that the same guard had assaulted other jail detainees previously. Id. at 1248. In reversing the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss, the court instructed that the district court first should have identified the precise constitutional violation alleged-deliberate indifference-and then should have applied the correct standard-a subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm, disregard of that risk, and conduct that is more than gross negligence. Id. at 1250. Then, the court explained, the district court should have disregarded conclusory allegations in the complaint and examined the well-pleaded facts. Id. at 1251. Applying this framework, the court found insufficient allegations of fact to support a claim of deliberate indifference because the plaintiff alleged that shortly after she reported the assault, an investigation commenced. Id. at 1252.

In this case, Bell has advanced two theories for her deliberate indifference to safety claim: one, that Pollen engaged in widespread abuse so that Valenza and Brazier knew of Pollen's actions, but no action was taken; and two, that Bell complained about Pollen's sexual harassment and assault to jail officials, but no action was taken. The motion to dismiss only has addressed the first theory. The Defendants have argued that Bell has failed to provide factual allegations of Valenza and Brazier's knowledge of any widespread abuse and instead has relied improperly on conclusory allegations. They argue that Bell's general allegations are not the type of facts of widespread abuse that can establish liability.

The Court agrees that Bell's allegations are not sufficient to plead widespread abuse. In her brief, she points to an allegation that “Pollen then told the Plaintiff stories about how many female inmates will ‘flash' him or ‘start doing sexual stuff' when he looks into their cells to check in on them and doesn't complain .” (Doc. 38 para. 26). In her...