Ben-Yisrayl v. Wilson

CHIJIOKE BOMANI BEN-YISRAYL, Petitioner, v. BILL WILSON, Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-661-TWP-MJD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

September 18, 2015

ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Chijioke Bomani Ben-Yisrayl ("Ben-Yisrayl"). (Filing No. 1). In 1984 Ben-Yisrayl was convicted of murder and other serious felonies, following a jury trial in an Indiana state court. He is currently serving an aggregate one-hundred-and-fifty year sentence for these crimes. The Court stayed this action for two years pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005)¹, so that Ben-Yisrayl could complete his post-conviction proceedings in the state courts. Following numerous state court proceedings, Ben-Yisrayl's petition is now ripe for decision and the stay has been terminated.

For the reasons explained in this Entry, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Following a jury trial, Ben-Yisrayl was found guilty of murder, rape, burglary, and criminal confinement. The trial court sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentence were upheld by the Indiana Supreme Court. See Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. 1992) ("Ben-Yisrayl I"). Following this, the denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court in all respects except that Ben-Yisrayl's death sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding. See Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. 2000) ("Ben-Yisrayl II").² On remand, the trial court held that Indiana's death penalty statute was unconstitutional, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed that decision in State v. Ben-Yisrayl, 809 N.E.2d 309 (Ind. 2004) ("Ben-Yisrayl III").

The State subsequently dismissed its request for the death penalty. Ben-Yisrayl was sentenced, but that sentence was partially reversed by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ("Ben-Yisrayl IV"). Upon remand he received an aggregate one-hundred-and-fifty-year sentence. The sentence was upheld by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 939 N.E.2d 130, 2010 WL 5135369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ("Ben-Yisrayl V"), and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer on February 17, 2011.

On September 20, 2011, Ben-Yisrayl filed a successive post-conviction petition in the state trial court, asserting claims not previously raised. That petition remained pending on May 16, 2012, when Ben-Yisrayl filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court. He moved to stay the instant case pursuant to Rhines 544 U.S. 269 (2005) so that he could attempt toexhaust the claims raised in his successive post-conviction petition. The Court granted his motion to stay, and, as noted, the case was stayed for approximately two years while Ben-Yisrayl completed his state court proceedings.

Ben-Yisrayl filed his application for authorization to file a successive post-conviction petition with the Indiana Court of Appeals on November 1, 2013. On January 10, 2014, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Ben-Yisrayl failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that he is entitled to post-conviction relief and therefore declined to authorize the filing of a successive post-conviction petition. His pending post-conviction petition was thereupon dismissed by the trial court. On April 23, 2015, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Ben-Yisrayl's petition to transfer the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision dismissing his appeal of his successive post-conviction petition. This was the conclusion of proceedings in state court and opened the door for development of the pending habeas petition in this Court. Briefing closed for this action on September 3, 2015.

B. Factual Background

The factual background supporting Ben-Yisrayl's convictions was summarized by the Indiana Supreme Court in Ben-Yisrayl I as follows:

The defendant was acquainted with the victim's former roommate and had visited the victim's residence on many occasions during the summer of 1983. The defendant told the roommate several times of his sexual interest in the victim. About 7:00 p.m. on April 2, 1984, the defendant knocked on the door of the victim's neighbors, asking them whether the victim lived there, and was told that that she did not. The defendant then left. Sometime after 9:00 p.m., the victim arrived home and telephoned her brother. She told him that someone had broken into her residence through a back window and had removed all the light bulbs. The victim believed that the intruder might still be present. Her brother told her to leave immediately, and assumed that she would come to his residence. When she failed to arrive as he expected, he reported the incident to the police. The responding officer did not find the victim at her residence, but found a broken window. Later investigations discovered the keys to her new car on the porch and the missing light bulbs in a waste paper basket.

On April 4, a police officer found the gagged and substantially disrobed body of the victim at the top of a ramp under a bridge near her residence. An autopsy revealed chipped teeth; broken fingernails; abrasions on the hands, chin, and knees; multiple bruises to the lips and gums; and 113 stab or puncture wounds. The stab wounds were caused by two different knives. The victim's neck evidenced manual strangulation. Seminal fluid was found in her vaginal cavity. The cause of her death was determined to be multiple stab wounds to the chest and abdomen.

The defendant told police investigators that he broke the back window of the victim's home, entered it, unscrewed the light bulbs, waited, and hid behind a door when she returned home and made a phone call. When she walked towards the door, he got behind her. With the victim's hands tied in front of her, he took her to nearby railroad tracks, under a bridge, and up a slope. At some point he gagged her. The defendant told police that he stabbed her. He described the disposal of the knife, and took police to the creek where he had dropped it while trying to wash it off. Two knives were discovered at this location. One was the victim's pastry knife and the other was a chef's knife from the victim's kitchen knife set. The defendant also admitted taking the victim's watch and later selling it.

Serological analysis of blood and seminal fluid obtained from the victim indicated characteristics representing less than one percent of the general population. The defendant's blood test results placed him within this category.

Ben-Yisrayl I, 598 N.E.2d at 1045.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996). Ben-Yisrayl filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). His petition, therefore, is subject to AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). As discussed further below, the two remaining claims from Ben-Yisrayl's habeas petitions were not adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, and thus they are subject to de novo review. See Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248, 263 (7th Cir. 2015) ("If no state court has squarely addressed the merits of a habeas claim, [the Court] review[s] the claim de novo under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243.").

In addition to the foregoing substantive standard, "federal courts will not review a habeas petition unless the prisoner has fairly presented his claims 'throughout at least one complete round of state-court review, whether on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings.'" Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 268 (7th Cir. 2014), and citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)); see also Anderson v. Benik, 471 F.3d 811, 814-15 (7th Cir. 2006) ("To avoid procedural default, a habeas petitioner must fully and fairly present his federal claims to the state courts.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Thomas v. McCaughtry, 201 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 2000) ("A state prisoner ... may obtain federal habeas review of his claim only if he has exhausted his state remedies and avoided procedurally defaulting his claim.").

Insofar as pertinent here, procedural default "occurs when a claim could have been but was not presented to the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court reviews the habeas petition, be presented to the state court." Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992). A federal claim is not fairly presented unless the petitioner "put[s] forward operative facts and controlling legal principles." Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "A federal court may excuse a procedural default if the habeas petitioner establishes that (1) there was good cause for the default and consequent prejudice, or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the defaulted claim is not heard." Johnson, 786 F.3d at 505.

III. DISCUSSION

Ben-Yisrayl raises six claims in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, four of which, as discussed further below, he subsequently abandoned. The Court first discusses the briefing of Ben-Yisrayl's habeas petition before addressing the two remaining grounds for habeas relief inturn.

A. Briefing the Habeas Petition

When the Court terminated the stay and ordered the respondent to show cause why the relief requested in Ben-Yisrayl's habeas petition should not be granted, the Court had informed the parties that it did not...