Benavidez v. New Mexico

ERNESTO J. BENAVIDEZ, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, GOVERNOR MICHELLE GRISHAM, BERNALILLO COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, GUADALUPE COUNTY CORRECTIONS, and WEXFORD MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, Defendants.

No. CV 21-00351 MIS/CG

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

March 15, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARGARET STRICKLAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the Complaint (Tort) (Doc. 1-1) filed by Plaintiff Ernesto Benavidez in the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of New Mexico, County of Guadalupe and removed to this Court on April 16, 2021, by Defendant Guadalupe County Corrections. The Court will dismiss all federal claims based on immunity and failure to state a claim for relief, will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims, and will remand the state law claims back to the Fourth Judicial District Court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Ernesto Benavidez filed his Complaint (Tort) in the State of New Mexico, County of Guadalupe, Fourth Judicial District Court on September 1, 2020. (Doc. 1-1 at 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for damages based on the failure of Defendants to release him from prison and allowing him to be exposed to the “Global Contagion COVID-19.” (Doc. 1-1 at 1, 5, 18). Plaintiff Benavidez sets out five counts in his Complaint:

1. “Count 1: Cruel and Unhumane” (Doc. 1-1 at 10);

2. “Count 2: Fourteenth Amend Equal Protection and Procedural Due Process (culpability)” (Doc. 1-1 at 11);

3. “Count 3: Medical Negligence” (Doc. 1-1 at 13);

4. “Count 4: Governmental Equal Protection” (Doc. 1-1 at 14);

5. “Count 5: Negligence and (Government Access to Court)” (Doc. 1-1 at 17).

He names, as Defendants, the State of New Mexico, Governor Michelle Grisham, Bernalillo County District Attorney, New Mexico Corrections Department, Guadalupe County Corrections, Wexford Medical Department, Assistant District Attorney Jerry W. Treich, Department of Corrections officials Eric Harrison and Gary Maciel, Warden Vincent Horton, Office of Senior Program Specialist Melissa Gonzales, Deputy Warden Mr. Peterson, and Medical Administrator Ms. Selena. (Doc. 1-1 at 1-3). Plaintiff Benavidez claims that the precautions taken at the Guadalupe County Corrections facility were inadequate to protect him and other inmates from exposure to COVID-19. He contends the Governor should have used her pardon powers to release him and other inmates from incarceration. (Doc. 1-1 at 5). He also claims that officials of the Department of Corrections conspired with the Second Judicial District, Bernalillo County District Attorney's Office, and Senior Program Specialist Gonzales to falsify COVID test results and used the false results to prevent prisoners from obtaining habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 1 at 5). He asks the Court to grant him:

“1) Compensatory Damages in an as yet undetermined amount, jointly and severally against all Defendants, including damages for attorneys fees and emotional harm, suffered damages including but not limited to, physical injuries, pain and suffering and severe psychological and emotional distress in the amount sum in trial loss of chance by circumvention to a judicial proceeding for the safety and freedom of plaintiff 2) such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper including monetary injunction relief if determined.”

(Doc. 1-1 at 18).

II. The Law Regarding Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Plaintiff Benavidez is proceeding pro se. The Court has the discretion to dismiss an pro se complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under either 28 U.S.C. § 1915A or Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under § 1915A, whenever a prisoner brings a civil action against government officials, the Court is obligated to screen the prisoner's complaint or petition. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A states:

“The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”

. . .

On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b).

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations, but not conclusory, unsupported allegations, and may not consider matters outside the pleading. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10^th Cir. 1989). The court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if “it is ‘patently obvious' that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting McKinney v. Oklahoma Dep't of Human Services, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A plaintiff must “nudge” claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Id. In doing so, the plaintiff must furnish factual “allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1966. A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 863 (10^th Cir. 2009).

Where the complaint pleads only facts that do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, it has not shown that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). In the end, a plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. In assessing whether plaintiff has met this burden, the court need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. In sum, a plaintiff must allege enough factual matter, that, taken as true, suggests the legal conclusions that plaintiff asserts. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. A claim should be dismissed where it is legally or factually insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court liberally construes the factual allegations. See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992).

However, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are judged by the same legal standards that apply to all litigants and a pro se plaintiff must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10^th Cir. 1994). The court is not obligated to craft legal theories for the plaintiff or to supply factual allegations to support the plaintiff's claims. Nor may the court assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110.

III. Analysis of Plaintiff Benavidez's Claims

A. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Section 1983 is the exclusive vehicle for vindication of substantive rights under the U.S. Constitution. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; rather it is the means through which a plaintiff may seek redress for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution); Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129 (10^th Cir. 2006). Section 1983 provides:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . .subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must assert acts by government officials acting under color of law that result in a deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).^[1] There must be a connection between official conduct and violation of a constitutional right. Conduct that is not connected to a constitutional violation is not actionable under Section 1983. See Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10^th Cir. 2006).

Further a civil rights action against a public official or entity may not be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior liability for the actions of co-workers or subordinates. A plaintiff must plead that each government official, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff must allege some personal involvement by an identified official in the alleged constitutional violation to succeed under § 1983. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10^th Cir. 2008). In a Section 1983 action, it is particularly important that a plaintiff's complaint “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claim against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10^th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in the original). Nor do generalized statements that defendants...