Benedict Genco v. Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist.

BENEDICT GENCO, Plaintiff, v. STARPOINT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

13-CV-301S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 8, 2015

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Benedict Genco commenced this action in March 2013 alleging that his employer, Defendant Starpoint Central School District, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Executive Law § 290 et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the Complaint. For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds the matter fully briefed and oral argument unnecessary, and concludes that Defendant's motion should be granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Although the initial date Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant is disputed, the parties agree that Plaintiff was granted a probationary appointment as a custodian on in August 2003 which was made permanent in October 2003. (Def's Stmt ¶ 36; Pl's Stmt ¶ 36.) At that time, Plaintiff, who had been diagnosed as having a form of cerebral palsy at age five, did not request any type of work accommodation. (Def's Stmt ¶¶ 42, 132; Pl'sStmt ¶ 132; Compl ¶ 11.) He alleges that, as a result of his condition, he has "an obvious disability which causes him to walk with a noticeable limp. (Pl's Stmt ¶ 42 (citing Compl ¶¶ 11-17).) As a result, a coworker named Donna Kolek made approximately six harassing comments starting in 2009 or 2010 about the way he walked. (Pl's Dep at 17-22, 27-28, Docket No. 27-2 at 14-19, 24-25.)

In August 2011, Plaintiff became aware that his custodial duties were going to change and he would be required to work not just in one building, as he had done previously, but in four different buildings. (Compl ¶¶ 33-37.) Plaintiff alleges that, prior to the change, he informed his union president that he had a disability and could not perform this heavier workload, and also complained about the resulting pain to his supervisor after performing the new duties. (Compl ¶¶ 33, 38, 42.) Plaintiff claims he was injured in September 2011 because of the increased workload and need to walk long distances, for which he received workers compensation benefits. (Def's Stmt ¶ 44; Pl's Stmt ¶ 44.)

Although Plaintiff returned to work on October 3, 2011, he was placed on administrative leave from October 6, 2011 to November 29, 2011, following a dispute with Kolek. (Def's Stmt ¶ 47; Pl's Stmt ¶ 47.) When he again returned to work, his workload was reduced, (Compl ¶¶ 63, 67; Defs Stmt ¶¶ 152-53; Pls Stmt 152-53), and he made no further complaints or inquiries to Defendant prior to March 26, 2012, when he took sick leave. (Def's Stmt ¶¶ 163-165; Pl's Stmt ¶ 163-165; Andrews Decl ¶ 20, Docket No. 27-9.) Plaintiff utilized a combination of sick leave, vacation time, and an unpaid leave of absence before returning to work in November 2012. (Andrews Decl ¶¶ 20-24.)

Plaintiff filed a written request for an accommodation with Defendant on or about June 13, 2012, again requesting a modification of his duties to reduce the amount ofwalking required of him. (Def's Stmt ¶ 171, 173; Pl's Stmt ¶ 173; Compl ¶ 88.) Following an examination of Plaintiff by a physician chosen by Defendant, the accommodation was granted and in place by the time Plaintiff returned to work in November. (Defs Stmt ¶¶ 175-186; Pls Stmt 175-186.)

Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of disability. (See Def's Stmt Ex E, Docket No. 27-3 at 86 (notice of charge dated August 7, 2012).) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and was improperly denied an accommodation with respect to his "job duties which became effective on September 5, 2011." (Id.) The EEOC was unable to conclude that Defendant had violated federal law, and issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter on January 3, 2013. (Def's Stmt Ex U, Docket No. 27-4 at 76-79.) Plaintiff commenced the instant action on March 22, 2013, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for Defendant's alleged: (1) discrimination based on disability in violation of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and NYSHRL; (2) retaliation in violation of these same statutes; (3) discrimination by way of a hostile work environment in violation of these statutes; and (4) deprivation of Plaintiff's due process rights under the state and federal constitutions.

III. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate, even in a discrimination case, where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law." Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.242, 249-250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000), cert denied 540 U.S. 811 (2003). A court's function on a summary judgment motion "is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists." Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545. "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 41 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Further, a court must "construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff concedes at the outset that punitive damages are not available against the Defendant school district, (Pl's Mem in Opp'n at 10; Def's Mem of Law at 4), and does not object to the dismissal of his due process claim. (Pl's Mem in Opp'n at 26.) Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the remainder of Plaintiff's claims as well, and this Court agrees.

A. Plaintiff's NYSHRL Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") must be dismissed because: (1) the Defendant school district is not an "education corporation" within the meaning of New York Executive Law § 296(4); and (2) Plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim as required by New York Education Law § 3813. (Def's Mem of Law at 4-5.)

Initially, the parties' discussion of whether Defendant is or is not an educationcorporation within the meaning of § 296(4) is irrelevant to the present action. That subsection applies to actions by or on behalf of students against "an education corporation or association which holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation pursuant to the provisions of article four of the real property tax law." N.Y. Executive Law § 296(4); see North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 19 N.Y.3d 481, 495, 973 N.E.2d 162, 168-169 (2012) (state division of human rights lacked jurisdiction to investigation complaints filed by students because public school district was not an education corporation under subsection four); Preston v. Hilton Cent. School Dist., 876 F. Supp. 2d 235, 245 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing discrimination claim made on behalf of a student under § 296(4) because school district was not an education corporation). In contrast, here Plaintiff is asserting an employment discrimination claim under § 296(1), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment, or to retaliate against an employee for opposing any such discrimination. See generally Tidball v. Schenectady City School Dist., 122 A.D.3d 1131, 1132, 997 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y.A.D. 3d Dep't 2014) (discussing employment discrimination claim against school district under § 296(1)(a)).

The notice of claim requirement found in New York Education Law § 3813(1), however, is applicable in this case. "A claimant seeking to commence an action against a school district for violations of the Human Rights Law must serve a notice of claim on the district within three months after accrual of the claim." Munro v. Ossining Union Free School Dist., 55 A.D.3d 697, 698, 866 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dep't 2008) (citingEducation Law § 3813(1)¹); see Cavanaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 296 A.D.2d 369, 745 N.Y.S.2d 433 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dep't 2002) (timely notice of claim is a condition precedent to suit). "[T]he purpose of section 3813 of the Education Law is to give a school district prompt notice of claims so that investigation may be made before it is too late for investigation to be efficient." Parochial Bus Systems, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 539, 547, 458 N.E.2d 1241 (1983). "The essential elements to be included in the notice are the nature of the claim, the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose." Id. Accordingly, the failure to present a claim within the statutory time limitation is a fatal defect. Id.

Plaintiff concedes that "he did not submit a notice of claim to the Board of Education as required." (Pl's Mem in Opp'n at 12.) He nonetheless argues that his EEOC complaint constituted sufficient notice for the purpose of § 3813. "A paper which is not denominated a notice of claim may satisfy that requirement if it provides the necessary information as to the nature of the claim, the time when, the place where, and the manner in which the claim arose." Mennella v. Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 287 A.D.2d 636, 636, 732 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dep't 2001), lv denied, 98 N.Y.2d (2002) (petition to Commissioner of Education can constitute functional equivalent of statutorily...